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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In Australia, birth is recognised in all jurisdictions as the time when a human being 
becomes a legal person with legal rights.1 In the prenatal period, the legal situation is 
less clear. Lacking a legal personality, the fetus cannot be the victim of a crime, yet 
its destruction may be recognised as unlawful in certain circumstances, in some 
jurisdictions. The way in which Australian law punishes or condones destruction of 
the fetus is the subject of this thesis. The aims of this thesis are to consider how the 
Australian law characterises the fetus and to ascertain whether there is a consistent 
position on when it is lawful to destroy a fetus.  
Specifically, this thesis reviews destruction of the fetus in four contexts chosen for 
their contrasting perspectives on the fetus; Firstly, third party assaults against the 
pregnant woman, where the fetus is a separate entity wanted by its mother and 
unjustly destroyed; Secondly, maternal duty of care to the unborn child, where the 
mother’s autonomy to behave as she wishes is in conflict with the well being of the 
fetus; Thirdly, abortion, where the mother intentionally wishes to destroy the fetus; 
and Fourthly, conscientious objection by doctors to performing lawful abortion, where 
the doctor requires the law to acknowledge their belief about the value of the fetus 
even though it may conflict with how the law values the fetus.  
This thesis predominantly presents a doctrinal analysis of the legislation and case 
law in Australia in these four areas. The central thesis of this work is that ‘The legal 
status of prenatal life in Australia is relative.’ This thesis will demonstrate that in 
Australian law, the legal status of the fetus is flexible and subject to change, with the 
context of fetal destruction as well as factors intrinsic to the fetus, relevant to 
determining the issue. This thesis demonstrates that there is a disparate approach 
between the jurisdictions as to what factors are consistently relevant in deciding this 
issue.  
                                                
1 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 20; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 10; Criminal Code)1899 (Qld) s 292; Criminal Code 
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 269; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) ss 1C sc1(2)(a)-(c); R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338, 
339.  
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It concludes that laws affecting destruction of the fetus in Australia, although valid, 
are weak because of the law’s inability to commit to a position on what the fetus is 
and to carry that through in all scenarios that involve its destruction. The destruction 
of human life is a moral issue as well as a legal issue. As life is a continuum, laws 
regulating destruction of prenatal life can impact society’s views about human life 
generally. It is arguable, therefore, that these laws should enunciate clear principles. 
The natural law theory argues that we can know objective truths through the use of 
reason via a set of basic, unchanging practical principles and a set of general moral 
standards.2 Accordingly, natural laws should sit neatly together, because the 
soundness of law is said to derive from unchanging principles.3  
Positive law would appear to underpin Australian laws on destruction of the fetus. 
According to Hart, as nobody can know objective truths or morals, so long as the 
lawmaker has the authority to make the law, the law need not necessarily reflect 
morality or justice. 4 As a consequence of this position, positive law may be changed 
without reference to notions of what is right or what is moral.5  
Accordingly, awkward contradictions that arise from the fetus having a relative status 
in law do not make the law invalid. However even with positive law, Kelsen notes it 
must still be able to demonstrate an ethical minimum to achieve a measure of justice 
as well as respect in the community.6 Additionally, Fuller notes that ‘good’ law needs 
to display, amongst other things, consistency and generality in application.7 By its 
critique of the legal status of prenatal life in Australia, this thesis will demonstrate that 
Australian laws affecting the destruction of prenatal life present a confused picture of 
the value of the fetus and when and why it may be destroyed. This calls into question 
whether changes should be made to achieve ‘good’ law. Weak laws with unclear 
principles as to when and why destruction of the fetus is unlawful may have a 
broader impact on other laws dealing with life and death issues. This is particularly so 
in quality of life versus sanctity of life arguments that arise in end of life decisions.  
                                                
2 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 23.  
3 Finnis, above n 2, 351.  
4 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 185-6.  
5 Ibid. 
6 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1994) 22.  
7 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964) 48, 63.  
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This thesis has several limitations. Firstly, although the term ‘prenatal life’ is used 
throughout this thesis, it does not address the issue of human embryos created 
outside the woman’s body through assisted reproductive technologies. Secondly, this 
thesis deals only with the domestic laws of Australia. Where there is an absence of 
legislation or case law on point in Australia, this thesis looks to the way in which 
comparable international jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom, Canada or the 
United States of America have considered and responded to a particular issue.  
Thirdly, this thesis will draw on only a small, but key, portion of the voluminous 
scholarly writing on abortion and a woman’s bodily autonomy. It is not the intention of 
this thesis to explore the morality of abortion and human rights law but rather to 
highlight the main arguments on both sides of the debate and to analyse how they 
have been applied, if at all, in the legislation and case law of Australia. 
The terminology used in debates about the legal status of prenatal life can be divisive 
and emotive. Criminal legislation in Australia generally uses two terms, unborn child 
and fetus. Neither of the terms is defined in the legislation. In this thesis, terms such 
as prenatal life, unborn child, fetus, embryo, pregnant woman and mother, will be 
used interchangeably, as determined to be most appropriate to the context or as 
used in the legislation, articles, commentary and other materials being discussed. It 
is not intended to give legal content to the word.  
A brief outline of the main Chapters now follows.  
Chapter Two discusses the ongoing application of the born alive rule in Australia, 
where the fetus is denied legal personhood.8 It critiques the Australian law’s current 
solution of characterising the pregnant woman and the fetus as a single entity, in 
order to meet the community’s expectations that a third party who destroys a fetus 
should be guilty of a crime precisely because a fetus was destroyed.9 It contrasts this 
with the existence of child destruction offences, which recognise the fetus about to be 
born or capable of being born alive as a separate entity.10 The conflict between child 
                                                
8 Above, n 1.  
9 See Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 4, 42; R v King (2003) 59 NSWLR 472; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 43, 48A; 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 15; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 184A. 
10 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); Criminal Code 1988 (NT) s 170; Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) 
s 290; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43.  
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destruction offences and late term abortion is flagged here and discussed further in 
Chapters Four to Seven, which deal with abortion law.  
Chapter Three analyses the conflict between the developing notion of a maternal 
duty of care to the unborn child and its clash with maternal bodily autonomy. It 
considers the approaches in literature to perceiving pregnancy in the law and 
practical examples from overseas cases where the courts have been asked to 
constrain the actions of the pregnant woman for the benefit of the fetus.  
Chapter Four considers the regulation of abortion law in New South Wales and 
Queensland where a pregnant woman may still be charged with procuring an 
unlawful abortion.11 The laws in these States have been interpreted in case law to not 
expressly reference any characteristics of the fetus as relevant to determining the 
lawfulness of abortion.12 Accordingly, late term abortions may well be lawful, however 
a lawful abortion still requires legal oversight that goes beyond that for a standard 
medical procedure. This is recognised by the requirement that doctors hold an 
honest belief that the abortion is a proportionate response to concerns about the 
pregnant woman’s life or health.13  
It is not clear whether the doctor may take into account the value of the fetus in 
assessing the appropriateness of abortion. The focus on maternal health in New 
South Wales supports the single entity characterisation of the woman and the fetus. 
This is consistent with its criminal laws. However Queensland’s retention of child 
destruction laws, with severe penalties for harming the unborn child at any time 
prenatally, create a potential conflict with late term abortion.14 With little guidance in 
the legislation and case law as to what maternal circumstances are serious enough 
to warrant abortion, consistent and predictable legal outcomes in these States cannot 
be guaranteed, hence the call for abortion law reform.15 
                                                
11 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 82; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 25.  
12 See R v Wald (1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25 (’Wald’); R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8 (‘Bayliss’). 
13  See Wald (1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25, 29; Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 45. 
14 Heather A. Douglas, ‘Abortion Reform: A State Crime of a Woman’s Right to Choose?’ (2009) 33(2) Criminal 
Law Journal 74, 86.  
15  Lachlan de Crespigny and Julian Savulescu, ‘Abortion: Time to Clarify Australia’s Confusing Laws’ (2004) 
181(4) Medical Journal of Australia 201, 203; Heather A. Douglas, ‘Abortion Reform: A State Crime of a Woman’s 
Right to Choose?’ (2009) 33(2) Criminal Law Journal 74, 86; Caroline De Costa, Heather Douglas and Kristen 
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Chapter Five considers the relevance of the gestational age of the fetus to abortion 
law and considers the approach used in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. Unlike New South Wales and Queensland abortion law, in Western 
Australia, the Northern Territory and South Australia, the fetus is formally recognised, 
specifically through its gestational age, which is measured and given value in the law.  
However in these jurisdictions, there is no agreement as to what gestational age is 
relevant to when abortion is lawful.16 Additionally, serious concerns for maternal 
health held by medical professionals will override the fetus’ right to protection.17 
Using fetal characteristics as a basis to consider the lawfulness of abortion may clash 
with child destruction laws in Western Australia and the Northern Territory, given 
abortion may be lawful at 20 and 23 weeks respectively, subject to certain 
conditions.18  
Using gestational age as a basis for valuing the fetus creates a sub category 
between fetuses. Chapter Six considers the inclusion of another fetal characteristic, 
the presence or risk of serious disability in the fetus as a basis for lawful abortion in 
Western Australia,19 the Northern Territory,20 and South Australia.21 As a standalone 
criterion, it takes the emphasis away from abortion being about women and their 
bodily autonomy and makes a statement about the attribute of disability.  
This Chapter considers judicial decisions in other areas of medical law to see 
whether quality of life, as opposed to sanctity of life, is a standard position in 
Australian law.  As with maternal health concerns, the decision as to whether the 
fetus’ disability or risk of disability is serious enough to satisfy the legal requirements 
for its lawful destruction is left to the individual judgment of medical practitioners, 
                                                                                                                                                   
Black, ‘Making it Legal: Abortion Providers’ Knowledge and Use of Abortion Law in New South Wales and 
Queensland’ (2013) 53 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 184,189.   
16 Health Act 1911 (WA) ss 334(3),(7)(a); Medical Services Act (NT), ss 11(1), 11(3); Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 (SA) ss 82A(1)(a)(i), (7), (8). 
17  Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7)(a); Medical Services Act (NT) ss 11(3)(a)(i)(ii), (4)(a); Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 82A(7).  
18 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7); Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(3). 
19  Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7)(a).  
20  Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(1)(a)(ii).  
21 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(1)(a)(ii). 
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subject to further judicial review.22 Hence, consistent outcomes cannot be 
guaranteed.  
Chapter Seven considers abortion on demand, where any concern for destruction of 
the fetus is notably absent. The fetus need only be unwanted by the pregnant 
woman. It reviews the laws in Tasmania and Victoria, where there is abortion on 
demand up to 16 weeks gestation in Tasmania23 and 24 weeks gestation in 
Victoria.24 It considers the practical effects of this legislation on the emerging and 
controversial practice of social sex selection abortion, where a woman seeks abortion 
because she does not wish to give birth to a child of a particular gender.25  
The maternal health requirements in these States where abortion is requested after 
the gestational time limit expires, says something about the value of the mature fetus 
and presents a restraining hand on abortion on demand up to birth.26 This Chapter 
also covers the law in the Australian Capital Territory, where doctors are the gate 
keepers of abortion due to lack of guidance from the lawmaker about when and in 
what circumstances abortion may be performed.27 
Chapter Eight discusses the extent of legal recognition of conscientious objection by 
doctors to performing or participating in abortion in Australia. It considers statutory 
duties in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia, where doctors are compelled to 
perform an abortion in an emergency where it is considered necessary to preserve 
the life of the mother,28 or prevent serious physical injury29 or mental health injury to 
the mother,30 regardless of conscientious objection. It also considers the statutory 
                                                
22 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(5); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(1)(a); Medical Services Act 
(NT) s 11(2).  
23 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 4. 
24 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 4. 
25 See especially National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (2007) 53 http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/ Guidelines and 
Publications> 
26 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic), s 5; Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 5.  
27 Health Act 1993 (ACT) ss 81-83.   
28 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8(3). 
29 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 6(3). 
30 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 82A(5)-(6).  
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duty in Victoria and Tasmania on doctors who conscientiously object to abortion to 
refer the pregnant woman on to another doctor so she may obtain an abortion.31  
The tension between perceiving destruction of the fetus from the perspective of the 
fetus, and perceiving it as merely a woman’s health issue and nothing more 
culminates in the recognition of conscientious objection by doctors to participating in 
abortion. A doctor’s alternative views on abortion and the value of the fetus are 
relevant to the discussion so long as the State will allow the doctor to act on those 
views. 
As there is no Australian case law that assists with interpreting the practical extent of 
these provisions, this thesis considers relevant overseas case law involving health 
care professionals and conscientious objection to abortion. This issue of restricting 
the application of conscientious objection raises the question of whether these laws, 
validly made, are unjust (in the broad understanding of that term). This is a highly 
political area of rights discourse and an emerging area of conflict in the law.32  
As this thesis will demonstrate, recent law reforms have focussed on increasing 
access to abortion and repealing child destruction laws.33 Continuing agitation for 
further law reform is made on the basis that nationally consistent abortion laws will 
provide certainty to the medical profession about when abortion is lawful, 
characterise abortion as a standard medical procedure, and affirm the primacy of a 
woman’s bodily autonomy over consideration of the fetus as human life of equal 
value.34  
 
                                                
31 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8(1); Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 
7(2).  
32 See, eg, Ronli Sifris, ‘Tasmania’s Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013: An Analysis of 
Conscientious Objection to Abortion and the “Obligation to Refer”’ (2015) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 900, 
910; Mike Davis, ‘Conscientious Objection to Abortion – An Ethical and Professional Balancing Act’ [2014] 
Australian Health Law Bulletin 36, 38; Anne O’Rourke, Lachlan de Crespigny and Amanda Pyman, ‘Abortion and 
Conscientious Objection: The New Battleground; (2012) 38(3) Monash University Law Review 87, 118; Erin 
Whitcomb, ‘A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection to 
Elective Abortion’ (2010) 24(4) Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 771, 808-9. 
33 See, eg, Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic); Criminal Code (Medical Treatment) Amendment Act 2009 (Qld); 
Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas).   
34 See, eg, De Costa, Douglas and Black, above n 15, 189; Douglas, above n 14, 86; De Crespigny and 
Savulescu, above n 15, 203.  
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This reform agenda may be in conflict with not only doctors who refuse to perform or 
participate in abortion because of strong, personal or religious beliefs about the fetus, 
but also with advances in scientific knowledge that may challenge the notion of 
personhood or viability of the fetus at certain gestational ages.35 How to balance 
these conflicting interests and create good law that is consistent, respected by the 
community and reflective of its ethical minimum is indeed a challenge for the 
lawmaker. Ultimately, it is a good indicator of whether the lawmaker wishes to 
accommodate conflicting views on the value of the fetus or whether it will simply 
impose its view on the community.  
Accordingly, research into the legal status of prenatal life remains a topical area. This 
thesis makes a contribution to existing research into the law by comparing and 
contrasting Australian laws current as at 2015 from the four conflicting perspectives 
of third party assaults against the fetus, maternal duty of care to the fetus, abortion 
and conscientious objection by doctors to performing abortion. The inconsistencies in 
the law due to the fetus having a relative status, confirms the difficulty in creating a 
national framework on the legal status of the fetus, without law reform.36 This thesis 
concludes with some suggested amendments to create more consistency in the law, 
but ultimately notes that even with such changes, positive laws affecting the 
destruction of prenatal life in Australia will remain confusing where there is no 
agreement on what the fetus is and why it is right or wrong to destroy it.  
                                                
35 See, eg, Talat Uppal et al, ‘The Legal Status of the Fetus in New South Wales’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 178, 183; Kristen Savell, ‘Life and Death Before Birth: 4D Ultrasound and the Shifting Frontiers of the 
Abortion Debate’ (2006) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 103, 109. 
36 See, Caroline De Costa et al, ‘Abortion Law Across Australia – A Review of Nine Jurisdictions’ (2015) 55 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 105, 109. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THIRD PARTY CRIMES AGAINST PREGNANT WOMEN 
2.1 Introduction 
In Australia, a person has no legal rights and is not considered to be a legal person 
until they are born.1 Years ago, stillbirth and miscarriage were common occurrences 
and there was an inability to determine conclusively whether an unborn child was 
alive within the womb and whether it might survive after birth.2 With advances in 
science, this difficulty no longer exists. Technology such as 3D and 4D ultrasound, 
and investigations such as fetal heart rate monitoring, can confirm the health and 
viability of the child in the womb and possibly even suggest sentience in the unborn 
child and its capacity to feel pain.3   
Despite this knowledge, in Australia we maintain what is known as the ‘born alive 
rule’ so that being born alive is the accepted point at which the law considers that a 
crime may be committed against a person,4 with murder only capable of being 
committed on a person who is in being.5 However, the reality that a person exists 
whilst in the womb, regardless of their legal status, is recognised in all jurisdictions. 
Within Australia, prenatal life is legislatively referred to in five ways with the terms ‘a 
child’,6 ‘an unborn child’,7 ‘a ‘fetus’,8 a child capable of being born alive’,9 and by a 
woman being ‘not more than [X] weeks pregnant’.10  The last two terms differentiate 
the fetus by its age and as will be seen, is a key factor in a number of offences that 
involve destruction of the fetus.  
                                                
1 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 20; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 10; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 292; Criminal Code 
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 269; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) ss 1C scl (2)(a)-(c); R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338, 
339.  
2 See, eg R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278 [31]-[32]; Kristen Savell, ‘Is the Born Alive Rule Outdated and 
Indefensible?’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 631.  
3 Kristen, Savell, ‘Life and Death Before Birth: 4D Ultrasound and the Shifting Frontiers of the Abortion Debate’ 
(2006) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 103, 109.  
4 R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278, 284.  
5 R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338, 339 (per Barry J).   
6 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 42; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(7); Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 
294. 
7 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7)(a); Criminal Code (Medical Treatment) Amendment Act 2009 (Qld) s 224; 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 282, 313.  
8 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 4; Crime Act 1958 (Vic) s 15. 
9 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(8). 
10 Medical Services Act (NT) ss 11(1)(a), 11(3)(a)(i), 11(3)(b); Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) ss 4-5; 
Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas), ss 4-5.   
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Robert notes that the complexity of pregnancy has long presented a challenge to the 
legal system’s notion of a unitary legal subject that underpins common law tradition.11 
The three primary schools of thought regarding how the law ought to deal with this 
unique relationship are that the pregnant woman and the unborn child are the same 
entity; that they are separate entities; or that the fetus is made up of not just its 
biological, physical characteristics, but also extrinsic relational factors.12  
Graycar and Morgan observe that a third party assault on a pregnant woman causes 
more ethical concern than abortion because it involves the senseless destruction of 
human life, where its loss is grieved.13 This thesis agrees that community 
expectations demand justice for the destruction of wanted prenatal life, but does this 
reflect indignation for the lack of maternal consent or concern for the inherent dignity 
of the fetus? As this Chapter will show, all these schools of thought regarding how to 
characterise the fetus are displayed in criminal laws dealing with third party actions 
that destroy the fetus.  
The focus of this Chapter is an analysis of laws that criminalise destruction of the 
fetus by third parties including the born alive rule; child destruction offences; and third 
party assaults to the fetus leading to harm in the womb that may or may not result in 
a live birth. It demonstrates an inconsistency in how these laws interact together 
within a jurisdiction and between the jurisdictions.  
This Chapter concludes that the criminal law has resisted the urge to do away with 
the legal significance of birth and has refused to determine the legal status of 
prenatal life. Interestingly, the acceptance of new and ongoing scientific discoveries 
about the fetus has not translated into a change in thinking regarding fetal 
personhood.14 Rather, the desire to find an acceptable balance between community 
expectations flowing from destruction of the wanted fetus without the mother’s 
consent and lawful abortion has resulted in confusing principles as to when and why 
it is unlawful to destroy a fetus.  
                                                
11 Hannah Robert, ‘The Bereavement Gap: Grief, Human Dignity and Legal Personhood in the Debate over Zoe’s 
Law’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 319, 319.  
12 Robert, above n 11. See also, Isabel Karpin, ‘Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the 
Reconstructed Woman’ (1992) 3(1) Columbia Journal of Gender & Law 325, 329. 
13 Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2002) 243.  
14 See, eg, Talat Uppal et al, ‘The Legal Status of the Fetus in New South Wales’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 178, 183; Savell, above n 2.  
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2.2 The Born Alive Rule  
In this section, this thesis will explore the born alive rule generally and then review 
how it is applied in legislation and case law throughout Australia on a state-by-state 
basis. In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, a child is ‘deemed to 
have been born alive if it has breathed, and has been wholly born into the world 
whether it has had an independent circulation or not’.15  
Similarly, in Queensland and Western Australia, a child is a human being, and thus 
capable of being killed, when it has been completely delivered in a living state from 
the body of its mother, whether it has breathed or not, and whether it has an 
independent circulation or not, and whether the navel-string is severed or not.16 
In the Northern Territory, a person’s birth occurs at the time the person is fully 
removed from the mother’s body and has an independent existence from the mother. 
Factors relevant to determining this fact include whether the baby is breathing; has 
organs functioning of their own accord; or has an independent circulation of blood.17 
South Australia and Victoria rely upon the common law, which is similar to the 
position in the other states and territories. The decision of Barry J in Hutty was that: 
A baby is fully and completely formed when it is completely delivered from the body of its 
mother and it has a separate and independent existence in the sense that it does not derive 
its power of living from its mother. It is not material that the child may still be attached to its 
mother by the umbilical cord… But it is required that the child should have an existence 
separate from and independent of its mother, and that occurs when the child is fully extruded 
from the mother’s body and is living by virtue of the functioning of its organs. 18   
Once born alive, the child formally acquires legal personhood and with it, the legal 
rights and protection that all people enjoy. However whilst providing a restraining 
hand as to what may be done to a baby after birth, the born alive rule does not 
provide guidance as to how to characterise the fetus in the antenatal period.  
                                                
15 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 20; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 10.  
16 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 292; Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 269. 
17 Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) ss 1C sc1(2)(a)-(c). 
18 [1953] VLR 338 at 339. This position was re-affirmed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v 
Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278. 
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New South Wales provides the seminal case on the application of the born alive rule 
in Australia. In the 2005 case of R v Iby (‘Iby’),19 the definition for being born alive in 
New South Wales and the legal consequences that flow from this status were 
reviewed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. Here, the accused was the driver of a 
motor vehicle that collided with a car driven by a woman who was 38 weeks 
pregnant. The accident caused the woman to undergo a caesarean delivery.20  
The child was born alive, had a heartbeat and respiration, but required immediate 
assistance with breathing via a mechanical respirator and died two hours later.21 The 
accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and manslaughter. The 
issue to be decided was what was meant by the words ‘born alive’.22 The prosecution 
case was that the child had fully issued from his mother, lived independently albeit on 
a mechanical respirator for two hours before he died and therefore had been a living 
person.23 The defence argued that although the child had a beating heart, he could 
only breathe with assistance and this was insufficient proof of life for the purpose of 
proving homicide.24  
The Court of Appeal noted that the born alive rule was based on antiquated factors, 
being primitive medical knowledge and previously high rates of stillbirth,25 and that 
the legal significance of birth was ‘an artificial and non-scientific concept of when life 
begins.’26  Accordingly, the Court acknowledged that there was a strong basis to 
abandon the born alive rule completely.27 In considering application of the rule today, 
the Court held that the rule should ‘be applied consistently with contemporary 
conditions by affirming that any sign of life after birth is sufficient.’28 There was held to 
be no requirement that the child born alive be capable of surviving as a functioning 
being.29 On this reasoning, the appeal was dismissed.30 
                                                
19(2005) 63 NSWLR 278. 
20 Ibid [1].   
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid [3].  
23 Ibid [4].  
24 Ibid [20]. 
25 Ibid [32]. 
26 Ibid [78].  
27 Ibid [63].  
28 Ibid 288. 
29 Ibid [54]. 
30 Ibid [79].  
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This minimalist interpretation of being born alive was applied in Barrett v Coroner’s 
Court31 that involved the home birth of a child who was documented as having 
exhibited pulseless electrical activity of 10 minutes duration. The Supreme Court in 
South Australia held that this satisfied the criteria for being born alive. There are a 
number of implications for this minimal interpretation of being alive.  Freckelton notes 
that these include a potential increase in the ambit of coronial inquests for neonatal 
death following obstetric intervention,32 and the need to ensure that the legal 
definitions for life and death are coherent.33  
 
The issue to be decided by the Court in Iby did not extend to how the defendant’s 
actions against the pregnant woman satisfied the charge of manslaughter against the 
child when the harm was occasioned in utero. However, the House of Lords decision 
in Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1994)34 dealt with a similar factual scenario 
as Iby, although here, the intentional stabbing of the pregnant woman led to early 
labour and the child lived for 121 days.35 The defendant did not intend to harm the 
child and initially pleaded guilty to the crime of wounding the woman with intent but 
when the child died, he was charged with murder.36  
 
In issue was whether the crimes of murder or manslaughter could be committed 
where unlawful injury is deliberately inflicted on a pregnant woman, where the child 
subsequently born alive dies of injuries caused or substantially contributed to by 
injuries inflicted in utero. Discussed at length was the legal reasoning as to how the 
accused could have the necessary mens rea for murder of the child when harm was 
occasioned when the fetus was not a legal person.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 [2010] SASCFC 70. 
32 Ian Freckelton, ‘Stillbirth and the Law: Option for Law Reform and Issues for the Coronial Jurisdiction’ (2013) 21 
Journal of Law and Medicine 7, 18.  
33 Ian Freckelton, ‘The “Born Alive” Rule’ (2006) 13 Journal of Law and Medicine 285, 288. Freckelton notes the 
potential conflict between a person who may be deemed to be dead for the purpose of human tissue legislation 
and alive for the born alive rule.  
34 (1998) AC 245 (HL). 
35 Ibid 251 per Lord Mustill. 
36 Ibid.  
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The House of Lords accepted that just because the fetus was not a legal person, it 
did not follow as a matter of course that the fetus was an adjunct of its mother. 
Rather, it held that the fetus was a unique organism to which existing principles could 
not necessarily be applied.37 Accordingly, it would not be sensible to say that the 
fetus could never be harmed or nothing could be done to it that was not dangerous.38  
The Court reasoned that the possibility of a dangerous act directed at a pregnant 
woman causing harm to the child subsequently born existed and the defendant must 
accept all consequences of his act.39 As the defendant intended to harm the woman, 
and although the fetus was not the intended victim of the crime, the mens rea was 
present for manslaughter, and the actus reus was completed when the child died.40  
  
Casey is critical of this reasoning, arguing that if it is true that one cannot be 
damaged unless they exist, then criminal injury cannot magically spring into being in 
the absence of an agent.41 Casey’s comments are persuasive, stemming from a 
desire that there be fixed legal principles about the fetus, however the hesitation of 
individual judges to set aside the born alive rule is understandable given the potential 
ramifications that flow from it. To set aside the born alive rule is to make a 
pronouncement about the personhood of the fetus, something that may be better 
suited to the Parliament.42  
 
Ultimately, as Savell notes, the continuation of the born alive rule is needed to 
provide a logical platform for lawful abortion.43 To abandon the born alive rule and 
bestow legal personhood on prenatal life would not only cause significant problems 
with lawful abortion, but transactions that enable people to access assisted 
reproductive technologies.44  
 
                                                
37 Ibid 256 per Lord Mustill. 
38 Ibid 271 per Lord Mustill. 
39 Ibid 274 per Lord Hope of Craighead. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Gerard Casey, Born Alive: The Legal Status of the Unborn Child in England and the U.S.A (Barry Rose Law 
Publisher, 2005) 74. 
42 See, eg, Tremblay v Dailge [1989] 2 SCR 530. The Canadian Supreme Court noted that the task of classifying 
a fetus is very different when done by the law or done by science, with the court’s task being restricted to 
regulating rights and duties between people. In Harrild v Director of Proceedings [2003] 3 NZLR 289, 313 [117]-
[118] per McGrath J, the New Zealand Supreme Court noted that the born alive rule is maintained for 
convenience today and does not rest on developed medical or moral principle.  
43 Savell, above n 2, 631. 
44 Thomas Faunce, ‘Crimes Amendment (Zoe’s Law) Bill 2013 (No 2): Paradoxical Commercial Impacts of the 
Conservative Agenda on Fetal Rights’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 308, 315.  
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The born alive rule is also used in other areas of law. As will be discussed further in 
Chapter Three, in personal injury law, the law may recognise that a person has been 
harmed whilst in the womb and thus accrues a legal right, but this right is only 
actionable when the person is born and therefore capable of suffering a loss.45 
Similar reasoning exists for personal property laws and succession laws.46   
As can be seen, these laws do not disrupt the application of the born alive rule. 
However, their retrospectivity highlights the contradiction in logic or weakness of the 
rule - from the perspective of the fetus - that a person exists in law only when they 
are born yet they can be harmed before the law says they legally exist. The 
increasing incidence of fetal surgery complicates this differentiation between the 
fetus and the child born alive.47 If the fetus does not exist as a person and cannot be 
harmed, who or what is the surgeon operating on?  
Accepting the legal rule that the fetus is not a person, even in the seconds prior to 
birth, in order to accommodate abortion, and then using the rule as a basis to stifle 
intelligent debate has consequences. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, 
conscientious objection by doctors to performing or participating in abortion is based 
on a belief that the fetus is a human life and that aborting it is morally wrong. Whilst 
abortion may be seen in some jurisdictions as an actionable right that involves 
nothing more than a standard medical procedure, it still requires the assistance of a 
doctor to carry it out. Whilst the status of the fetus is a question that supersedes the 
law, this sometimes seems to be forgotten.  
 
Legislation in New South Wales, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory 
contain provision for offences that cover harm occasioned to a child when they are 
not yet born, though the offence is only actionable after the child is born. In other 
words, the legislation retrospectively recognises an assault if the person survives it.48 
However some jurisdictions make provision for child destruction offences. Child 
destruction concerns destruction of a very mature fetus about to be born or capable 
of being born alive. This offence highlights the artificiality of the born alive rule from 
                                                
45 Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353; X and Y v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26; Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15.   
46 Williams v Ocean Coal Co Ltd [1907] 2KB 422, 429, 431, 432.  
47 Freckelton, above n 32, 18.  
48 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 42; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(2); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43.  
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the perspective of the fetus. It obligates the law to protect and value the fetus and 
suggests that the maturation of biological traits of the fetus may well determine 
personhood.49  
 
The ongoing existence of such offences represent a clash with lawful late term 
abortion, which may place little or no focus on the biological realities of the fetus. The 
arguments around retaining or repealing the offence of child destruction will now be 
reviewed.  
2.3 The Offence of Child Destruction 
The offence of child destruction exists in several Australian jurisdictions. Its continued 
existence has been criticised for causing confusion or conflict with the born alive rule 
and late term abortion.50 The offence derives from the Infant Life Preservation Act 
1929 (UK), which covered a lethal act performed intentionally during childbirth on a 
child capable of being born alive, but for the act. It was seen as necessary because 
the born alive rule would deliver an injustice, as destruction of the fetus, the very 
point of the act, would have prevented the commission of a crime.51  
Due to the lack of prosecution for child destruction, there is uncertainty as to whether 
child destruction covers just the act of childbirth, or destruction of a fetus capable of 
being born alive.52 Rankin argues that in Australia, if being born alive requires only 
minimal signs of life as per the judgment in Iby, then the capacity to be born alive 
likewise only requires the fetus to be capable of minimal signs of life. He suggests 
that this understanding could decrease the gestational age of a fetus potentially 
caught by child destruction to include a significant number of lawful medical 
abortions.53  
 
                                                
49 Casey, above n 41. Contra Savell, above n 2, 664. Savell argues that such comparisons are crude and lack an 
understanding of the complexity of personhood. 
50 See, eg, Mark Rankin, ‘The Offence of Child Destruction: Issues for Medical Abortion’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law 
Review 1, 1; Victorian Law Reform Commission, Law of Abortion Final Report 15 (2008) 100 [7.31].   
51 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 50, 99 [7.15]. 
52 Ibid 102 [7.47]. 
53 Rankin, above n 50, 20.  
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This is a valid point. Rankin’s solution is to argue for a repeal of child destruction 
offences in Australian jurisdictions so as to avoid ambiguity and confusion with lawful 
late term abortion.54 Whilst this would ensure clarity, it does not address the ethical 
issue of whether the mature fetus should be given greater protection in the law. 
Certainly the maturation level of the fetus as the basis of a crime is in line with the 
gradualist approach to lawful abortion, whereby gestational age of the fetus is relied 
on to signify growing concerns about fetal personhood.  
This point was made in the landmark Californian case, People v Smith, where the 
defendant was accused of the homicide of a 12-15 week old fetus.55 The pregnant 
woman was beaten by the defendant who used the words ‘bleed baby, bleed’ whilst 
kicking the pregnant woman in the stomach and back.56 She suffered a miscarriage 
some weeks later, whilst in hospital for treatment of her injuries from the beating.57  
The Court of Appeal held that a viable fetus, with its capacity for independent 
existence, could be the object of murder whereas a non-viable fetus (defined as 
having only an expectancy and potentiality for life) could not.58 As the evidence here 
did not support viability, the Court dismissed the charge of murder.59  
Ultimately, the Court created a special legal identity or status for the viable fetus, 
although the attributes of independent existence were not set out in any detail. It 
noted that the concept of viability of the fetus arose from the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court in the seminal decision of Roe v Wade, that made abortion lawful 
where the fetus had only the expectancy and potentiality for human life.60 The Court 
noted in Smith that where viability is the litmus test for lawful abortion, and where 
advances in medical science have shortened the period of gestation, logic demands 
that the fetus at a lower gestational age requires increased legal protection.61  
                                                
54 Ibid 26. 
55 (1976) 59 Cal. App. 3de 751.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid 753. 
59 Ibid. 
60 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 162. 
61 (1976) 59 Cal. App. 3de 752.  
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The definition of a child capable of being born alive was discussed in the United 
Kingdom decision of C v S.62 The Court of Appeal affirmed that a fetus of 18-21 
weeks gestation although capable of showing signs of life such as a pulsating cord or 
heart beat but not capable of breathing nor able to survive for more than a short 
period of time, was not a child capable of being born alive.63 This is obviously a 
harsher test than that in Iby.  
Gestational age limits that prohibit very late term abortion bear witness to the reality 
of failed late term abortions performed on a fetus capable of being born alive. The 
multiple guilty verdicts against abortionist Dr Kermit Gosnell in Philadelphia in the 
United States of America are a case in point.64 Gosnell, a medical doctor who ran the 
Women’s Medical Society, regularly performed late term abortions on pregnant 
women. When the abortions were unsuccessful in destroying the unborn child, he 
took to finishing the job outside the womb by severing the child’s spinal cord with 
scissors.  
Had the babies been destroyed before birth, Dr Gosnell could have been performing 
a lawful medical procedure, subject to the laws of his State.65 As it stood, he was 
found guilty of three counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Cases such as these highlight the conundrum of late term abortion. 
Where the technique delivers a live child, a strange situation exists where the woman 
and the doctor are confronted with what the law describes as a person with a right to 
life, but whom a few seconds beforehand, was not a person in the eyes of the law 
and was capable of being lawfully destroyed because it was not capable of being 
harmed.  
 
                                                
62 [1988] 1 QB 135 (CA). The relevant legislation was the Infant Life Preservation Act 1929 (UK). See also Rance 
v Mid Downs Health Authority and Anor [1991] 1 QB 587. 
63 Ibid 142. 
64 See Steve Wilson, ‘Abortion Doctor Convicted of Killing Three Babies Spared the Death Penalty’, The 
Telegraph (online), 15 May 2013< 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10057946/Abortion-doctor-convicted-of-killing-
three-babies-spared-the-death-penalty.html?fb>.  
65 Though in this particular case, it is unlawful in Philadelphia to perform an abortion on a woman at 24 weeks 
gestation unless her life is at stake.  
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The United States has legislation that reinforces the consequences of the born alive 
rule specifically in circumstances of failed late term abortion. In the federal Born-Alive 
Infants Protection Act 2002, minimal signs of life, such as a heartbeat, pulsation of 
the umbilical cord, breath and a voluntary muscle movement, are adequate signs of 
life to provide the child with legal recognition of personhood and legal rights, 
including the right to life.  
In response, the American Academy of Pediatric Steering Committee concluded that 
the Act would not alter decisions about withholding or discontinuing medical 
treatment that are considered to be futile by the medical care providers in conjunction 
with the parents such that infants deemed not appropriate to resuscitate or to have 
treatment should be treated with dignity and respect and provided with comfort. 66  
The use of gestational age limits for lawful abortion can be found in five Australian 
jurisdictions, although the lack of consensus regarding the lower limit for abortion is 
startling.67 Three jurisdictions do not acknowledge the maturity of the fetus as a 
relevant consideration for lawful abortion.68 Herein lies the difficulty in discussing 
child destruction offences in Australia where there is discordance with the underlying 
abortion law.  
Four jurisdictions maintain child destruction offences and each of them permits lawful 
late term abortion in certain circumstances, none of which are the same. This thesis 
now considers these four jurisdictions to ascertain the level of guidance provided in 
the relevant statutes as to when the offence applies and in analysing these laws, it 
will consider the underlying abortion laws in order to ascertain any potential conflicts 
between child destruction and late term abortion.  
 
 
                                                
66 American Academy of Pediatric Neonatal Resuscitation Programme, Steering Committee, ‘Born-Alive 
Protection Act of 2001 111 Pubic Law No. 107-207’ (2003) 111 Pediatric 680. 
67 Gestational age is a relevant criterion for abortion in Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, the Northern Territory 
and Western Australia. This will be explored in detail in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.  
68 Maternal health concerns are the only basis for lawful abortion in New South Wales and Queensland, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. The Australian Capital Territory has no gestational age criterion for lawful abortion. 
This will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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2.3 (a) Queensland, Northern Territory, Western Australia, Australian 
Capital Territory 
Criminal statutes in Queensland,69 Northern Territory,70 Western Australia71 and the 
Australian Capital Territory,72 maintain the offence of child destruction. As discussed 
above, the controversy with maintaining these offences include whether they are 
restricted in application to the actual time of childbirth, or to a wider set of 
circumstances that include abortion techniques at any time during the second 
trimester of pregnancy.  
Ellwood notes that the term ‘late term abortion’ is generally understood to mean 
abortion past 20 weeks gestation.73 It involves different techniques to abortion 
performed earlier in time due to the challenges of fetal size, the potential for maternal 
complications, and the not infrequent need for an intact fetus so that a post mortem 
may be performed.74 With a ‘grey zone’ of fetal viability between 23 and 25 weeks 
gestation,75 late term abortion on a child capable of being born alive may well be 
lawful and therefore contradict child destruction laws. As all of these jurisdictions 
allow for the possibility of a lawful late term abortion, this thesis will consider the 
possible conflict.  
In section 313(1) of the Queensland Criminal Code 1899, it is an offence for any 
person who ‘when a woman is about to be delivered of a child, prevents the child 
from being born alive by any act or omission of such a nature that, if the child had 
been born alive and had then died, he would be deemed to have unlawfully killed the 
child, is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for life.’ The overlap between 
child destruction and late term abortion is arguably covered by section 282 of the 
Code which provides a defence for where a surgical operation or medical treatment 
is performed on a person in good faith for the benefit of the patient or to save the 
pregnant woman’s life (this will be explored further in Chapter Four).  
                                                
69 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) – ‘Killing unborn child’ s 313(1). 
70 Criminal Code 1988 (NT) – ‘Killing the unborn child’ s 170.  
71 Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) – ‘Preventing birth of a live child’ s 290. 
72 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43. The maximum penalty for this offence is 10 years imprisonment.  
73 David Ellwood, ‘Late Terminations of Pregnancy – An Obstetrician’s Perspective’ (2005) 29(2) Australian Health 
Review 139, 139.  
74 Ibid 140.  
75 John Keogh et al, ‘Delivery in the Grey Zone: Collaborative Approach to Extremely Preterm Birth’ (2007) 47 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 273, 275.  
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However Douglas argues that as Queensland’s abortion laws are particularly 
uncertain with no specific gestational age requirement, and with the practice itself 
being highly political, it is not possible to state for certain that s 313(1) would not 
apply to late term abortions.76 Rankin agrees that despite the lack of Australian case 
law on point, the possibility of overlap between child destruction and late term 
abortion exists.77   
This thesis concurs. Whilst the lack of prosecution for either child destruction or 
unlawful late term abortion lends support to the view that a conflict is more theoretical 
than actual, the fact that Queensland’s abortion provisions make no reference to fetal 
characteristics is confirmed in the case law interpretation. Decisions such as R v 
Bayliss,78 discussed in detail in Chapter Four, indicate that whilst serious maternal 
health concerns will override concern for fetal life, the courts have not reduced 
abortion to be merely a woman’s health issue.  
The lack of certainty regarding what situations satisfy serious maternal health 
concerns coupled with the possibility of prosecution, underline concerns expressed 
by abortionists advocating for law reform in Queensland.79 However such concerns 
represent one side of the argument only.  
The Australian Capital Territory, maintains the offence of child destruction in section 
42 of the Crimes Act 1900 where it is a crime punishable by up to 10 years 
imprisonment for a person preventing a child from being born alive either intentionally 
or recklessly by any act or omission ‘occurring in relation to childbirth and before the 
child is born alive.’ There is a lack of legal guidelines as to when abortion is lawful 
other than that it has to be performed by a doctor in a facility approved by the 
Minister with the requisite consent.80 Abortion is a private medical matter between the 
pregnant woman and the Hospital.  
                                                
76 Heather Douglas, ‘Abortion Reform: A State Crime or a Woman’s Right to Choose?’ (2009) 33 Criminal Law 
Journal 74, 78, 86.  
77 Rankin, above n 50, 23.  
78 (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8.  
79  Caroline De Costa, Heather Douglas and Kristen Black, ‘Making it Legal: Abortion Providers’ Knowledge and 
Use of Abortion Law in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 53 Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 184, 189.  
80 Health Act 1993 (ACT) ss 81-2.  
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However this thesis notes the concerns raised by the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission in its Final Report on Abortion. Relying on advice it received from a 
medical panel, the Commission expressed concern that on rare occasions, a 
decision must be made during childbirth to kill the child to save the mother. 
Additionally, parents may request the intact birth of a disabled fetus to assist with 
their grieving process.81  
Whilst it is possible these scenarios might be caught by the child destruction 
provisions, repealing the law for these rare occasions has to be balanced against the 
protection the mature fetus gains from laws that punish an unscrupulous health care 
practitioner performing indiscriminate late term abortions such as in the Dr Gosnell 
example referred to above. It becomes a question for the lawmaker. The lack of child 
destruction prosecutions supports the position that conflict here may be more 
theoretical than actual. 
Similarly worded child destruction laws exist in the Northern Territory and Western 
Australia but in these jurisdictions, gestational age is used to control abortion. In the 
Northern Territory, a late term abortion after 23 weeks is lawful where a medical 
practitioner determines that it is necessary for the sole purpose of saving the 
mother’s life.82 In Western Australia late term abortion past 20 weeks is lawful where 
two doctors from a panel of six determine that there is a serious condition in either 
the mother or the child that in the clinical judgment of those doctors, justifies the 
abortion.83 The abortion must take place in a facility approved by the Minister.84  
Accordingly, these late term abortions require serious medical reasons to be verified 
before they will be performed. This thesis argues that the abortions are likely to be 
lawful and therefore unlikely to be caught by the child destruction offence. Child 
destruction offences integrate into abortion laws in these jurisdictions because there 
is already a stated concern for the mature fetus whereby it is more difficult to achieve 
a lawful abortion the closer it comes to viability. The circumstances where late term 
                                                
81 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 50, 109 [7.84]-[7.85]. 
82 Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(4)(a).   
83 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7)(a).  
84 Ibid s 334(7)(b).   
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abortion may be lawful in these jurisdictions will be discussed further in Chapters 
Five and Six.  
This thesis now reviews the two jurisdictions that have repealed child destruction 
laws and considers the basis of the repeal, and the ramifications upon related laws 
affecting the fetus.  
2.3 (b) Victoria and Tasmania 
As suggested by Rankin, one way to deal with the perceived inconsistency issue 
between child destruction and lawful late term abortion is to repeal the offence of 
child destruction altogether. 85 In recognition of this conflict in the law, Victoria 
abolished the offence of child destruction in 2008, when it introduced the Abortion 
Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic). The Victorian Law Reform Commission noted that the 
offence of child destruction had never been used in Victoria for its original purpose, 
which was stated to be an attempt to avoid the crime of homicide that would apply if 
death occurred after birth, by destroying the unborn child before or during birth.86 
Rather, it was used to regulate late term abortions and assaults on a pregnant 
woman causing harm to the fetus but the law failed to do either with clarity.87  
The old offence of child destruction was considered to be an anachronism developed 
to cover a potential former offence: the calculated and intentional killing of a child in 
the process of childbirth to avoid punishment for infanticide or murder, due to a gap 
between abortion and homicide laws .88 Today, Victoria has abortion on demand up 
to 24 weeks gestation,89 and thereafter where two doctors agree that abortion is 
appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.90 Victoria’s repeal of child 
destruction laws and its liberal abortion laws suggest a clear de-valuing of the fetus 
and characterisation of abortion as an ordinary matter of women’s health.  
 
                                                
85 Rankin, above n 50, 26.  
86 Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 50, 98 [7.19]. 
87 Ibid108 [7.93]. 
88 Ibid 96 [7.6].   
89 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 4.  
90 Ibid s 5.  
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In her Second Reading Speech, Minister Maxine Morand stated that the choice of 24 
weeks as the upper limit for abortion on demand was because it was a common 
threshold for complex cases and was consistent with the clinical practice in Victoria, 
Australia and overseas.91 Concern for fetal viability, arguments regarding personhood 
or the possibility the child might be born alive were notably absent although 
Mendelson notes that the statutory distinction of 24 weeks retains the traditional 
temporal criterion for the law’s understanding of pre and post quickening.92  
Oreb describes the repeal of child destruction and the abortion law reform in Victoria 
as creating an actionable right to abortion in Victoria, as opposed to a ‘merciful 
allowance’.93 As discussed above, the consequences of these changes to the law 
and the impact it has on doctors who conscientiously object to participating in 
abortion will be discussed further in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
Likewise, Tasmania repealed the offence of ‘causing the death of a child before 
birth’94 that provided that any person who caused the death of a child who had not 
yet become a human being in such a manner that he would have been guilty of 
murder if such a child had been born alive, was guilty of an offence. Tasmania now 
permits abortion on demand up to 16 weeks gestation and thereafter where two 
doctors certify in writing that they have a reasonable belief that continuation of the 
pregnancy involves greater risk of injury to the pregnant woman’s physical or mental 
health than if the pregnancy was not terminated.95  
Like Victoria, the upper age limit was chosen on the basis of clinical practice and 
approaches in other jurisdictions, with no mention of concerns regarding fetal viability 
or personhood.96 In a similar vein to Oreb, Sifris notes that as abortion has already 
been conceptualised as falling within a number of rights such as the right to health, 
right to autonomy, and right to be free from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
                                                
91  Victoria, Legislative Assembly (2008) Debates, Bk 11, 2951. 
92 Danuta Mendelson, ‘Decriminalisation of Abortion Performed by Qualified Health Practitioners Under the 
Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 651, 659.  
93 Naomi Oreb, ‘Worth the Wait? A Critique of the Abortion Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2009) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 
261, 262. 
94 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 165(1), now repealed.  
95 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 5(1)(a). 
96 Population Health Equity, ‘Information Paper Relating to the Draft Reproductive Health (Access to 
Terminations) Bill’ Department of Health and Human Services, March 2013, 6-11. It should be noted that the 
upper limit here appears to be well below the age of viability or grey zone referred to earlier.  
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treatment or punishment,97 abortion ought to be re-framed as a standard medical 
procedure.98 
However as Parker notes,  
‘…even if abortion comes to be seen as a woman’s rights/health issue, this presupposes that 
a decision (more likely an unreflective assumption) has been made concerning fetal status, 
since abortion consists of the killing of a fetus. Coming to conceive of abortion as nothing 
more than a woman’s health issue is thus a critically important statement on the part of 
society about fetal status, and also of great significance for those doctors who do not share 
that moral view.’99 
This thesis agrees with this view and shares those concerns. Clearly, in these two 
jurisdictions any concern for mature fetal wellbeing is not reflected in its laws, 
particularly with abortion characterised as a standard medical procedure. The 
possibility of injecting an alternative characterisation of the fetus into the debate will 
be discussed further in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
How to characterise the loss of a fetus at any time throughout the prenatal period, 
destroyed through a third party act without the consent of the mother, is another 
dilemma in the criminal law. This thesis now reviews how the law deals with third 
party assaults on pregnant women resulting in destruction of the fetus in utero.  
2.4 Destruction of the fetus in utero  
Several jurisdictions recognise that the act of destroying a wanted, unborn child that 
is destroyed without the mother’s consent is a crime.100 Whilst the destruction of a 
wanted, unborn child is acknowledged by all as a tragedy, the ‘single entity’ 
characterisation of the loss is often unsatisfactory to the parents of the stillborn child.  
 
                                                
97 Ronli Sifris, ‘Tasmania’s Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013: An Analysis of Conscientious 
Objection to Abortion and the “Obligation to Refer’’’(2015) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 900, 901-2. 
98 Sifris, above n 97, 902. 
99 Malcolm Parker, ‘Teaching Medical Ethics and Law’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 444, 448-9.  
100 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(2); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 4, 13; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 15; Criminal 
Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 184A.  
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The failure of the criminal law to formally recognise the death of the fetus, or as 
Robert notes, to recognise and name the harm to it, can negatively impact on 
families grieving for the loss of their unborn child, regardless of whether other 
offences exist that will ensure punishment of the guilty third party.101 Attempts by 
grieving parents to have the law recognise personhood in their unborn child have not 
been successful to date largely because of the fear that to do so will jeopardise lawful 
abortion. Dalmau comments that there is no reason to think that any solution can 
satisfy all interested parties, or entirely avoid inconsistencies and grey areas.102  
This thesis agrees with that conclusion. Without a touchstone principle that values 
the fetus, dissatisfaction about the limitation of the law to fully recognise the loss of a 
wanted fetus, will no doubt continue. Additionally, clarity and constancy in application 
of the law, considered to be hallmarks of good law,103 may be degraded where the 
law accommodates multiple legal characterisations of the fetus. 
2.4 (a) Queensland  
In addition to the child destruction offence in section 313(1) of the Criminal Code 
1899 (Qld), section 313(2) of the Criminal Code, provides that ‘any person who 
unlawfully assaults a female pregnant with a child and destroys the life of, or does 
grievous bodily harm to, or transmits a serious disease to, the child before its birth, 
commits a crime’ with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. This offence therefore 
has a broad application in that it does not require any proof that the unborn child was 
‘viable’ or that the offence took place during childbirth in order for a crime to have 
been committed. The recognition of the unborn child as being something of value in 
and of itself is evident in the harsh and equal penalties applying to its destruction or 
harm at any stage of development and regardless of whether it goes on to be born.  
 
 
                                                
101 Robert, above n 11, 323.  
102 James Dalmau, ‘An Alternative to Zoe’s Law’ (2015) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 698, 710.  
103  Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1964) 48, 63. 
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The genesis of this offence of destruction of the unborn child arose from an 
unreported District Court decision of R v Lippiatt,104 where the defendant assaulted 
his pregnant girlfriend by kicking her in the stomach. He knew she was pregnant and 
wished to avoid paying child maintenance. The woman went on to suffer a 
miscarriage and the fetus was stillborn at 32 weeks gestation.105  
The charge of murder or manslaughter could not be brought because an unborn child 
did not satisfy the definition of a human being capable of being killed as set out under 
section 292 of the Criminal Code. Additionally, the offence of ‘killing unborn child’ 
under section 313(1) of the Criminal Code was not thought to apply, as the woman 
was not about to deliver the child.106 The case therefore highlighted a gap in the 
Queensland criminal law with regards to the destruction of an unborn child capable of 
being born alive, but not destroyed during the act of childbirth.  
The complainant in Lippiatt argued for an amendment to section 292 of the Criminal 
Code, which defines when a child becomes a human being, so that the definition of a 
child ‘capable of being killed’ included a fetus at or over the age of 20 weeks 
gestation or a fetus weighing 400 grams or more who could reasonably be expected 
to live if born, regardless of whether the child had proceeded in a living state from its 
mother, breathed, had an independent circulation or had its navel string severed. 
As a result, the Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1996 was introduced to amend section 
313(1) of the Criminal Code, so as to define a child of 24 weeks or more gestation 
being prima facie evidence that the child was capable of being born alive, thus 
broadening the coverage of the offence.107 This amendment, however, was rejected 
by the Queensland Parliament because of concerns that the definition of a child 
‘capable of being born alive’ might conflict with lawful abortions performed at this 
time.  
 
                                                
104 R v Lippiatt (Unreported, District Court of Queensland, Hoath J, 24 May 1996). 
105 Ibid 130. 
106 Ibid 131. 
107 Explanatory Notes, Criminal Law Amendment Bill 1996, 12.  
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As a compromise, Parliament enacted section 313(2) of the Criminal Code to create 
an offence for the destruction of a child before birth. Later, section 282 of the 
Criminal Code was amended, so that the surgical operation or medical treatment 
considered reasonable in all the circumstances of the case to preserve the mother’s 
life is not a crime. This was said to clarify the law, particularly for doctors, given the 
lack of appellate level decisions to interpret the lawful circumstances for abortion.108  
2.4 (b)  New South Wales 
In 2001, Michael Harrigan drove a motor vehicle in which a seven months pregnant 
woman, Renee Shields, was a passenger. The accident caused the death of the 
unborn child and Ms Shields was required to undergo a hysterectomy. At trial, the 
judge did not sentence the accused for manslaughter and instead the accused was 
jailed for 18 months, and a maximum six years and three months for dangerous 
driving.109  
This led to proposed changes to the criminal law to recognise the death of the fetus 
known as ‘Byron’s Law’ (named after the baby of Ms Shields). In his 2003 Review of 
the Law of Manslaughter in New South Wales, the Honourable Murray Finlay QC 
was asked to consider whether the New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 ought to be 
amended to include a structured scheme of manslaughter offences and penalties.110 
This was to include whether manslaughter provisions ought to be brought when an 
unborn child dies, whether New South Wales ought to legislate to introduce the 
offence of child destruction, and whether it would be necessary to establish that the 
offender knew that the mother was pregnant.111  
Ultimately, Finlay did not recommend that the Crimes Act 1900 be amended to allow 
a charge of manslaughter upon the death of an unborn child, but rather made a 
policy recommendation that an offence of ‘killing an unborn child’ be created whereby 
the unborn child was defined as one capable of being born alive, with a pregnancy of 
greater than 26 weeks being prima facie evidence that the woman was carrying a 
                                                
108 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 September 2009, 1981-2 (Cameron Dick, 
Attorney-General).  This will be discussed further in Chapter Four.  
109 R v Harrigan (unreported, District Court, Parramatta, Judge Tupman, 27 February 2003). 
110 Mervyn D Finlay, ‘Review of the Law of Manslaughter in New South Wales’ (Report, New South Wales 
Attorney General and Justice, Criminal Law Division, 2003) 7. 
111 Ibid 14-15. 
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child capable of being born alive.112 This conclusion was to be capable of being 
dispelled by medical evidence.113  
Finlay was persuaded that ideological problems existed in granting a zygote, embryo 
or fetus the same status as that of a fetus so advanced that it could live outside its 
mother’s body.114 Additionally, he concluded that a fetus capable of being born alive 
was not merely a body part of its mother nor was it a person at law but it was a 
distinct entity, the existence and value of which the law should recognise, in some 
circumstances.115  
The recommendation to enact a child destruction offence was not, however, taken up 
by Parliament. Instead, section 42 of the Crimes Act 1900 was introduced to create 
the offence of ‘Injuries to child at time of birth’ which currently provides that ‘any 
intentional or reckless infliction during or after delivery of a child, whether wholly born 
or not, causing any grievous bodily harm shall be liable for imprisonment for 14 
years’.  
In 2005, the Crimes Amendment (Grievous Bodily Harm) Act 2005 (NSW) amended 
the definition of grievous bodily harm in the Crimes Act to include ‘the destruction 
(other than for a medical procedure) of the fetus of a pregnant woman, whether or 
not the woman suffers harm.’116 This expanded definition of the offence of grievous 
bodily harm so as to include death of the fetus whether viable or not came after the 
decision in the Court of Appeal case of R v King (‘King’).117 Here, the accused 
assaulted a woman who was 23 to 24 weeks pregnant with his child.118 When she 
refused to agree to an abortion, he allegedly stomped on her stomach several times. 
These actions led to a placental abruption and the stillbirth of the child.119  
 
                                                
112 Ibid 160. 
113  Ibid 135.  
114  Ibid 110. 
115  Ibid 114.   
116  Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 4.  
117  (2003) 59 NSWLR 472. 
118  Ibid [6]. 
119  Ibid. 
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The accused was charged under section 33 of the Crimes Act of maliciously inflicting 
grievous bodily harm against a person with intent.120 The situation differed therefore 
to that of Iby, where the child was born alive, albeit living for only a short period after 
birth. Here the unborn child was both injured, and died, in utero. The Court therefore 
had the opportunity to consider the continued usage of the born alive rule as against 
modern medical knowledge of the viability of the unborn.  
The trial judge accepted the defendant’s argument that the fetus was a unique 
organism, genetically different to its mother and therefore not technically part of its 
mother (the separate entities argument).121 The trial judge noted that the cause of the 
injury was to the placenta and accepted that the placenta was not a part of the 
woman but rather a structure attached to the woman’s blood stream and in turn to 
that of the fetus.122  
There was no evidence that the woman suffered grievous bodily harm123 and as the 
fetus is not recognised by the law as a person and therefore capable of being the 
victim of a crime, the accused was acquitted.124 This case brought to a head the 
issue of whether strict application of the born alive rule leaves the law without a 
remedy where a pregnant woman loses a wanted, unborn child. The Prosecution 
appealed. In considering the issue, the Court of Appeal noted no binding authorities 
on whether the fetus could be regarded as part of the mother so that harm to the 
fetus would be harm to the mother, satisfying the requirement that harm be done to a 
person.125  
A review of decisions of superior courts in other jurisdictions was undertaken by 
Speigelman CJ in King in which His Honour concluded that  
 
 
                                                
120 Ibid [2]. 
121 Ibid [10]. 
122 Ibid [9]. 
123 Ibid [8]. 
124 Ibid [14]. 
125 Ibid [36]. 
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[t]here is no clear rule, applicable in all situations, as to whether the mother and the foetus 
will be considered as one or as separate. The answer will turn on the incidents of the 
particular legal situation under consideration including, where relevant, the scope, purpose 
and object of the particular statutory scheme.126  
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s decision, preferring the 
single entity argument and ruling that for the purpose of section 33 of the Crimes Act, 
‘[t]he close physical bond between the mother and the foetus is of such character 
that, for purposes of offences such as this, the fetus should be regarded as part of 
the mother.127 The Chief Judge also noted, that 
[t]he aggravated forms of assault reflect the community’s legitimate concern to control 
violence between persons. The greater the degree of injury, as compared with the result of 
common assault, the greater the community’s concern. Where such enhanced injury is 
inflicted on a foetus alone, I can see no reason why the aggravated form of offence should 
depend on whether the foetus is born alive. The purpose of the law is best served by 
acknowledging that, relevantly, the foetus is part of the mother.128 
By deciding as it did, the Court of Appeal did not bestow personhood on the fetus, 
rather the fetus was considered, in this limited context, to be so much a part of its 
mother that harm to it was considered to be harm to its mother thus allowing 
punishment to flow from the incident. Thus, as the act of violence was committed 
against the woman (as representative of herself and the fetus, the single entity 
approach) and as the woman did not die, then logically, the charge could only be that 
of aggravated assault of the woman.  
Accordingly, prosecution under section 33 of the Crimes Act is a crime against the 
pregnant woman, even if she does not suffer harm to the requisite level herself but 
the fetus is destroyed, with the maximum penalty being imprisonment for 25 years. 
Ultimately the Court sanctioned the idea that retention of the born alive rule is best 
for our society and that the physical nature of prenatal life should not be the ultimate 
determinant of its legal status. Rather, flexibility is permitted so that one can re-
characterise the legal status of the fetus in other scenarios so as to achieve a 
bespoke outcome.  
                                                
126 Ibid [87]. 
127 Ibid [96]. 
128 Ibid [97]. 
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Another push to further amend the New South Wales Crimes Act to recognise the 
death of a fetus as manslaughter and even murder came in 2009, when Ms Brodie 
Donegan, an eight months pregnant woman, was run down by a motor vehicle driven 
by a driver affected by drugs. The injuries occasioned by the accident caused a 
placental abruption to Ms Donegan leading to the stillbirth of her child, Zoe.129  
Thereafter, the New South Wales Attorney General appointed the Honourable 
Michael Campbell QC to undertake a review of section 33 of the Crimes Act 1900.  
However, in his 2010 ‘Review of the Laws Surrounding Criminal Incidents Involving 
the Death of an Unborn Child’, Campbell recommended no changes be made to the 
Act, concluding that the previous changes in 2005 allowed the justice system to 
respond appropriately to the death of an unborn child.130 
In November 2013, the Crimes Amendment (Zoe’s Law) Bill 2013 (No 2) passed by a 
majority of the Legislative Assembly. The Bill proposed that the list of offences for 
grievous bodily harm set out in section 8A(1) of the Crimes Act be extended to the 
fetus of 20 weeks gestation or weighing greater than 400 grams,131 so that it would 
be an offence against the fetus as a legal person, rather than an offence against the 
pregnant woman alone.132 Importantly, the Bill specifically exempted medical 
abortion.133  
Writing an opinion piece for The Guardian, Ms Donegan noted; 
…. I couldn’t reconcile that my daughter – which I’d held, cried over and willed to breathe – 
was placed in a list of broken bones and soft tissue injuries. I couldn’t reconcile that the child 
I’d applied for a stillbirth certificate for, held a funeral for, received the baby bonus for and 
received paid parental leave from work for wasn’t recognised separately to me… I am pro-
choice. I do not want to see any rights taken from women. But I cannot reconcile how the 
                                                
129 R v Hampson (unreported, District Court of NSW, Judge Ellis, 31 March 2011).  
130  Michael Campbell, ‘Review of Laws Surrounding Criminal Incidents involving the Death of an Unborn Child’ 
(Report New South Wales Department of Justice and Attorney General, Legislation, Policy and Criminal Law 
Review, 2010), 5.  
131 Crimes Amendment (Zoe’s Law) Bill 2013 (No 2) s 8A(1)(a)(b). 
132 Ibid s 8A(2). 
133 Ibid s 8A(4). 
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current law works. Zoe's law works well with existing legislation, and I believe it would help 
give victims closure and also ensure the offender takes responsibility for their actions.134 
Whilst providing a level of comfort to an aggrieved mother, it would clearly create 
tension with the born alive rule. By accepting the born alive rule, the consequences 
of fetal destruction are measured by a combination of its relational and physical 
attributes. With Zoe’s Law, legal personhood becomes relative and subject to 
change.  
However as has been stated earlier in this Chapter, against the backdrop of positive 
law, ascribing legal personhood to human life at the point of birth is not the equivalent 
of passing a moral judgment about its status. Rather, as Kelsen notes, in legal 
positivism,  
While the individual human being is a natural reality, the ‘physical’ person is a heuristic 
notion of legal cognition – a notion that might well be dispensed with, that facilitates the 
exposition of the law, but is not necessary to it.135 
The Women’s Electoral Lobby of New South Wales protested that the move to give 
the fetus legal rights would be a ‘disturbing step backwards for women in NSW’ that 
would ‘set an unacceptable precedent for the way fetuses are considered in the law 
through granting them rights.’136 The Australian Medical Association registered their 
objection directly with the Health Minister noting their concern that the proposed law 
could have unintended consequences on doctors in the areas of genetics and 
obstetrics.137  
 
 
                                                
134  Brodie Donegan, ‘Zoe’s Law: I Am Pro-Choice But My Daughter Deserved To Be Recognised’ The Guardian 
(online), 13 September 2013  < http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/13/zoe-law-abortion-pro-
choice>. 
135 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1994) 22.  
136 Women’s Electoral Lobby of NSW, ‘”Zoe’s Law” A Trojan Horse for Nile’s Anti-choice Agenda,’  1 July 2013 
http://welnsw.org.au/2013/07/01/zoes-law-a-trojan-horse-for-niles-anti-choice-agenda/. 
137 Brian Owler, ‘Crimes Amendment (Zoe’s Law) Bill No. 2 2013’ (Factsheet, Australian Medical Association New 
South Wales) 
<http://amavic.com.au/icms_docs/160608_Abortion_conscientious_objection_template_and_information_for_GPs
.pdf>. 
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The New South Wales Bar Association noted that to define a person as being above 
20 weeks gestation or 400 grams in weight was arbitrary and a risky principle. They 
enquired how abortion, a medical procedure designed in the interests of the mother, 
could also be characterised as harming or killing another person and how a mother 
could consent to the destruction of a fetus where what is occurring is the destruction 
of another person.138 Such a change to the law highlights the awkward situation 
where personhood is based on the context of one’s destruction. But how different is 
this really when gestational age is used as a marker for when destruction of the fetus 
is lawful? Is this not also an arbitrary and risky principle when seen from the 
perspective of the fetus?  
Hamblin noted in an opinion piece that it would be ‘foolhardy’ to believe that Zoe’s 
Law would have no impact on the legal status of abortion in New South Wales 
because judges strive for consistency and coherence in the principles they apply to 
legislative interpretation, with an overwhelming tendency for judges to take into 
account the fact that the Parliament has declared a fetus in one situation to be a legal 
person when interpreting the lawfulness of an abortion.139  
This thesis disagrees with this contention. Accepting the born alive rule as a technical 
legal rule rather than a philosophical certainty of personhood, Zoe’s Law would just 
be another artificial construct created to try and achieve justice. Judges should be 
able to understand this and simply apply the law, utilising the perspective that fits 
with the particular characterisation the fetus has for that case. It is not possible to say 
what practical effect the Bill would have had on a doctor’s understanding of the 
lawfulness of abortion in New South Wales other than to note that the Bill clearly 
exempted lawful abortion. Precedent exists in the United States, where Casey notes 
that feticide laws in some jurisdictions operate side by side with laws regulating 
abortion. They do so by simply distinguishing third party crimes from abortion.140 
 
                                                
138 Letter from Mr Phillip Boulten QC, the New South Wales Bar Association, to Mr Chris Spence MP dated 6 
September 2013. 
139 Julie Hamblin, ‘Zoe’s law attacks reproductive rights in NSW’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 19 September 
2013 <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/zoes-law-attacks-reproductive-rights-in-nsw-21030909>. 
140 Casey, above n 41, 106.  
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Debate of Zoe’s Law in the Upper House failed to take place in 2014 and currently it 
has lapsed, with the suggestion it would be reintroduced in 2015 after the March 
State elections.141 At the time of writing, no such Bill has been proposed. As the law 
stands at the moment in New South Wales, the decisions in the cases of Iby142 and 
King143 illustrate the discomfort the Court of Appeal feels in allowing a third party to 
escape punishment for acts that cause harm to a fetus, albeit in two very specific 
circumstances. It also highlights the hesitation of the legislature in proscribing the 
same recognition to the fetus as given to a child, given the community’s reactions to 
the broader legal consequences.  
Noting that opponents to the Bill were concerned primarily with matters of legal 
substance whilst supporters were more concerned with procedural and symbolic 
changes, Dalmau proposes an alternative to Zoe’s Law. Essentially, by changing the 
wording of the charge to refer to death of the fetus, and maintaining a separate 
charge to be brought in respect of any other harm occasioned to the pregnant 
woman, he argues that such a framework strikes the right balance.144  
By doing so, the law is not changed in substance, yet the amendments may better 
appeal to community standards. He argues that the gist of either offence is the 
grievous bodily harm not the specific injury caused.145 Any rule of law allowing double 
jeopardy benefit to the defendant would be denied.146  
The thesis agrees that changes to the wording of the offence to recognise separate 
entities would assist the community to perceive the law as good law because it 
achieves justice, which Kelsen referred to as being necessary even in a positivist 
state system.147 This might be similar to child destruction offences, where the unborn 
child is clearly recognised within the wording of the offence but technically, no 
offence is committed against it.  
                                                
141 Ehssan Veiszadeh,‘Zoe’s Law Back on NSW Agenda’ The Australian (online), 23 October 2014 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/latest-news/zoes-law-back-on-nsw-agenda/story-fn3dxiwe-
1227099698304. 
142 (2005) 63 NSLR 278. 
143 (2003) 59 NSWLR 472. 
144 Dalmau, above 102, 705-6.  
145 Ibid 709. 
146 Ibid 707. 
147 Kelsen, above 135, 22.  
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Prenatal destruction through a third party assault is not recognised as a specific 
crime in the Northern Territory and Western Australia though arguably it is open to 
the courts to follow King and use public policy grounds to characterise the harm 
against prenatal life as harm against the pregnant woman so as to ensure that a third 
party is punished.  
This thesis now reviews how laws in Victoria, Tasmania and the Australian Capital 
Territory deal with the destruction in utero of a fetus without the consent of the 
mother. It considers how these jurisdictions with liberal abortion laws integrate laws 
that acknowledge fetal harm and destruction in other contexts.  
2.4 (c)  Victoria, Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory 
These jurisdictions are in line with Queensland and New South Wales in possessing 
offences that recognise loss of the fetus as harm to the mother. The Australian 
Capital Territory’s Crimes Act 1900 allows for the upgrade of various offences to 
aggravated offences under section 48A.148 Here the offence is characterised as 
having been committed against a pregnant woman causing her loss or serious harm 
to the pregnancy or the death or serious harm to a child born alive as a result of the 
pregnancy (section 48A(2)). Pursuant to section 48A(3), aggravated offences require 
the defendant to have known or ought reasonably to have known, that the woman 
was pregnant.  
In Victoria, it is an offence under sections 16 and 17 of the Crimes Act 1958, to 
destroy the fetus of a pregnant woman without lawful excuse, intentionally or 
recklessly. The maximum penalty is imprisonment for 20 and 15 years respectively. 
Section 15 of the Crimes Act 1958 amends the definition of ‘serious injury’ via section 
10 of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) to include ‘the destruction, other than 
in the course of a medical procedure, of the fetus of a pregnant woman, whether or 
not the woman suffers harm.’ Destruction of a fetus is characterised as a crime 
against the pregnant woman as opposed to a crime against the fetus, thus 
maintaining the born alive rule.  
                                                
148 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 29(2) or (4). 
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Like Queensland and Victoria, Tasmania has a related offence affecting pregnant 
women who are assaulted. Section 184A of the Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924 
provides that any person who unlawfully assaults a woman knowing her to be 
pregnant is guilty of the crime of ‘Assault on a pregnant woman,’ an offence 
punishable by imprisonment for 21 years or by fine, or by both such punishments.149 
The degree to which the pregnancy has advanced is not set out in the legislation but 
the fact that the accused must know that the woman is pregnant provides the starting 
point.  
The crime is characterised as a crime against the pregnant woman and follows the 
other jurisdictions discussed above in choosing to maintain the born alive rule, 
choosing not to recognise the unborn child as a legal person but providing 
punishment against a third party who seeks to destroy prenatal life, except where the 
act is consistent with a lawful abortion. Accordingly, a person who knows a woman is 
in the early stages of pregnancy can be guilty of a crime regardless of whether the 
unborn child has reached the age of viability.  
Of note, section 178E of the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 
(Tas) inserts a new offence into the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) of ‘termination 
without woman’s consent’. Robert notes that the wording of the offence is unique and 
makes it a crime where a person who intentionally or recklessly performs a 
termination on a woman without the woman’s consent, whether or not she suffers 
harm.150 The definition of ‘termination’ extends to discontinuing a pregnancy through 
instruments, drugs or the very broad phrase ‘any other means’.  
Robert argues that this offence properly focuses on the lost pregnancy and treats the 
harm as a violation of the mother’s reproductive autonomy as opposed to an offence 
structured around the fetus as a legal person and having a right to life.151 Roberts 
argues that the wording is important and gives recognition of loss of human life 
without giving the fetus legal personhood.152 However Dalmau, observes that there is 
                                                
149 Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 389(3).  
150 Robert, above n 11, 333. 
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no reason to think that any solution can satisfy all parties or entirely avoid 
inconsistencies or grey areas.153 
This thesis agrees with Robert’s observations that such an offence could provide a 
grieving mother with satisfaction that justice was achieved. However it of course 
creates a demarcation between the wanted, as opposed to the unwanted, fetus and 
firmly embeds the ‘relational’ school of thought of characterising the fetus as an entity 
that has no inherent value in and of itself, but rather its value depends in part on that 
which the pregnant woman or others give to it.  
This thesis takes the position that the relational analysis of the fetus is complicated 
and can lead to less than clear-cut results. 
2.5 Summary 
Despite the problems with logic when considering destruction of the fetus from its 
perspective, the born alive rule remains the law within Australia. Accordingly, the 
unborn child cannot be the victim of an assault or a homicide. Despite this, all 
criminal statues throughout Australia recognise in one way or another, that harm to 
or destruction of prenatal life can be a crime. The way in which the various 
jurisdictions characterise these crimes however can vary both within and between 
the states.  
This thesis argues that failing to acknowledge harm to prenatal life requires 
perceiving the fetus as an artificial construct. Choosing birth as the time when a 
human being becomes a person reflects a legal rule rather than a universally 
accepted and provable truth. Using that rule as a non-negotiable starting point for 
related laws such as those that deal with conscientious objection by doctors to 
participating in abortion, can potentially lead to an injustice.  Where alternative 
positions such as the fetus as a person from conception or the fetus as a human 
being with a right to be protected from destruction, are dismissed due to the rule, the 
capacity for doctors to argue for freedom of conscience seems limited.  
                                                
153 Dalmou, above n 102, 710.  
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 44 
The task of the positive law is not to answer the question of what is personhood, but 
to regulate the rights and obligations of people in the community. Arguably if the 
natural law were applied, it would likely disallow many reproductive medical 
procedures where prenatal life is destroyed. Where the lawmaker rejects the natural 
law in favour of legal positivism, as here, they have the flexibility to decide when 
destruction of the fetus is a crime. They can do so without subscribing to immutable 
principles based on any objective, provable truths that could be replicated and 
applied in related laws.154 Such laws created in a positivist State need not integrate 
with each other and can be subject to change.155  
This thesis has argued here in Chapter Two that whilst on the face of it, the criminal 
laws affecting destruction of prenatal life may seem confusing at times, it is more 
correct to say they are merely examples of legal positivism where the line in the 
sand, the born alive rule, does not have the moral or scientific authority to assess 
what the fetus is during the antenatal period. As a consequence, the laws fail to 
provide clear, unchanging criteria for why it is right or wrong to destroy prenatal life.  
In Chapter Two, this thesis reviewed three contexts involving destruction of the fetus 
that are regulated by the criminal laws in Australia; harm to the fetus that goes on to 
be born; destruction of the mature fetus in the process of childbirth; and harm to the 
fetus resulting in stillbirth. It confirmed inconsistencies between jurisdictions such as 
whether an offence existed, the elements of the offence and how the law 
characterises this loss. A summary of the inconsistencies follows.  
If a fetus is harmed in the womb and goes on to be born, the law will recognise that 
the harm occurred, but only after the birth.156 This is because the law does not 
recognise the existence of the person in the prenatal state as a legal entity. 
Therefore, though they were in fact harmed at that time, the law will only 
retrospectively acknowledge that fact.  
                                                
154 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 23.  
155 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 185-6. 
156  R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278. 
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Child destruction laws recognise the destruction of the very developed fetus about to 
be born.157 The offence is a serious crime, mostly carrying a sentence of life 
imprisonment. The gist of the offence is the physical development of the unborn 
child, who is capable of surviving outside the womb. However the co-existence of 
child destruction laws in jurisdictions that also allow late term abortion (under certain 
conditions) is contradictory. It allows, in theory, the destruction of the fetus in one 
scenario, but not in another even though nothing intrinsic has changed about the 
fetus.  This perceived conflict illustrates the shortcomings of the born alive rule, 
which can produce seemingly incoherent outcomes.  
Where the fetus does not survive the assault, some jurisdictions specifically 
characterise the act as a crime against the pregnant woman.158 The law rationalises 
this by extending her legal personality to include that of the fetus. From time to time, 
attempts have been made to recognise the ‘death’ of a wanted, unborn child 
destroyed as a result of a third party assault, by making the fetus in that limited 
circumstance, a legal person. Whilst sympathetic to the plight, lawmakers have 
resisted the urge to make legal personhood a relative legal state.  
Retaining the born alive rule obviously produced an unjust outcome for the fetus, 
and for the parents who mourn its passing.159 As has been demonstrated in this 
Chapter, the consequence of having a touchstone principle in law that is based on 
an artificial construct is that laws that derive from it may be confusing, vulnerable 
and subject to change. However maintaining the born alive rule as the touchstone for 
all laws affecting prenatal life in Australia provides the required platform for abortion 
to be lawful.160  
Chapter Three of this thesis considers second and third party assaults on the fetus in 
the civil law. It discusses the materno-fetal conflict in the literature, which involves the 
rights of the pregnant woman to bodily autonomy pitted against the law’s recognition 
of the existence of the fetus and its capacity to be harmed by the mother’s acts and 
                                                
157 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); Criminal Code 1988 (NT) s 170; Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) 
s 290; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43.  
158 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 4, 42; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 43, 38A; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 15; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 184A.  
159 See, eg, Robert, above n 11, 327; Dalmau, above n 102, 709. 
160 See, eg, Savell, above n 2, 631; Faunce, above n 44, 315.  
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omissions. It considers the development of a maternal duty of care to the fetus in tort 
law, which perceives the fetus as a separate entity from the mother, and attempts to 
place restraints on her behaviour for the benefit of the fetus. Such a duty sits 
uncomfortably with lawful abortion, which is a direct action consented to by the 
mother to destroy the fetus, and which is discussed in detail in Chapters Four to 
Seven.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MATERNAL DUTY OF CARE TO THE UNBORN CHILD 
3.1 Introduction 
The conflict between the primacy of maternal autonomy over foreseeable harm to the 
fetus is at the heart of the vexed legal issue of whether the pregnant woman owes 
the fetus a duty of care, and if so, what the scope of that duty is, and in what 
circumstances it is breached. In accepting the existence of a maternal duty of care to 
the unborn child, the law is asked to recognise the fetus as an entity separate from 
the pregnant woman and capable of being harmed. Given her acts and omissions 
may indirectly affect the fetus, she is expected to alter her behaviour so as not to 
cause harm to the fetus.  
As was discussed in Chapter Two, in third party criminal offences, the law has 
refused to recognise personhood in the fetus, and has developed a logic whereby 
harm is recognised through the pregnant woman.1 If the child goes on to be born, the 
temporal disconnection between the assault and the acquisition of personhood does 
not operate as a bar to the offence.2 Child destruction offences, which weaken the 
single entity logic by recognising the mature fetus as a separate entity in the law,3 
have disappeared from jurisdictions like Victoria and Tasmania, where there is 
abortion on demand up to a certain gestational age4 (discussed in Chapter Seven).  
Abortion on demand conflicts with the notion of a maternal duty of care to the unborn 
as the former requires no justification for destruction of the fetus other than maternal 
consent. It centres on bodily autonomy and the concept that the pregnant woman 
and the fetus are a single entity and that she may do to it whatever she wishes.  
                                                
1 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); Criminal Code 1988 (NT) s 170; Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 
290; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43.  
2 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 42; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(2); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 43.  
3 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(2); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 4, 13; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 15; Criminal Code 
Act 1924 (Tas) s 184A. 
4 See Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic); Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas). 
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Australian law continues to recognise that a competent adult may consent to or 
refuse medical treatment notwithstanding the particular reasons.5 This is irrespective 
of whether the reasons are ‘rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’.6 
However, although technically the reasons for the pregnant woman’s non-consent to 
intervention are not relevant in the law, where medical evidence suggests that non-
intervention will likely cause fetal demise, with little comparable harm to the pregnant 
woman, overseas case law has demonstrated that her capacity to make such a 
decision may be scrutinised.7  
The use of capacity to undermine autonomy underlines the law and medicine’s 
uneasiness in allowing a pregnant woman to do what she wishes to the fetus. It 
exposes the reality that although the law may not recognise the fetus as a person, it 
does not necessarily follow that it is a thing of no value.8 Ultimately, it highlights the 
unique status of pregnancy and the difficulty in trying to compare it to any other 
relationship in society. Potentially, this unique status of pregnancy holds back 
ultimate decision-making power from the pregnant woman to do with her body 
whatever she wishes in circumstances where prevention of harm to the fetus can be 
achieved.  
This thesis considers this to be an appropriate position for the law to take as it 
reflects scientific knowledge about the fetus and its capacity to be harmed, and the 
need to ethically justify its destruction. However this thesis concludes that whilst 
there is a continuing tension between fetal beneficence and maternal autonomy, law 
reform to increase state intervention in favour of fetal rights is a dwindling 
proposition. Such intervention would likely be seen as an unwelcome interference in 
a personal, medical decision of the pregnant woman and her doctor. The current 
trend in laws governing third party assaults on the fetus and abortion laws support 
this conclusion. Accordingly, intervention in a pregnant woman’s bodily autonomy 
may be restricted to rare and exceptional cases only. 
                                                
5 See, eg, Secretary Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (Marion’s Case) 1992 175 CLR 218, 
234; Brightwater Care Group Inc v Rossiter (2009) 40 WAR 84, 91 [24]-[26]. 
6 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (1993) Fam 95, 113. 
7 See, eg, Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) (1993) Fam 95, 113; Re MB [1997] FLR 426; Re AA [2013] 
EWCOP 4378. 
8 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [1998] 3 WLR 936, 952. Here the Court noted, ‘Whatever else it may be, a 
36-week foetus is not nothing; if viable it is not lifeless and it is certainly human.’ 
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This Chapter will discuss the key approaches to perceiving pregnancy in academic 
legal discourse,9 as well as a selection of relevant cases where the courts have been 
required to consider if and when a pregnant woman’s wishes about what may or may 
not be done to her body will be set aside in favour of saving the life of the fetus. 
Where there is no Australian case law on point, well-known cases from the United 
Kingdom, the United States and Canada will be considered although it should be 
noted that Australian law closely follows the law of the United Kingdom.10 
3.2 Approaches to perceiving pregnancy  
This section of the Chapter reviews key legal academic perspectives on pregnancy. It 
considers the constructs of the fetus and the pregnant woman as separate entities, 
and the more fluid relational analysis approach to the fetus and the pregnant woman, 
where there is no one way of perceiving the pregnant state. Further on in section 3.3, 
this thesis will consider whether and how those opinions are taken up in the law, 
where judges are required to grapple with notions of separateness or inter-
connectedness in real life scenarios.  
3.2 (a) Separate entity 
If it were accepted that the fetus was a person, than perceiving the fetus and the 
pregnant woman as separate entities with equal rights would be logical. The 
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church advocate this view. It consistently teaches 
that life must be absolutely respected and protected from the moment of conception, 
because from the time that the ovum is fertilised, a new life is begun which is neither 
that of the father nor of the mother; rather it is the life of a new human being with its 
own growth and its own rights as a person.11  
 
                                                
9 The materno-fetal conflict is the subject of voluminous commentary from the disciplines of philosophy, theology 
and science. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to critique these approaches.  
10 See Brightwater Care Group Inc v Rossiter WASC 229, 90-91 [24]-[27].  
11  Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Roman Catholic Church, ‘Instruction Dignitatis Personae On Certain 
Bioethical Questions’ (2008) 10-11. 
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The Church’s position is that there is an objective truth about the value of prenatal life 
and therefore purposefully destroying prenatal life goes against the natural law.12 
Accordingly, many reproductive medical practices are deemed immoral.13  Having 
said that, the Church permits destruction of the fetus in limited circumstances. These 
circumstances, however, must conform to the Church’s moral principles to pursue 
good and avoid evil.14  
Where there is a vital conflict between the pregnant woman and the unborn child, 
defined as an action that will likely save one of two lives but if not performed, both 
lives will be lost, the Church does not permit direct abortion.15 Accordingly, in those 
rare vital conflict situations, the Church’s position is controversial as it seeks to 
intervene in the woman’s right to preserve her life.16  
Tonti-Filippini gives examples of acceptable destruction of the fetus including ectopic 
pregnancy, severe pre-eclampsia, acute leukaemia and certain forms of cancer 
where pregnancy hastens the development of a potentially fatal cancer in the 
mother.17 Taking ectopic pregnancy as an example, the fetus implants itself into 
somewhere other than the uterus such as the fallopian tube and threatens the life of 
the woman should the tube rupture. The removal of the fallopian tube with the fetus 
within it is an indirect abortion as destruction of the fetus is a side effect of the 
woman’s medical treatment, and in any case, the fetus could not survive.18  
In contrast, Thompson in her seminal 1971 essay, ‘A Defense of Abortion’ took the 
alternative position of defending the morality of abortion whilst accepting that the 
fetus is a person.19 Thompson’s argument derives from the position that any special 
relationship a woman has with the unborn child can only exist where the woman has 
given the fetus permission to use her body.20  
                                                
12 Ibid 10.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Catechism of the Catholic Church (2nd ed, 2000) 1732. 
15 Kevin L Flannery, ‘Vital Conflicts and the Catholic Magisterial Tradition’ (2011) 11 National Catholic Bioethics 
Quarterly  691, 694.  
16 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, Bioethics – Motherhood, Embodied Love and Culture (Cooper Consulting Victoria, 
2013) 225.  
17 Tonti-Filippini, above n 16, 180. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Judith Jarvis Thompson, (1971) 1(1), ‘A Defence of Abortion’ (1971) Philosophy and Public Affairs, 47, 65-6.  
20 Ibid 61.  
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The fact the fetus requires the continued use of its mother’s body for nine months is 
not considered by Thomson to be a basis to establish that the fetus has a right to do 
so. In her view, the fetus does not possess any inherent dignity. Notwithstanding this, 
Thompson conceded the existence of situations where a fetus has a right to use its 
mother’s body and where an abortion would be an unjust killing. She noted: 
There may well be cases in which carrying the child to term requires only Minimally Decent 
Samaritanism of the mother and this is a standard we must not fall below… It would be 
indecent in the woman to request an abortion, and indecent in a doctor to perform it, if she is 
in her seventh month, and wants the abortion just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip 
abroad.21 
Thompson’s concept of the ‘minimally decent Samaritan’ concedes the need for the 
law to display a degree of justice or morality. As has been noted throughout this 
thesis, the concept of minimal justice is not completely foreign to legal positivism. It 
sits neatly with Kelsen’s comment that  
In order to be ‘law’ so theory has it, the positive state system must have concern for justice, 
be it a matter of assuring an ethical minimum, be it a matter of attempting however 
inadequately to be ‘right’ law, that is simply, to be just. In order to be ‘law’, the positive law 
must correspond in some measure, however modest, to the idea of law, to justice.22 
The acceptance by Thompson of limits to a woman’s right to abortion when the fetus 
is clearly viable, sits neatly with criminal laws that maintain child destruction offences 
for the fetus about to be born or capable of being born alive, and with abortion laws 
that regulate the lawfulness of abortion based on gestational age of the fetus. This is 
an important concession that underlines the moral dimension of abortion and the 
right to life. However Scott is critical of Thomson’s exceptions, which she describes 
as a narrow, rights-based morality position where the fetus has a right to the 
woman’s body, based on her special responsibility towards the fetus, which derives 
from her consent to become pregnant.23  
                                                
21 Ibid 65-6. 
22 Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1994) 22.  
23 Rosamund Scott, ‘The Pregnant Woman and the Good Samaritan’ (2000) 20(3) Oxford University Press 407, 
416.  
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This thesis agrees with this assessment of Thomson’s theory, which lacks clarity 
regarding where and when abortion is morally wrong and why. Exceptions, such as 
late term abortion for social reasons, are not adequately addressed by Thompson. It 
is not clear why the fetus’ dependence on the woman’s body for survival makes it 
morally right to destroy it. The potential to extend this rationale to other dependant 
persons such as the infirm, disabled or even temporarily dependant persons is 
obvious. Thompson’s reliance on the values of a minimally decent Samaritan for 
challenging scenarios seems strange where such values are not referred to in the 
initial premise of why it is permissible to destroy a fetus that she concedes is a 
person. 
3.2 (b) Relational analysis of pregnancy 
The relational analysis approach to pregnancy challenges common social and legal 
constructions of pregnancy and essentially perceives personhood as an integration of 
intrinsic and relational aspects as opposed to just the biological realities of the fetus. 
Known as the ‘not one, but not two’ approach to pregnancy, it has been propounded 
by Karpin, who has long been critical of the traditional legal conceptions of the female 
body.24 She has criticised the concepts of self and non-self in pregnancy as being 
decided by lawyers and biologists in what she refers to as ‘a strange legal-scientific 
coalition, using prenatal technologies to establish the fetus as a victimised subject.’25  
Karpin argues that legal personhood, being an abstract notion, should not be subject 
to traditional constructions of pregnancy as correct and privileged in their priority or 
importance.26 Rather, she recommends such constructions should be resisted where 
they result in legislation of the female body that leads to disempowerment of women 
and makes them available for public use.27 
 
                                                
24 Isabel Karpin, ‘Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman’ (1992) 
3(1) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 325, 329. 
25 Isabel Karpin, ‘Reimagining Maternal Selfhood: Transgressing Body Boundaries and the Law’ (1994) 2 
Australian Feminist Law Journal  36, 53-4.  
26 Karpin, above n 24, 349.  
27 Ibid. 
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Savell argues that maintaining birth as the time when the human being becomes a 
person is defensible, notwithstanding technological advances where the fetus can be 
seen and where its developmental progression raises issues about ‘personhood’ in a 
philosophical sense.28 She argues that comparisons between late term fetuses and 
newborn babies are crude, and that the resemblance between a fetus and a person 
is by virtue of the value ascribed to them through their relations with kin, particularly 
mothers, as opposed to just the fetus’ intrinsic properties.29  
Seymour observes that this approach will invariably encounter opposition from those 
who wish to define the fetus and to punctuate arguments about its destruction with 
assumptions about the essential nature of the fetus.30 He argues that this relational 
approach presents a more sophisticated analysis based on the context of destruction 
and avoids perceiving pregnancy as a conflict between competing entities.31 
Arguably, this construction allows the possibility for late term abortions to sit neatly 
with third party destruction of the fetus, and with refusal to undergo medical treatment 
to save the unborn child. Knowledge of physical realities of the developed fetus 
would be subjugated to the value ascribed to the fetus by the mother and her consent 
(or refusal) to continuing the pregnancy. Such a construction would seem to disallow 
state intervention in pregnancy, certainly in a criminal sense, and permit abortion on 
demand. It is not clear when fetal interests overtake maternal ones. Seymour 
concedes that this flexibility in outcome can be seen as either a strength or an 
‘unprincipled refusal to acknowledge the true nature of the fetus’.32 
Whilst this approach to pregnancy permits the flexibility to change the value of the 
fetus, it might still be subject to criticism by those pregnant women wanting firm legal 
recognition of the loss of their unborn child in a third party assault on them. It still 
withholds from the fetus legal personhood and by extension, the right to be 
recognised as having died. The degree to which the parent may require a specific 
legal result as opposed to being able to say the law recognises the fetus ‘died’ is 
                                                
28 Kristen Savell, ‘Is the Born Alive Rule Outdated and Indefensible?’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 631, 644 
29 Ibid. 
30 John Seymour, ‘Legal Status of the Fetus: An International Review’ (2002) 10 Journal of Law and Medicine 28, 
39.  
31 Ibid 40. 
32 Ibid 40. 
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unknown. The former requires a change in legal principle, the latter might be satisfied 
by a change in phraseology (as proposed by Dalmou in his alternative to Zoe’s Law, 
referred to in Chapter Two of this thesis).33  
However the interdependence required of this relational analysis of pregnancy does 
not provide clear solutions to conflict between the pregnant woman and the fetus.34 
Thampapillai observes that it cannot escape the requirement that a choice be made 
in favour of one or the other.35 Having either the pregnant woman or a third party to 
be the judge of this decision, simply morphs the theory back into the single entity 
theory.36 
This theory seems to simply provide a basis for the pregnant woman to justify any 
decision she makes that affects the fetus. Arguably there is no baseline on which to 
judge the appropriateness of the pregnant woman’s acts or omissions that will harm 
the fetus.   
3.3 Duty of care to the unborn child 
The Victorian case of Watt v Rama37 provides precedent in Australian law for a duty 
of care to the fetus, on the basis that the fetus may only exercise their right to sue for 
injuries occasioned within the womb, after they are born.  A significant case, it is 
precedent for the notion of a contingent relationship capable of developing into the 
kind required by tort law. It held that the fact there was separation in time between 
the negligent act or omission and the injury was not a bar to the action.38 
Casey notes that this reasoning depends on a ‘metaphysical miracle’.39 He suggests 
that the law is better off ‘…identifying the fetus with its biological successor. The 
                                                
33 James Dalmou, ‘An Alternative to Zoe’s Law’ (2015) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 698. 
34 Dilan Thampapillai, ‘Court-Ordered Obstetrical Intervention and the Rights of the Pregnant Woman’ (2005) 12 
Journal of Law and Medicine 455, 458 
35  Ibid.  
36  Ibid.  
37 [1972] VR 353. 
38  Ibid 359. 
39 Gerard Casey, Born Alive: The Legal Status of the Unborn Child in England and the U.S.A (Barry Rose Law 
Publishers, 2005) 40. 
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physical damage subsisting in the newborn child could then constitute evidence of 
the damage inflicted by the defendant on that same child as a fetus in utero.’40  
However this would require the law to abandon the born alive rule or to simply extend 
legal personhood to the unborn child in that particular circumstance.  
 
Obviously, this has the same practical problems encountered with attempts to 
provide legal personhood to the unborn child for criminal assaults by third parties, 
discussed in Chapter Two. Case law has developed incrementally to expand this 
principle to driving offences where a pregnant woman, through negligent driving, has 
caused injury to the fetus in utero. After surviving the accident, the fetus, now a legal 
person, brings a negligence action against its mother for harm caused in the womb 
resulting in ongoing injuries suffered as a person.  
3.3 (a) Negligent driving 
In the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision Lynch v Lynch, Clarke JA noted 
that although very difficult public policy decisions might arise when determining 
whether certain types of conduct by a pregnant woman cause her to be liable for her 
child’s disabilities occasioned in the womb, when it comes to negligent driving, the 
question is narrow.41 The relevant Act central to the case in Lynch v Lynch involved 
the creation of a scheme whereby persons injured as a result of negligent driving 
could be compensated so that a claim would not be defeated by a tortfeasor being 
impecunious.42 
The Court held that in determining whether the mother had a liability towards the 
child injured by her driving, it would not be required to scrutinise the mother’s conduct 
in the years prior to the incident. Rather, the Court would have to decide the very 
narrow question of whether the mother drove the vehicle negligently and caused 
injury to the child, resulting in cerebral palsy.43 Accordingly, the Court held that a 
tortfeasor’s liability to an unborn child in the context of a motor vehicle accident is 
maintained even where the tortfeasor is the pregnant woman who was negligently 
                                                
40 Ibid.  
41 Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411, 415. 
42 Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942 (NSW), s 15 (2)(a).  
43 Lynch v Lynch (1991) 25 NSWLR 411, 416. 
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driving the motor vehicle. To provide the mother with immunity from suit in these 
circumstances was said to single out children injured in the antenatal period as being 
a class of individuals to be denied access to a fund that every other car accident 
victim can access.44  
Critical of this decision, Karpin notes the ‘political expediency of the notion of 
separateness’ between the fetus and the pregnant woman.45 In order to make the 
woman responsible, she says, it is necessary to emphasise their separateness, so as 
to exteriorise the fetus and empower it. Yet at the same time, their connectedness 
must also be accepted as the fetus’ claim for damages is sustained through the 
argument that when the woman is injured, so too is the fetus. Pitting the mother 
against the child is, she argues, ‘a political decision which affords greater control over 
the female body and over women’.46 
This view regarding the motivations behind such legal rationales is unconvincing. 
Tort law deals with the economic outcome of harm caused by wrongdoing as well as 
with justice. To withhold compensation for injury from the child merely to stay true to 
an abstract notion of pregnancy seems impractical and unjust. It is not consistent 
with how the laws of negligence have developed in Australia where it has found ways 
to deliver justice in a particular situation whilst balancing other potential interests.  
 
Certainly driving offences, where an insurance scheme covers compensation in a 
simple liability scenario, is a very narrow basis to consider a maternal duty of care. 
The acts or omissions of the pregnant driver affect not just her and the fetus, but 
potentially all drivers using the road at the same time as her. More controversial is 
developing the scope and content of a duty of care by the mother to the unborn child 
in other scenarios. Kerr notes   
 
If, from the point of view of the law, an unborn child is not a person and therefore is not the 
subject of rights and duties, it must follow that a pregnant woman and her unborn child are 
one. Consequently, a pregnant woman cannot owe a duty of care to her fetus any more than 
she can owe a duty of care to herself. Thus the only possible rights that the child could be 
                                                
44 Ibid 416. 
45 Karpin, above n 24, 330.  
46 Ibid.  
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 57 
said to have prior to birth are those which can be derived from the rights of the pregnant 
woman.47 
 
Certainly, there is logic to this statement. As has been discussed earlier in Chapter 
Two, the law is hesitant to dislodge the born alive rule even though it is 
acknowledged as being ‘an artificial and non-scientific construct of when life 
begins.’48 Whilst the law recognises that the fetus can be harmed in utero, it has 
steadfastly refused to re-consider personhood for the fetus and has demonstrated a 
clear commitment to tolerate a legal artificial construct of the person, and to use it as 
a starting point which other laws must conform to.  
 
Stewart and Stuhmcke argue that a uniform legal approach to defining the fetus is an 
impossibility and that in reality, every legal area has a separate way of determining 
how to recognise the fetus in the law.49 They consider this to be appropriate where 
various areas of law have different policy requirements that serve differing social, 
economic and moral interests. Whilst this thesis concedes that there may be scope to 
separate out criminal assaults by third parties from second party assaults occasioned 
by the pregnant woman on the fetus, the circumstances discussed in this Chapter 
have a common core of maternal autonomy and therefore the same approach to the 
fetus ought to be taken. Additionally, it seems illogical to separate out materno-fetal 
conflicts from abortion and by extension, conscientious objection by doctors to 
participating in abortion.  
 
The following section focuses on behaviour of pregnant women known to cause fetal 
harm such as drug taking, smoking or exposure to danger. Here the courts have 
acknowledged the reality of fetal harm separate to the pregnant woman, and is asked 
to reconcile the lawfulness of allowing the pregnant woman to cause harm to the 
fetus on the basis of autonomy, with what are sometimes terrible consequences for 
the fetus who goes on to be born.  Articulating a maternal duty of care to the unborn 
child is a great challenge given every act the pregnant woman makes may impact the 
fetus in one way or another.  
                                                
47 Ian R Kerr, ‘Pregnant Women and the ‘Born Alive’ Rule in Canada’ (2000) 8(1) Tort Law Review 13, 14-5.  
48 R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278 [78]. 
49 Pam Stewart and Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Legal Pragmatism and the Pre-Birth Continuum: An Absence of Unifying 
Principle’ (2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 272, 294.  
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3.3 (b) Reckless maternal behaviour during pregnancy 
Paltrow50 argues that no mother can provide the perfect womb and that recognition of 
fetal abuse criminalises pregnancy. The mother could be reluctant to seek pre-natal 
care or to give honest and accurate information to health care providers for fear of 
reprisals, and this in turn could negatively affect the fetus’ well being. 51  
In contrast, the author of Maternal Rights and Wrongs, argues that narrow laws that 
target specific conduct might well strike the correct balance, particularly where such 
behaviours are already criminal when engaged in by the non-pregnant woman, such 
as taking heroin, and the crime is one that imposes a special penalty as against the 
pregnant woman.52 As the link between heroin abuse and fetal distress is strong, 
such a law might well be valid. However Faunce makes a good point that to apply 
such laws to women who do not know they are pregnant creates not just two entities 
competing for rights, but an extended obligation on fertile women to know at all times 
whether they are pregnant and to modify their behaviour.53   
Robertson54 argues for post birth sanctions on pregnant women in ‘egregious cases’ 
only, with the State pursuing criminal prosecution of the mother for pre-natal conduct 
causing severe impairment to the child. However mainstream behaviours that are not 
criminal could still result in significant harm to the fetus such as eating junk food or 
not taking medications.  
Faunce notes that with those behaviours, there must be a turning point where the 
desire to contravene fetal rights does not exceed the desire to infringe the mother’s 
autonomy. Otherwise, the unborn child’s autonomy has legal primacy over the 
mother’s interests.55 However if autonomy means a person with capacity may do 
whatever they wish, and if the fetus is considered part of the mother, then it is hard to 
identify such a turning point without compromising the principle of autonomy. 
                                                
50 J Robertson & L Paltrow, ‘Fetal Abuse: Should We Recognise It As A Crime?’ (1989) 75 American Bar 
Association Journal 38, 38. 
51  Ibid.  
52 ‘Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalisation of Fetal Abuse’ (1988) 101 Harvard 
Law Review 994 (‘Maternal Rights and Wrongs’). 
53 Thomas Faunce, ‘Crimes Amendment (Zoe’s Law) Bill 2013 (No 2): Paradoxical Commercial Impacts of the 
Conservative Agenda on Fetal Rights’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 308, 311.  
54 Robertson, above n 50.  
55 Faunce, above n 53, 312. 
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Deciding on a standard of care for the reasonable pregnant woman would indeed be 
difficult. Roberts56 argues that it is possible to articulate a standard of care for the 
pregnant woman towards her fetus. This could be done by measuring the degree to 
which her freedom to engage in certain behaviours is infringed, by the extent to 
which fetal protection can be assured.57  
Two well-known international case law examples follow where the court refused to 
elevate the interests of the fetus over the autonomy of the pregnant woman. In 
Winnipeg Child and Services (Northwest Area) v G, the Canadian Supreme Court 
considered whether a pregnant woman could be negligent for sniffing glue during the 
pregnancy and causing harm to the fetus that was at 37 weeks gestation. The 
majority denied liability on the basis that to do so would introduce ‘a radically new 
conception to the law, the unborn child and its mother as separate juristic persons in 
a mutually separable and antagonistic relation.’58 The pregnant woman’s autonomy 
to do as she sees fit, even where it has a serious, indirect consequence on the fetus, 
was upheld on the basis that in one sense she is the fetus and the court may not 
intervene.59 The dissenting judgment however criticised the use of the born alive rule 
as being based on basic medical knowledge long overtaken by advances in medical 
science.60 
The Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom in In re F (in utero)61 considered whether 
a fetus could be made a ward of the state on the grounds that the behaviour of the 
pregnant woman was endangering it. Here, the fetus was accepted to be one that 
was capable of being born alive.62 The pregnant woman was mentally disturbed and 
led a nomadic existence.63 Local authorities held fears for the safety of the unborn 
child and wanted her found and admitted to a hospital.64  
                                                
56 D Roberts, ‘Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy’ 
(1991) 104 Harvard Law Review 1041.  
57 Ibid 1041. 
58 Winnipeg Child and Services (Northwest Area) v G [1997] 152 DLR (4th) 193, 207 [29].  
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid 227.  
61 [1988] 2 WLR 1288. 
62 Ibid 1294. 
63 Ibid 1291.  
64 Ibid 1292. 
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The Court held that as a fetus has no existence independent of its mother, the Court 
could not exercise its rights, powers and duties of a parent over the fetus without 
controlling the actions of the pregnant woman.65 Confirming the Court’s hesitation to 
becoming involved with changing the fundamentals of the law, Balcombe L.J noted  
If the law is to be extended in this manner, so as to loose control over the mother of an unborn 
child where such control may be necessary for the benefit of that child, then under our system 
of Parliamentary democracy it is for Parliament to decide whether such controls can be 
imposed and, if so, subject to what limitations or conditions…. In such a sensitive field, 
affecting as it does the liberty of the individual, it is not for the judiciary to extend the law.66 
These decisions apply foundational principles such as the born alive rule, with its 
denial of fetal personhood, and bodily autonomy, with its focus on beneficence, to 
ground rationale to reject any maternal duty of care to the unborn. Given the 
existence of similar principles in Australia, it seems unlikely that a different result 
could occur here without the introduction of laws that reverse these principles. 
Authority exists for the lack of basis for guardianship orders in respect of the unborn 
child based on the born alive rule.67 
Whilst an argument might be made that in other Australian laws affecting the fetus, 
viability or gestational age are used to give value to the fetus as an entity, harm to 
the fetus through reckless maternal behaviour might well occur at earlier gestational 
ages.68 This would be another hurdle to defining the scope of any duty and the class 
of persons foreseeably affected by the negligent acts or omissions. Ultimately, the 
concept of maternal duty of care is difficult to apply in practice and seems very 
unlikely to be introduced into Australian law.  
This thesis now considers the more contentious issue of a pregnant woman’s refusal 
of medical treatment that creates risk of harm to the fetus. It is a good illustration of 
the consequences of exercising bodily autonomy and what circumstances, if any, will 
override the mother’s wishes.  
                                                
65 Ibid 1301, 1306, 1307.  
66 Ibid 1306.  
67 Attorney-General (Qld) (Ex el Kerr) v T (1983) 57 ALJR 285. 
68 See, Emily Gordon, ‘State Intervention in Pregnancy: Should the Law Respond Thus to the problem of Foetal 
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder?’ (2015) 23 Journal of Law and Medicine 156, 157. Gordon notes that the fetus is 
most vulnerable to brain damage in the first trimester of pregnancy and then again in the middle of the second 
trimester until birth.  
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3.3 (c) Maternal refusal of medical treatment 
If one accepts that the fetus has no legal rights until birth, and a person with capacity 
can refuse medical treatment because of the principle of beneficence, then at first 
blush it is difficult to see how the law can make an exception and force a woman to 
undergo any type of surgical procedure that may result in harm to her in order to 
benefit the fetus, even where the outcome may be fatal for the fetus.  
Compelling a pregnant woman to undergo medical treatment differs from 
endangering the fetus by glue sniffing and other behaviour because the pregnant 
woman is required to undergo a medical procedure against her will that affects her 
wellbeing and carries with it the usual medical risks of surgery. Requiring a pregnant 
woman to undergo a caesarean section delivery is comparable to a person being 
compelled to undergo surgery to save another person’s life, such as donating a body 
part. 69  
Annas argues that with no one ever being forced to undergo surgery for another, 
then to be forced to undergo surgery for a fetus is ironic as the fetus has less legal 
status than the born child.70 Annas makes the practical observation that the cases 
that come before the courts that involve the refusal of a woman to undergo a 
caesarean section are decided within hours, without time for thoughtful judicial 
consideration of the rights of the pregnant woman.71 Additionally, he argues that 
physician prediction of harm to the fetus can be inaccurate, with investigations such 
as cardiotocograph monitoring of the fetal heart rate being notoriously sensitive, 
leading to an overstatement of the potential risk of danger.72   
Of course caesarean section is only one of a number of medical treatments that a 
pregnant woman might be recommended to undergo for the benefit of her unborn 
child. Others include blood transfusions. Pregnant women belonging to the Jehovah’s 
Witness faith may refuse to undergo blood transfusion on religious grounds. 
Additionally, treatment may result in very little infringement on her bodily integrity 
such as the taking of a pill, thus raising moral issues as to what possible 
                                                
69 George J Annas, ‘Forced Caesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All’ (1982) The Hastings Centre Report 16.  
70 Ibid 17. 
71 Ibid 16. 
72 Ibid 17.  
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circumstances permit the law to uphold her refusal to take it where the fetus might 
suffer significant harm.73  
A line of authority exists in the United Kingdom demonstrating that whilst maternal 
autonomy takes precedence over concern for the fetus, front and centre of such 
decisions is a review of the pregnant woman’s capacity to make the decision to 
refuse treatment. In the decisions noted below, the Courts have been keen to note 
that an irrational decision by a pregnant woman that may well cause harm or death to 
her or the fetus should not be assumed to indicate a lack of capacity. Whilst the 
discomfort of health care professionals is understandable, the Court is clear that 
demise of the fetus is the price to be paid for maintaining autonomy. 
In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment), a declaration was sought from the father of a 
woman who had recently given birth and who had refused a blood transfusion, for the 
hospital to administer the transfusion without her consent, based on her best 
interests.74 The woman’s mother was a practising Jehovah’s Witness and was 
against a blood transfusion and there were concerns the woman was unduly 
influenced by her and also by erroneous information by hospital staff that other 
means were available and effective if she refused blood transfusion.75  
Although the woman was not a practising Jehovah’s Witness, she signed forms to 
refuse a blood transfusion for the birth and on deterioration of her condition following 
birth, she became unconscious and unable to re-consider this decision in light of her 
new medical circumstances.76 Ultimately, the Court held there was no valid refusal of 
treatment and that the hospital was right in treating her on the basis of necessity.77 
Lord Donaldson noted that  
…a patient’s right of choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, 
irrational, unknown or even non-existent. That his choice is contrary to what is to be expected 
of the vast majority of adults is only relevant if there are other reasons for doubting his 
                                                
73 Scott, above n 23, 422.  
74 [1993] Fam 95. 
75 Ibid 105, 110. 
76 Ibid 105.  
77 Ibid 120, 122. 
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capacity to decide. The nature of his choice or the terms in which it is expressed may then tip 
the balance.78  
In Re MB (Medical Treatment), the appellant was a pregnant woman whose 40-week 
fetus was in breech presentation.79 She was advised that without a caesarean 
section delivery, there was a 50% risk to the fetus of death or brain injury, with little 
danger to her.80 Although she originally consented to the caesarean delivery, the 
woman withdrew her consent right before the surgery was to take place due to a 
needle phobia.81  
The health authority applied for a declaration from the High Court that it would be 
lawful to operate on the woman to affect a caesarean delivery and to use reasonable 
force if necessary. A psychiatric assessment was performed and concluded that the 
woman was competent and understood the need for the caesarean and consented to 
it, but the needle phobia caused a panic in the final phase that dominated her 
thinking. He felt the woman lacked the capacity to see very far beyond the immediate 
situation and there was likely to be long-term significant damage if the operation did 
not go ahead and the baby died or was handicapped.82  
In its reasoning, the Court reviewed case law, statue and overseas authorities but re-
stated the principle in Re T, that it had no jurisdiction to take into account the unborn 
child that might be injured by a mentally competent woman’s refusal to undergo a 
caesarean section regardless of whether it is for any reason, rational or irrational or 
for no reason at all and even where that decision might lead to their death.83 The 
evidence here was that the woman wanted a healthy baby and had consented to the 
caesarean and only withdrew that consent because of her needle phobia.84 There 
was enough evidence to satisfy the Court that the woman had a temporary lack of 
capacity and that it was in the woman’s best interests to have medical intervention 
using reasonable force if necessary.  
                                                
78 Ibid 113.  
79 [1997] 2 FLR 426. 
80 Ibid [2].  
81 Ibid [3]-[4]. 
82 Ibid [8], [36]. 
83 Ibid [17].  
84 Ibid [36].  
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In arriving at its decision, the Court acknowledged the lack of logic in having child 
destruction laws which punish those who destroy the child capable of being born 
alive, as well as boundaries for abortion set by the Abortion Act 1967 (UK) but not 
protect the fetus from an irrational decision of a competent mother to refuse medical 
treatment that will avert death. However it simply noted ‘… this appears to be the 
present state of the law.’85  
The plurality held 
The law is, in our judgment, clear that a competent woman who has the capacity to decide 
may, for religious reasons, other reasons, or for no reasons at all, choose not to have medical 
intervention, even though, as we have already stated, the consequence may be the death or 
serious handicap of the child she bears or her own death….The foetus up to the moment of 
birth does not have any separate interests capable of being taken into account when a court 
has to consider an application for a declaration in respect of a caesarean section operation. 
The court does not have the jurisdiction to declare that such medical intervention is lawful to 
protect the interests of the unborn child even at the point of birth.86 
Following Re MB, an example of an irrational yet competent decision of a pregnant 
woman to refuse a caesarean section was seen in St George’s Healthcare NHS 
Trust v S.87 Here the woman was 36 weeks pregnant and diagnosed with pre-
eclampsia. Both her life and that of the fetus were at risk.88 Understanding this 
advice, she refused on the basis that she wanted a natural delivery.89 Found to be 
competent, the Court held that the relevant Mental Health legislation could not be 
used by the hospital to detain her merely because the woman’s thinking process was 
‘unusual, even apparently bizarre and irrational, and contrary to the views of the 
overwhelming majority of the community at large.’90 
 
 
                                                
85 Ibid [50].  
86 Ibid [60]. 
87 [1998] 3 All ER 673. 
88 Ibid 677. 
89 Ibid 677.  
90 Ibid 692. 
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Scott argues that apart from reiterating that the fetus is not a person, these cases fail 
to address the question of why a pregnant woman, clearly different to a non –
pregnant woman, should have the same right as any other competent adult to refuse 
treatment.91 In St George’s Healthcare v NHS, Scott observes that the Court merely 
confirmed that despite the pregnant woman’s moral obligations to the fetus, her legal 
rights remained intact.92 Therefore, the failure of the courts to enforce moral duties 
the pregnant woman may have to the fetus, this line of cases merely leaves the 
impression of an uncomfortable split between the law and ethics relating to a 
pregnant woman’s rights.93 
This thesis agrees with this assessment. In support, Thampapillai notes that implicit 
in the arguments in favour of intervention are a judgment that the pregnant woman’s 
decision to refuse intervention is immoral.94 Ultimately such applications to courts 
assume that a woman cannot objectively decide between her health and that of the 
fetus and if she decides in her favour, she will be regarded as self-serving or weak.95 
A recent example of capacity and a pregnant woman from the United Kingdom is that 
of Re AA.96 Here, the Court of Protection ruled that a hospital could use restraints 
and perform a caesarean section delivery on a mentally ill pregnant woman, 
scheduled under the Mental Health Act who was 39 weeks pregnant.97 The woman 
expressed a desire to have a natural vaginal delivery despite the fact she had 
delivered two previous children by caesarean section and was told of the risks to the 
fetus of brain damage, and a 1% risk to herself of a ruptured uterus. 98 
The treating psychiatrist gave evidence that she lacked the requisite capacity to 
refuse a caesarean due to her mental illness. Importantly, the option of allowing a 
natural delivery with intervention only should complications occur, was dismissed as 
not being a workable option. This was because the pregnant woman would need to 
advise hospital staff when she went into labour so as to allow them to monitor her. 
                                                
91 Scott, above n 23, 408. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid.  
94 Thampapillai, above n 34, 459. 
95 Thampapillai, above n 34, 459. 
96 [2013] EWCOP 4378, 1.  
97 Ibid [2]. 
98 Ibid [4].  
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This was considered to be a difficult proposition, given she had delusions and anxiety 
about the birth itself. Mostyn J noted the case fell squarely within the ambit of Re 
MB.99 In finding that the caesarean was in the woman’s best interests, Mostyn J 
noted that the 1% risk of uterine rupture was significant. Additionally His Honour 
noted that it was in her best mental health interests that her child be born alive and 
healthy.100  
It is debatable whether risks to the pregnant woman were serious enough to override 
her actual refusal. Medical opinions relating to hypothetical future events are not 
guarantees of outcome. However here, the pregnant woman was legally represented 
and no contrary evidence was adduced.  
An often criticised decision from the United States is that of In re A.C101, where the 
District of Columbia Circuit court ordered a Hospital to perform a caesarean section 
delivery on a 26 and a half weeks pregnant woman who was terminally ill with cancer 
and whose membranes had ruptured 60 hours earlier.102 The medical evidence was 
that to allow the labour to proceed naturally, would lead to a 50-75% risk that the 
baby would suffer from infection which could be fatal or lead to brain damage, and 
that caesarean section was the only method to avoid this risk to the fetus. The risk to 
the mother of adverse consequences with caesarean section delivery was assessed 
at 25%.103  
The court at first instance (making the decision at the Hospital and under time 
constraints) held that it had a compelling interest that would override the woman’s 
objections to undergoing the surgery.104 In line with relevant United States abortion 
law, the court reasoned that the State had an important and legitimate interest in 
protecting the potentiality of human life and that at the point of viability, that interest 
becomes compelling.105 Given the significant risks to the fetus as compared to the 
                                                
99 Ibid [1]. 
100 Ibid [5].  
101 573 A2d 1235 (DC App 1990). 
102 Ibid 1239. 
103 Ibid 1239. 
104 Ibid 1240. 
105 Ibid 1240. 
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pregnant woman, the court held that there was a compelling interest for the court to 
intervene and protect the life and safety of the fetus.106  
The woman consented to the caesarean after she was informed of the court’s 
decision but then withdrew that consent.107 The caesarean delivery took place but 
tragically, both the woman and the child that was born, died. The District of Columbia 
Court of Appeal re-heard the case a few months later on application by the estate of 
the deceased woman. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision, noting that  
although the possibility of a conflicting state interest might be so compelling that the 
patient’s wishes are overridden, such cases would be ‘extremely rare and truly 
exceptional’ and this was not such a case.108  
Karpin notes that cases such as In re AC are the ultimate scenario for the 
construction of the female body as ‘a replaceable container for the separate and 
alienable fetus and the annihilation of the female as active participant.’109 The court, 
she observes, chose to ‘treat her body as permeable, penetrable and insignificant, as 
mere flesh to be cut into to save the “innocent’110 where the effect was to de-value 
the mother’s life.   
This thesis suggests that this particular case does not present the ‘ultimate scenario’. 
The outcome itself, with death of mother and child, suggests it was a highly unusual, 
emergency medical situation, where the capacity to determine the issues at hand 
were limited. An irrational reason given by the mother to refuse any intervention, 
where it is documented and given in advance of any emergency setting, may 
arguably cause less anguish to the health professionals involved with care.  
 
 
 
                                                
106 Ibid 1240. 
107 Ibid 1252. 
108 Ibid 1252.  
109 Karpin, above n 24, 346. 
110 Ibid. 
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Lyng et al argue that in an emergency situation, doctors have the right to perform a 
caesarean section without the woman’s consent in order to save the fetus.111 In 
taking into account the weakest right and the greatest health benefit, they conclude 
that deliberate violation of the mother’s bodily autonomy can still occur.112 This of 
course is a medical reaction to a legal issue but serves to highlight the point made in 
this thesis that the born alive rule cannot please everyone’s conception of what the 
fetus and its value is.  
Certainly, doctors who are charged to care for the pregnant woman may well have 
the fetus strongly in mind. With advances in medicine, fetal surgery now occurs 
where the fetus is in the mother’s uterus. Uppal et al note the incongruity of a fetus 
having no legal rights or identity being treated as a patient from a medical 
perspective.113 This is a perplexing problem as it unmasks the fiction of pretending 
the fetus is not a separate entity capable of being harmed.    
Cases involving religious convictions can be differentiated from irrational refusals to 
undergo treatment in that there is an acceptance by the medical profession and the 
courts that those convictions are held by a number of people, not just the pregnant 
woman in issue. So, however unusual the conviction may be to others, the decision 
to refuse is not immediately seen as evidence on incapacity. This raises some 
interesting issues regarding tolerance in both medicine and the law for non-main 
stream points of view about life issues and lifestyles, particularly those based on 
religious beliefs. 
Gyamfi et al recommend that where physicians take on the care of a patient who 
refuses treatment, such as a Jehovah’s Witness refusing a blood transfusion, the 
physician should do so only after deciding that they can let the patient die when all 
other options have been exhausted.114 They note that although the physician may 
want to ‘do no harm’ they need to consider that in the case of a Jehovah’s Witness, 
                                                
111 Kristin Lyng, Aslak Syse and Per E Bordhal, ‘Can Cesarean Section Be Performed Without Woman’s 
Consent?’ (2005) 84 Acta Obstetrics and Gynaecologia Scandinavica 39, 42.  
112 Ibid.  
113 Talat Uppal, et al, ‘The Legal Status of the Fetus in New South Wales’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine, 
178, 179.  
114 Cynthia Gyamfi, Mavis M Gyamfi and Richard L Berkowitz, ‘Ethical and Medicolegal Considerations in the 
Obstetric Care of a Jehovah’s Witness’ (2003) 102(1) Obstetrics and Gynecology 173, 174.  
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most members of the sect would consider it worse off to be eternally damned than to 
die from refusing a blood transfusion.115  
Earlier this year, Biscoe and Kidson-Gerber published a case note of the tragic death 
of a pregnant woman at Sydney Hospital who refused a life-saving blood transfusion 
that would more likely than not have saved her and the unborn child’s life.116 The 
woman, who was a Jehovah’s Witness, was seven months pregnant and suffered 
from acute proyelocytic leukaemia and pre-eclampsia. She had an advanced care 
directive refusing blood transfusion and was fully informed of the circumstance-
specific consequences, including death. In line with the law, both she and the unborn 
child perished. They warn that as more fetal-specific treatments become available, 
conflict between the best interests of mother and fetus will increase.117  
Biscoe and Kidson-Gerber recommend that the development of a clear 
understanding by the physician of their own attitudes and beliefs will, with the 
assistance of open communication between hospital staff and, if time allows, 
identifying alternative treating doctors, improve care to the patient.118 This would 
avoid the emergency situation such as In re AC referred to earlier, and suggests best 
practice.  
Tonti-Filippini observes that doctors used to have clear duties to serve the health 
needs of a patient, but today their obligations are determined by what the patient 
wants.119 This in turn may cause conflict between doctor and patient.120 This is seen 
in the cases discussed in this Chapter, and it has a parallel in conscientious objection 
by doctors to participating in abortion, discussed in Chapter Eight of this thesis. In 
both scenarios, the lack of legal recognition of the fetus as a person, does not 
dissolve concerns by medical staff that they are dealing with two patients.   
                                                
115 Ibid 173. 
116 Alison Biscoe and Giselle Kidson-Geber, ‘Avoidable Death of a Pregnant Jehovah’s Witness with Acute 
Promyelocytic Leukaemia: Ethical Considerations and the Internal Conflicts and Challenges Encountered by 
Practitioners’ (2015) 45(4) Internal Medicine Journal 416, 462.  
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, About Bioethics – Philosophical and Theological Approaches (Connor Court 
Publishing, 2011), 24. 
120 Ibid.  
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It remains to be seen whether refusal to undergo a caesarean based on personal 
choice by a pregnant woman can be elevated to the same level of respect as that of 
a religious conviction that serves to underpin a similar refusal. One assumes that a 
legal system that does not recognise personhood in the fetus and values bodily 
autonomy will have to accommodate this outcome. However whether the community 
and its political representatives have the same capacity, is uncertain.  
These case examples demonstrate the ethical conundrum of balancing fetal 
beneficence with maternal autonomy. Generally speaking, the cases consistently 
favour recognition of bodily autonomy. Where they do not, the case falls under an 
exception, whereby the woman is said to lack the requisite capacity to refuse the 
caesarean section. Obviously proving lack of consent where a person has a pre-
existing mental health illness can be complicated and no doubt any judgment call is 
bound to be open to criticism.  
The question at the centre of such refusals to undergo medical treatment, particularly 
where there is grave danger to the fetus and little inconvenience to the woman, is the 
rubric of what a good mother would do.121 This situation underscores the unique 
position of the pregnant woman and the law’s desire for ethical minimums that has 
been elsewhere argued in this thesis. It demonstrates the divide between the theory 
of bodily autonomy for the pregnant woman and the reality of medical practice, which 
recognises two patients.  
The legal position in Australia is likely to be the same, where respect for bodily 
autonomy and the competent adult’s decision to refuse medical treatment are long 
standing principles. Upholding foundational principles that the pregnant woman has 
bodily autonomy to decide what medical procedures will or will not be performed on 
her, and that the fetus is not a person, lead to reasonably clear outcomes in favour of 
the pregnant woman. However as the Court noted in Re MB, irrationality sits uneasily 
with competence and therefore, the graver the consequences of the decision, the 
greater the level of competence required to accept the decision.122 
                                                
121 See, eg Belinda Bennett, ‘Pregnant Women and the Duty to Rescue: A Feminist Response to the Fetal Rights 
Debate’ (1991) 9 Law in Context 70, 76; Thampapillai, above n 34, 459. 
122 [1997] 2 FLR 426 [26]. 
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3.4 Summary 
These cases demonstrate the unusual situation that the pregnant woman finds 
herself in that really has no equivalent counterpart in the tort world. As the purpose of 
the positive law is not to legislate morality,123 the courts have not been keen to 
develop a line of reasoning to create a definitive legal duty of care for the mother to 
the unborn child. However these cases demonstrate the reality of pregnancy, where 
the medical world perceives they have two patients despite what the law says. It 
highlights the divide between academic legal discourse and the reality of medical 
practice.  
Changing societal views on bodily autonomy for pregnant women or indeed the 
status of the fetus may result in uncomfortable situations for medical professionals 
forced to accede to a legally valid maternal directive where the indirect result may be 
the demise of the fetus. There is obvious consistency in outcome in allowing a 
maternal directive, which has an indirect result of fetal destruction, and abortion, 
which is essentially a maternal directive to directly destroy the fetus.  
However as Scott notes, given the undeniable difference between a pregnant and 
non-pregnant patient, an ethical justification for abortion is desirable.124 Requiring a 
justification for abortion is consistent with the legal position in Australia, except for 
those jurisdictions that allow abortion on demand, discussed in Chapter Seven. 
However as this Chapter has shown, a pregnant woman’s refusal of medical 
treatment that will harm the fetus does not require justification in the law, only 
confirmation that she has the capacity to make the decision.  
Arguably, the principle of bodily autonomy and the born alive rule provide a platform 
for lawful abortion for any reason. As will be seen in the following Chapters, a 
disparate approach exists in Australia regarding when abortion is lawful. It is based 
on a need to show evidence of negative impact on maternal health or the gestational 
age of the fetus or the presence of disability in the fetus.  
                                                
123 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 184. Hart notes that ‘not all extensions 
of morality beyond obligations and ideals generally recognised in a given society need take the form of social 
criticism’.  
124 Rosamund Scott, Rights, Duties and the Body, (Hart Publishing, 2002) 183.  
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However as will be argued by this thesis in the following Chapters, where the law 
provides an unclear or discretionary basis for doctors and judges to consider the 
lawfulness of an abortion, the ethical relativism that is undeniably present in our 
society, weakens the law and makes it vulnerable to criticism. Its capacity to deliver 
consistent legal results and provide clear guidelines to both the community and the 
medical professions as to when it is right and just to allow abortion, becomes 
questionable.  
This thesis now reviews the regulation of abortion in New South Wales and 
Queensland, where maternal health concerns are the sole determinant of the 
lawfulness of an abortion.. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MATERNAL HEALTH CONCERNS AS THE SOLE BASIS FOR LAWFUL ABORTION 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, both the criminal and civil law respect the 
born alive rule and deny personhood to the fetus. This is despite criticism of the rule 
as being ‘an artificial and non-scientific concept of when life begins.’1 Should the 
fetus survive any wrongdoing in the antenatal period and go on to be born, the laws 
in both areas provide a remedy by recognising harm in specific ways.2  
Savell argues that continuing to recognise birth as a legally significant event even 
when the historical basis for the rule no longer exists is appropriate because it 
preserves the autonomy that women have with regards to abortion and decisions 
with obstetric care.3 Clearly, the recognition of the fetus’ right to be born is in direct 
conflict with lawful abortion. Gough notes that, ‘Any society that wishes to distinguish 
abortion from homicide must draw a (more or less) arbitrary line between people who 
qualify for the full panoply of legal rights and fetuses, which receive reduced 
protection.’4  
In Chapter Three this thesis discussed cases where despite this arbitrary line in the 
sand as to when personhood commences, conduct of a pregnant woman that may 
indirectly but foreseeably harm the fetus resulted in legal actions seeking to create a 
maternal duty of care to the unborn child. Such actions have at their core, concern for 
the life of the fetus and any harm that may come to it.  
Abortion involves the same issue of maternal bodily autonomy, however fetal 
destruction is the direct and desired outcome of the medical procedure. How the 
Australian law regulates abortion is discussed in Chapters Four to Seven.  
                                                
1 R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278 [78]. 
2 See, eg, R v King (2003) 58 NSWLR 472; Watt v Rama [1972] VR 353. 
3 Kristen Savell, ‘The Legal Significance of Birth’ (2006) 12(1) University of New South Wales Law Journal Forum 
Reproductive Rights and the Law 5.   
4 Stephen Gough, ‘Pre-Natal Injury and Homicide Following Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3) of 1994’ (1999) 
62 Modern Law Review 128, 128.  
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Over the last 25 years, abortion meeting specific requirements has been 
decriminalised in five jurisdictions and dealt with under health legislation; the 
Australian Capital Territory,5 Victoria,6 Tasmania,7 Western Australia8 and the 
Northern Territory9. This is not to say that unlawful abortion is not still a crime. In the 
remaining states, New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia, abortion 
remains a criminal act unless it is found to be lawful.10  
In deciding whether an abortion is lawful or not, three broad themes are set out in the 
legislation and/or case law. These are the effect continuation of the pregnancy will 
have upon maternal life or maternal health, the gestational age of the fetus and the 
presence of severe disability in the fetus. Not all themes are present in each 
jurisdiction. Table One provides a current snapshot of abortion legislation in 
Australia.  
From a technical perspective, there is a disparate national approach to the 
lawfulness of abortion in Australia that is often the subject of criticism and calls for 
reform.11 Abortion law in Australia is a mess but reform is a complex issue. This 
thesis takes the position that achieving a balance between the various jurisdictions 
requires a common understanding of the purpose of the law, as well as agreement as 
to whether a specific value will be given to the fetus or whether alternate views about 
the value of the fetus will be accommodated in an appropriate fashion. Consistency 
between abortion law, civil law and third party assaults that destroy the fetus would 
assist with making good law.  
 
                                                
5 Health Act 1993 (ACT), ss 80-3.  
6 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic).  
7 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas).  
8 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334. 
9 Medical Services Act (NT) s11.  
10 R v Wald (1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25; R v Sood [2006] NSWSC (31 October 2006); R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld 
Lawyer Reps 8; R v Davidson [1969] VR 667; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A. 
11 See, eg, Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Non Fatal Offences Against the Person, 1998, Standing 
Committee of Attorneys General, APGS; Lachlan de Crespigny and Julian Savulescu, ‘Abortion: Time to Clarify 
Australia’s Confusing Laws’ (2004) 181 (4) Medical Journal of Australia 201; Caroline De Costa, Heather Douglas 
and Kirsten Black, ‘Making it Legal: Abortion Providers’ Knowledge and Use of Abortion Law in New South Wales 
and Queensland’ (2013) 53 (2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 184; Kirsten I 
Black, Heather Douglas and Caroline De Costa, ‘Women’s Access to Abortion After 20 weeks’ Gestation for Fetal 
Chromosomal Abnormalities: Views and Experiences of Doctors in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2015) 55 
(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 144. 
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Table One – Comparison of Criteria for Lawful Abortion in Australia 
 
 Jurisdiction 
Maternal health Gestational Age 
 
Foetal disability  
ACT Not relevant Not relevant Not relevant 
NSW A doctor must hold a reasonable belief that 
it is a proportionate response to  
preserve the woman from serious danger to 
their life, or harm to their physical or mental 
health 
Not relevant Not relevant 
NT 
 
Up to 14 weeks, a doctor must medically 
examine the woman and a 2nd doctor must 
agree  that there is a greater risk to her life 
or to her physical or mental health if the 
pregnancy is not terminated  
 
Between 14 and 23 weeks, a doctor must 
believe it is immediately necessary to 
prevent serious harm to the physical or 
mental health of the woman 
Relevant in conjunction 
with maternal health or 
foetal disability 
concerns at 14 and 23 
weeks  
 
 
Relevant up to 14 weeks 
if there is substantial risk 
the child would be 
seriously handicapped 
because of physical or 
mental abnormalities  
 
 
 
QLD A doctor must believe it was necessary to 
preserve the mother’s life and it was 
reasonable having regard to the patient's 
state at the time and to all circumstances of 
the case  
Not relevant Not relevant 
 
 
 
SA Two doctors must personally assess the 
woman and believe there is a greater risk to 
her life or to her physical or mental health if 
the pregnancy is not terminated 
At 28 weeks, a child is 
prima facie capable of 
being born alive and 
abortion at that time 
can only be lawful if it is 
to preserve the life of 
the woman 
Relevant up to 28 weeks 
if two doctors have 
personally assessed the 
woman and believe the 
child would be born with 
physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be 
seriously handicapped 
 
TAS After 16 weeks, two doctors (one being an 
obstetrician or a gynaecologist) must certify 
in writing that continuation of the pregnancy 
will involve greater risk of injury to the 
woman’s physical or mental health or is to 
save the life of the woman 
Abortion on demand 
available on request up 
to 16 weeks 
Not relevant  
 
VIC  After 24 weeks, two doctors must believe it 
is appropriate in all the circumstances  
Abortion on demand 
available on request up 
to 24 weeks 
Not relevant 
WA Up to 20 weeks if the pregnancy is causing 
serious danger to the woman’s physical or 
mental health or will cause serious personal, 
family or social consequences 
 
After 20 weeks, two doctors must believe 
the woman has a serious medical condition 
Relevant in conjunction 
with maternal health 
concerns 
Not relevant up to 20 
weeks 
 
After 20 weeks, two 
doctors believe the 
unborn child has a 
serious medical condition 
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Most recently, De Costa et al have concluded that there is an urgent need for 
abortion law reform in order to ensure equal access to abortion services throughout 
Australia and consistent standards of service.12 Given the nature of Federation in 
Australia, they suggest that constitutional constraints preclude the creation of a 
national law, but that uniform legislation in each jurisdiction is possible.13  
They suggest all jurisdictions adopt the Victorian legislation, (to be discussed in 
Chapter Seven), which represents at its core, a very liberal approach to accessing 
abortion. However there are many things to consider in adopting this approach. 
Abortion on demand must meet the ethical minimum expected of the community, 
particularly where it characterises abortion as merely a woman’s health issue14 and 
disregards the existence of the fetus and the moral implications of its destruction. If 
adopted, consideration needs to be given to whether it creates an actionable right to 
abortion15 and in so doing, creates a legal duty or obligation on doctors and hospitals 
to perform abortion (discussed further in Chapter Eight).  
Due to the cross over of themes, there are several ways of considering the regulation 
of abortion in Australia. This thesis chooses to consider abortion regulation in three 
stages: Firstly, it reviews the law in the jurisdictions of New South Wales and 
Queensland, where maternal health concerns are the sole basis to consider abortion 
lawful. Secondly, it reviews the jurisdictions of Western Australia, Northern Territory 
and South Australia, where maternal health concerns coupled with gestational age 
and/or disability in the fetus are the basis for the lawfulness of abortion.  
Thirdly, it reviews the jurisdictions of Victoria and Tasmania, where there is abortion 
on demand to a certain gestational age and thereafter, maternal circumstances are 
considered as the basis for lawful abortion. The Australian Capital Territory is 
discussed with Victoria and Tasmania, even though its legislation does not 
technically refer to any of the three themes discussed above.  
                                                
12 Caroline De Costa et al, ‘Abortion Law Across Australia – A Review of Nine Jurisdictions’ (2014) 55 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 105, 111.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ronli Sifris, ‘Tasmania’s Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013: An Analysis of Conscientious 
Objection and the “Obligation to Refer”’ (2015) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 900, 901-2.  
15 Naomi Oreb, ‘Worth the Wait? A Critique of the Abortion Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2009) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 
261, 262.  
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The focus of this Chapter is the law in New South Wales and Queensland, 
specifically, what constitutes sufficiently serious harm to the physical and mental 
health of the woman to justify abortion. This Chapter considers what guidance, if any, 
can be gleaned from domestic case law. This Chapter concludes that whilst a basic 
framework exists for when maternal health concerns override concern for the life of 
the fetus in Australia, there is obvious scope for individual interpretation by judges 
based on personal values.   
As this Chapter shows, in practice very few cases are prosecuted. However without 
clearer guidelines in legislation or case law, there can be no guarantee of a particular 
legal outcome for either the pregnant woman or the fetus. Therefore, criticism that 
these laws are unstable or unable to provide constancy in outcomes is arguably not 
without basis.16  
4.2 New South Wales 
In New South Wales, the District Court case of R v Wald17 is considered to be the 
benchmark for the lawfulness or otherwise of a medical abortion. Here five people 
were charged under section 83 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) for unlawfully using an 
instrument with intent to procure miscarriage of a woman, as well as conspiracy to 
commit the offence and aiding and abetting the commission of the offence.18  
Arguments for one of the defendants included that under the common law at the 
time, termination of the pregnancy with consent of the pregnant woman did not 
constitute a crime unless harm befell the pregnant woman.19 Additionally, Counsel for 
the third and fourth defendants argued that 
                                                
16 Caroline De Costa, Heather Douglas and Kirsten Black, ‘Making it Legal: Abortion Providers’ Knowledge and 
Use of Abortion Law in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 53 (2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 184, 188; Kirsten I Black, Heather Douglas and Caroline De Costa, ‘Women’s 
Access to Abortion After 20 weeks’ Gestation for Fetal Chromosomal Abnormalities: Views and Experiences of 
Doctors in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2015) 55 (2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology 144; Heather Douglas, Kirsten Black and Caroline De Costa, ‘Manufacturing Mental Illness (and 
lawful abortion): Doctors’ Attitudes to Abortion Law and Practice in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 20 
Journal of Law and Medicine 560, 575. 
17(1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
18 Ibid 26.  
19 Ibid 27. 
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…laws operate in a secular environment with no theological or deistic underlying content… 
the social utility of the law which makes an abortion a crime in a time of worldwide concern 
with the threat of population explosion, which includes the demand of women for a new 
status in the life of society, must clearly be open to question.20  
This secular, humanist position is, of course, not a neutral position. This thesis takes 
the view that even in a positive legal framework, given the subject matter involved, 
ethical considerations should not be banned from the discussion. However Levine J 
accepted the defendant’s proposition and took the position that it was not for him to 
indulge in judicial legislation, rather, he was merely to construe the statute.21 Levine J 
held that the legislature seemed to have had in mind circumstances where use of an 
instrument to affect abortion could be lawful.22 On this basis, his Honour held that 
procurement of an abortion was defined as lawful if a medical professional holds an 
honest belief on reasonable grounds, that what they did was necessary to preserve 
the woman involved from serious danger to their life, or physical or mental health, 
which a continuation of the pregnancy would cause.23  
In regards to the level of danger to health, Levine J directed that it be distinct from 
the normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth and that, the danger of the operation 
must not be out of proportion to the danger to be averted.24 Levine J went on to note 
that it would be for a jury to decide in each case whether there was any economic, 
social or medical ground or reason which in their view would constitute reasonable 
grounds upon which an accused could honestly and reasonably believe there would 
be a serious danger to the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health.25  
Additionally, Levine J noted that it would be sufficient if at the time of being 
interviewed by the doctor, the pregnant woman’s mental health although not at the 
time in serious danger, but could reasonably be expected to be seriously endangered 
at some time during the pregnancy.26  
 
                                                
20 Ibid 27-8.   
21 Ibid 28. 
22 Ibid 28. 
23 Ibid 29. 
24 Ibid 29.  
25 Ibid 29. 
26 Ibid 29.  
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Clearly, Levine J had discretion as to how to interpret the term ‘lawful’. Casey notes 
that where a judge is required to interpret the term ‘unlawfully’, there emerges a 
‘curious circularity inasmuch as a certain act turns out to be against the law only 
when done unlawfully but to determine whether it was done unlawfully or otherwise 
one must determine whether or not it was against the law.’27 This thesis agrees. 
 
In coming to his finding, his Honour disclosed his personal attitudes regarding the 
parameters to when abortion is appropriate and not a crime. Whilst this is not 
unusual in a legal case, the responsibility of the judge to do this for abortion is very 
significant. Decisions like these create legal precedent as well as impact on medical 
practice and moral principles. As a parallel, this thesis refers back to commentary in 
Chapter Two regarding judicial hesitation to set aside the born alive rule.  
It seems an impossible task to critique the reasoning used by judges in reaching their 
decisions on the definition of the term ‘unlawful’. The same applies to doctors. Are 
they obliged to reference current community values, or may they insert their personal 
views? What if their personal views about abortion are at odds with community 
values or include beliefs about fetal personhood?  
The difficulty of critiquing any person’s views on the rightness or wrongness of 
abortion in any particular case was remarked upon in the landmark United States 
case of Roe v Wade.28 The Supreme Court noted 
We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the 
abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the 
deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One’s philosophy, one’s 
experience, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one’s religious training, 
one’s attitude towards life and family and their values and the moral values one establishes 
and seeks to observe, are likely to influence and colour one’s thinking and conclusion about 
abortion.29  
 
                                                
27 Gerard Casey, Born Alive: The Legal Status of the Unborn Child in England and the U.S.A (Barry Rose Law 
Publishers, 2005) 33.  
28 410 US 113 (1973) 114 (’Roe’). 
29 Ibid 116 per Buckman J. 
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The law can influence our attitudes as to the rightness or wrongness of abortion. 
George notes that ‘people shape their own lives (and often treat others differently) in 
light of these notions’.30 This suggests that people tend to conflate what is lawful with 
what is moral. 
Strikingly, for Levine J, there was no direct consideration of the fetus or any 
characteristics of it that might impact on whether maternal health concerns were 
proportionate to its destruction. Levine J did not require the mother’s physical life to 
be in immediate danger but rather offered lesser circumstances as potential 
considerations for lawfulness. Known as the ‘Levine ruling,’ this decision has never 
been challenged to date in New South Wales. Accordingly, a single judge’s personal 
views on what circumstances excuse abortion as a crime has continued to be 
accepted as the correct legal position in New South Wales for over 40 years.  
Arguably, the Levine ruling was expanded in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
decision of CES v Superclinics31 a medical negligence case arising from a pregnant 
woman suing her doctor for failing to diagnose her pregnancy and causing her to lose 
the opportunity to have an abortion. The fetus did not suffer from any abnormalities. 
Here, the trial judge ruled that the appellant would not have satisfied the 
requirements for a lawful abortion in the first place and therefore no damage flowed 
from the doctor’s alleged breach of duty of care.32  
On appeal, Kirby P made obiter comments suggesting an extension of the Levine 
ruling to include threats to the mother’s health after the child is born as being a 
serious danger to the pregnant woman’s physical or mental health.33 Kirby P went on 
to state that these threats might well include social and economic difficulties that 
arise from the responsibility of caring for a child. Again, the judgment did not dwell on 
the fetus or any knowledge regarding its biological traits that might require the law to 
set boundaries for its destruction.  
 
                                                
30 Robert P George, Making Men Moral (Oxford University Press, 1993) 2-3.  
31 (1995) 38 NSWLR 47. 
32 Ibid [23]-[26]. 
33 Ibid [83]-[85]. 
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As will be seen here and in Chapter Five of this thesis, this widened interpretation of 
serious harm to the mother’s physical or mental health has been adopted in 
legislation in other jurisdictions. Arguably, it was also adopted in the most recent New 
South Wales decision on abortion in R v Sood (‘Sood’)34 where it was used not to 
sanction an abortion as lawful, but rather to successfully prosecute a doctor for 
performing an unlawful abortion. This case involved a late term abortion at 24 weeks 
gestation using prostaglandin drugs to induce labour.35  
The pregnant woman had apparently experienced difficulty in trying to locate a doctor 
willing to perform an abortion so late in the pregnancy.36 She was 20 years of age, in 
an unstable relationship with the father of the baby, in financial distress and lacked 
family assistance.37 She took the drugs and gave birth to the baby boy at home.38 
There was some concern that the baby was born alive as both a nurse and a medical 
practitioner saw what they thought were signs of life in the baby.39 A decision was 
made not to resuscitate him as his condition was not consistent with survival.40 
Ultimately, the baby did not survive.41  
The defendant was charged with both manslaughter and the lesser charge of 
unlawful administration of a drug with intent to procure miscarriage under section 83 
of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW).42 In choosing not to overrule the Levine ruling, the 
fact this was a late term abortion was not considered a relevant consideration by the 
court. Rather, the focus was on the prediction of harm to the physical or mental 
health of the woman if the abortion was not performed.43  
Simpson J noted that the requirement that there be serious concerns for maternal life 
or health was broad enough to include ‘economic, social, or medical factors, 
including matters that can arise after the birth.’44 Simpson J noted 
                                                
34 [2006] NSWSC 1141(31 October 2006). 
35 Ibid [9]. 
36 Ibid [6].  
37 Ibid [24]. 
38 Ibid [11].  
39 Ibid [12]. 
40 Ibid [12].   
41 Ibid [12]. 
42 Ibid [1], [2], [4].  
43 Ibid [19], [23].  
44 Ibid [24].   
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I am unable to find that this termination was one which, if the proper inquiries had been 
made, would not or could not have been lawfully performed. In other words, it was not an 
unlawful termination because of the circumstances of LT; it was an unlawful termination 
because Ms Sood failed to make the requisite inquiries in order to satisfy herself of the 
necessity to terminate the pregnancy. Had she made those inquiries, she may well have, 
quite properly, formed that belief and proceeded lawfully to terminate the pregnancy.45 
The jury acquitted the defendant of the manslaughter charge but the defendant was 
found guilty of the lesser charge.46 Simpson J, noted the policy arguments contained 
in the Crown’s submissions regarding sentencing,  
We submit that the policy behind the law is to protect women from taking such an irrevocable 
step unwisely and without due consideration. And we submit that your Honour's sentence of 
this medical practitioner should send a clear message to medical practitioners performing 
terminations in New South Wales that the law requires them to ensure that a woman 
receives that proper counselling prior to having an abortion. ... This case is not about 
changing the law of abortion; however, it is an appropriate opportunity for this Court to 
reinforce what the law is and has been for many years in this State, that the law requires the 
medical practitioner who is performing the termination to form a view that it is necessary, in 
the interests of the life or the health of the mother, and that that is a reasonable belief.47 
Concepts such as viability of the fetus and its capacity to be born alive, as well as 
issues of personhood referred to in Chapter Two, were not considered. Instead, the 
opportunity was used to expand the definition of serious health concerns for the 
mother’s physical or mental health. The case was controversial not just because it 
involved the modern day prosecution of a medical doctor for performing an abortion, 
but because it involved a late term abortion. Ultimately, the age of the fetus was not 
considered to be a reason to characterise the abortion as unlawful.  
As pointed out by Simpson J, had the defendant made the required enquiries, the 
abortion might well have been lawful and if so, there would have been no basis for 
any criminal charges to flow from it.48  
 
                                                
45 Ibid [25]. The doctor had been de-registered by the time of the trial and was therefore known as ‘Ms’ Sood as 
opposed to ‘Dr’ Sood.  
46 Ibid [1].  
47 Ibid [20].  
48 Ibid [25].  
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 83 
This disregard for the physical maturity of the fetus for lawful abortion, or indeed any 
other feature of the fetus such as the presence of disability, is consistent with the fact 
that in New South Wales, there is no offence of child destruction and third party 
destruction of a fetus is characterised as grievous bodily harm to the pregnant 
woman.49 Fetal attributes do not enhance criminal offences that result in fetal 
destruction. Gleeson argues that abortion law in New South Wales (and Queensland) 
concern women and therefore it is illogical to identify certain fetuses as more 
expendable than others via abortion and not make the same demarcation for 
grievous bodily harm, child destruction or damages for wrongful birth.50  
In practice doctors may feel uncertain about what circumstances meet the legal 
threshold for abortion. A qualitative study performed by De Costa et al of medical 
practitioners resident in New South Wales and Queensland who perform abortions 
concluded that the participants felt the law was out of date, particularly with regard to 
fetal disability and that the law did not provide adequate guidance to assist with a 
defence to a prosecution for unlawful abortion.51 In another study by the same 
authors, they concluded that abortionists even went as far as to manufacture mental 
health illness in patients in order to meet the legal requirements for lawful abortion.52 
Policy directives from government health departments overseeing public hospitals 
may cause additional confusion. The current policy directive for abortion in public 
hospitals in New South Wales Health notes that the doctor must consider the 
woman’s physical and psychological condition; the gestational age of the fetus; the 
diagnostic probability of any birth defect; and in the case of birth defect, the 
prognosis for the fetus.53  
 
                                                
49 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 4, 33.  
50 Kate Gleeson, ‘Bracket Creep in Australian Abortion Indications: When Did Rubella Arrive?’ (2007) 15 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 423, 433.  
51 Caroline De Costa, Heather Douglas and Kirsten Black, ‘Making it Legal: Abortion Providers’ Knowledge and 
Use of Abortion Law in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 53 (2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 184. 
52 Heather Douglas, Kirsten Black and Caroline De Costa, ‘Manufacturing Mental Illness (and lawful abortion): 
Doctors’ Attitudes to Abortion Law and Practice in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law 
and Medicine 560, 572. 
53 Policy Directive, New South Wales Health, Pregnancy – Framework for Terminations in New South Wales 
Public Health Organisation, PD2014_022, 2 July 2014.  
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Accordingly in practice, gestational age and the presence of fetal disability would 
appear to be factors taken into account by the doctor, despite not being a formal 
requirement in the law. This suggests that the law in New South Wales may be out of 
step with the clinical practice of doctors or alternatively, that doctors are not following 
the law in regards to abortion.  
Arguably, the fact that the Levine ruling requires the doctor to hold an honest belief 
that maternal health concerns are proportionate to the abortion seems to recognise 
that abortion is not a standard medical procedure because it involves destruction of 
human life. The thesis suggests that the failure of the Levine ruling, and those that 
have followed, to specifically include aspects of the fetus as a basis to consider the 
lawfulness of an abortion brings into question whether or not consideration of the 
fetus as an entity of value may be taken into account by doctors when considering 
whether the abortion is appropriate.  
However the ruling requires the doctor’s belief to be not just an honest belief, it must 
also be based on reasonable grounds. This thesis takes the position that as a matter 
of common sense, despite the Levine ruling focussing the lawfulness of abortion on 
maternal health concerns, it is inescapable not to acknowledge that abortion involves 
destruction of the fetus. The moral views about the value of the fetus should be 
permitted into a doctor’s decision about abortion. This will be discussed further in 
Chapters Seven and Eight where it discusses abortion on demand and limitations to 
conscientious objection by doctors to performing or participating in abortion.  
4.3 Queensland 
Abortion is still a crime in Queensland, with the practice regulated by the Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld). Section 224 of the Criminal Code provides that where any person 
‘… with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman, whether she is or is not with 
child, unlawfully administers to her or causes her to take any poison or other noxious 
thing, or uses any force of any kind or uses any other means whatsoever is guilty of a 
crime.’ The offender is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.  
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A pregnant woman undergoing an abortion, and those assisting her, can still be 
charged with a crime for administering to herself any poison or noxious thing or by 
use of force of any kind with the intent to procure an abortion on herself with the 
penalty being imprisonment for seven years.54  
Medical practitioners and health professionals can rely on a defence available in 
section 282 of the Criminal Code where it provides:  
A person is not criminally responsible for performing or providing in good faith and with 
reasonable care and skill a surgical operation on or medical treatment of  
(a) a person or an unborn child for the patient’s benefit; or  
(b) a person or an unborn child to preserve the mother’s life; 
If performing the operation or providing the treatment is reasonable, having regard to the 
patient's state at the time and to all circumstances of the case. 
This defence is extended to the mother, and those who administer, supply or procure 
any substance to be used on the patient under the lawful direction or advice of the 
health professional. In issue is that there is no definition of the phrase ‘preservation 
of the mother’s life’. The seminal 1986 case of R v Bayliss (‘Bayliss’),55 which 
involved the prosecution of two medical practitioners charged under section 224 of 
the Criminal Code with unlawfully using force on a woman with intent to procure her 
miscarriage, is the starting point for guidance on what will be lawful.   
The judgment of Maguire DCJ is well researched and elaborates on the history of 
abortion law in Australia, England and other jurisdictions. In reviewing the relevant 
case law, Maguire DCJ noted that there had been no reasoned judgment of the 
relevant sections of the Criminal Code since their inception in 1901.56 In approaching 
this formidable task, Maguire DCJ made reference to the fact that 
 
                                                
54 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 225, 226. 
55 (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8. 
56 Ibid 9.  
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The function impliedly entrusted to the Courts in interpreting the law of abortion is not to say 
who is right and who is wrong as between the extreme views held by different sections of the 
community as regards this highly controversial subject. Rather the Courts have to do their 
best to draw a line at a point where the procuring of a miscarriage ceases merely to be a 
matter of debate from a religious, moral or ethical point of view, and becomes activity of a 
kind which warrants its designation as criminal.57  
In giving the jury a direction on the law, Maguire DCJ reviewed the English case of R 
v Bourne (‘Bourne’),58 the first case where the courts had to consider a therapeutic 
abortion performed in a modern way by a medical practitioner in a hospital. It 
involved a first trimester abortion on a 14-year-old girl, pregnant as a result of being 
gang raped. The doctor was charged under section 58 of the Offences Against the 
Persons Act 1861 (UK) which provided that any person who with intent to procure the 
miscarriage of a woman unlawfully administers to her any poison or noxious thing or 
unlawfully uses any instrument or other means with the like intent is guilty of felony.  
The trial judge interpreted the term ‘unlawfully’ to require proof beyond reasonable 
doubt that the doctor did not procure miscarriage for the purpose of preserving the 
life of the mother. The defence led evidence of the pregnant woman’s probable 
physical and mental outcome if the child were born. Dr Bourne was acquitted.  
Maguire DCJ followed Bourne and applied a broad interpretation of section 282 of 
the Criminal Code to include ‘the preservation of the mother’s life’, thus allowing a 
medical practitioner the flexibility to consider whether the abortion, was reasonable in 
all the circumstances of the case.59 In doing this though, Maguire DCJ noted 
I hope that this ruling will not be misunderstood or misconstrued. The spirit of the Bourne 
…cannot be made the excuse for every inconvenient conception. It would be wrong indeed 
to conclude that Bourne equates to carte blanche. It does not. On the contrary, it is only in 
exceptional cases that the doctrine can lawfully apply... The law in this state has not 
abdicated its responsibility as guardian of the silent innocence of the unborn. It should rightly 
use its authority to see that abortion on whim or caprice does not insidiously filter into our 
society. There is no legal justification for abortion on demand.60 
                                                
57  Ibid 10.  
58  [1939] 1 KB 687. 
59  R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 45. 
60  Ibid.    
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This comment from Maguire DCJ, which is almost 30 years old, is one judge’s view 
of the reach of section 282 of the Criminal Code.  It requires a judge to review the 
circumstances of the case so that the abortion is based on necessity and 
proportionality, both relative terms. The wording of Maguire DCJ characterises the 
destruction of a fetus as a serious act and one where the State may punish the 
offender for a crime. It is not, therefore, a standard medical procedure or a private act 
left to the discretion of pregnant woman and her doctor.  
Maguire DCJ concluded the judgment with the following comment 
This ruling serves to illustrate the uncertainty of the present abortion laws of Queensland. It 
will require more imperative authority (either the Court of Appeal or Parliament) to effect 
changes if changes are thought to be desirable or necessary with a view to amending and 
clarifying the law.61 
Following this decision in Bayliss, there was judicial approval of the approach of 
Maguire DCJ in the medical negligence case of Veivers v Connolly.62 Here, the 
events in issue occurred in 1975. The plaintiff sued her doctor for failure to diagnose 
rubella infection in the fetus and causing her to lose the opportunity to undergo an 
abortion and avoid the birth of a child with serous disabilities.  
In the course of establishing the facts of that case, the court confirmed that an 
abortion in those circumstances would have been lawful under Queensland law with 
De Jersey J noting 
I would therefore reason that continuing with a pregnancy which would so likely result in the 
birth of a severely affected rubella baby, entailed a serious danger to the first plaintiff’s 
mental health, albeit a danger which would not fully afflict her in a practical sense until after 
the birth…63 A therapeutic termination could lawfully have occurred in this case, because it 
was, as would have been gauged in 1975, necessary to preserve the first plaintiff from the 
serious danger to her mental health – and not merely the normal dangers of pregnancy and 
childbirth – which would have been entailed were her pregnancy to continue.64  
                                                
61  Ibid 45-6.   
62  [1995] 2 Qd R 326. 
63  Ibid 329. 
64  Ibid 330.  
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It is interesting to note that the court assumed knowledge of fetal disability would 
have caused mental illness in the mother sufficient to justify an abortion. Gleeson 
notes that de Jersey J was treading on egg shells so as not to directly make disability 
in the child the basis for abortion.65 Rather it was said to be the maternal reaction to 
the disability that was the basis for the justification of the abortion. Gleeson notes that 
to base abortion on fetal disability says something about the fetus and this takes 
away from the primary focus of abortion being about women.66 This is in contrast to 
other jurisdictions, to be discussed in Chapter Six, where fetal disability coupled with 
gestational age, is an articulated basis to condone the lawfulness of an abortion, 
subject of course to maternal informed consent.  
Section 282 of the Criminal Code was amended in September 2009 through the 
Criminal Code (Medical Treatment) Amendment Act 2009 (Qld) to include a medical 
abortion by the administration of drugs, such as RU 486, as opposed to surgical 
abortion. Hansard of the second reading speech and debate in the Queensland 
Parliament makes clear that abortion remains a divisive issue.  
In his second reading speech, the Attorney General noted that the purpose of the bill 
was to ensure that the Criminal Code remained relevant to the realities of life in 
Queensland and into the foreseeable future. There was said to be no attempt to alter 
the law at that time on abortion so as to either increase or decrease its prevalence.67 
In supporting the bill, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition stated: 
This is a highly personal and emotive issue for most members of this place. As I said 
yesterday when I stood to speak on the motion moved by the government to make this an 
urgent bill, there would be an extraordinary diversity of views within this parliament. Indeed 
there are probably as many views on this particular issue as there are members who occupy 
this House.68  
 
                                                
65  Gleeson, above 50, 427. 
66  Ibid.  
67  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 1 September 2009, 1981 (Cameron Dick, Attorney 
–General). 
68 Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 September 2009, 2120 (Lawrence Springbord).  
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In recent times, Queensland has had two abortion cases involving medical abortions 
via administration of a drug. In September 2008, the Supreme Court was asked via 
its parens patriae jurisdiction to sanction a late term abortion on a 12-year-old 
pregnant girl by the administration of the drug Misoprostol.69 The pregnant girl was 
18 weeks pregnant by the time the case came before the Court.70 A declaration was 
sought on her behalf that termination by that method was lawful in all the 
circumstances of the case and that Hospital staff could administer the drug.71  
The Court comprised a single judge, Wilson J, who heard evidence from two 
psychiatrists and an obstetrician to the effect that continuation of the pregnancy 
would result in serious danger to the pregnant girl’s mental health well beyond the 
normal dangers of pregnancy and childbirth. Administration of the drug was 
considered to be a safer alternative than a surgical abortion. Wilson J decided in 
favour of allowing the abortion on the grounds that it was reasonable to avert the 
danger to the pregnant girl’s mental health and that it was in her best interests to do 
so.  
There was no reference to the fetus or even concern for it. This reasoning is 
consistent with that used in Bayliss72 and approved in Veivers,73 where a threat to the 
mother’s life is to be interpreted broadly by the court to include effects on mental 
health that need not include a threat of imminent death.  
In the 2009 case of R v Leach,74 a pregnant woman was charged under sections 225 
of the Criminal Code with intent to procure an abortion by unlawfully administering a 
noxious thing in the form of the drug Misoprostol. Her partner procured the drug and 
was charged under s 226 of the Code with procuring something that he knew was to 
be used to cause a miscarriage. The woman was 8 weeks pregnant at the time.  
 
                                                
69 Queensland v B [2008] QSC 231. 
70  Ibid [2].  
71  Ibid [1].  
72 (1986) 9 Qld Law Reps 8, 45. 
73 [1995] 2 Qd R 326. 
74 R v Brennan (unrep. Dist Ct, Qld, Criminal Jurisdiction, 13 October 2010).  
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Section 282 of the Criminal Code was not relevant as a defence, given there was no 
evidence that continuation of the pregnancy would have produced a life threatening 
or serious medical condition for the pregnant woman, rather she simply did not want 
to be pregnant and did not want to give birth to the child. The accused were both 
found not guilty. The jury placed emphasis upon the expert evidence, which stated 
that the drug was widely and safely used overseas and in some places in Australia to 
effect abortion. It was not, therefore, a noxious thing to the pregnant woman 
Specifically, the judge directed the jury not to determine this issue from the fetus’ 
perspective.75 The case was not appealed.  
These two recent cases and the reasoning of Maguire DCJ in Bayliss76 confirm that 
the focus of the Queensland laws is the requirement that the doctor hold an honest 
belief that abortion was necessary to preserve the mother’s life. In practice, the few 
instances where cases have been before the courts in the last 50 years, surgical or 
medical abortion is lawful where it can be proven that the mother will suffer serious 
physical or psychological harm if the pregnancy is continued.  
There is no requirement in the law that the mental harm must reach a particular 
threshold, such as being a recognised psychiatric injury diagnosed by a psychiatrist. 
This could suggest that the threshold is low. The extent to which the mother’s 
physical health needs to be endangered by the pregnancy or birth of the child in 
order to consider abortion lawful has not been considered by the Queensland courts 
to date.  
However, in other criminal matters involving the fetus, the Criminal Code 
acknowledges as a serious crime the third party destruction of an unborn child at any 
time.77 Additionally, Queensland maintains the offence of child destruction.78 In either 
circumstance, the maximum penalty is life imprisonment. Accordingly, while 
Queensland’s abortion laws focus on maternal health concerns, recognition of the 
fetus and its value in the criminal law suggests to this thesis that the maternal health 
concerns must be serious to justify abortion.  
                                                
75  R v Brennan (unrep. Dist Ct, Qld, Criminal Jurisdiction, 14 October 2010), 3-7.  
76 (1986) 9 Qld Law Reps 8, 45.  
77 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1).  
78 Ibid s 313(2).  
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Therefore, it would be reasonable to suggest that there is uncertainty in the 
application of the Queensland law when it comes to concerns about the degree of 
mental health illness required to be experienced by the pregnant woman seeking 
abortion. It is therefore understandable why Queensland doctors who perform 
abortions might be concerned about the potential criminality of their conduct. 
Whether this will result in abortion law reform remains to be seen.  
In Queensland, Douglas et al have noted there is limited access to abortion in the 
public health system.79 For late term abortions, the decision must go through a 
clinical ethics committee, which they say is often slow in responding to applications 
and inconsistent in its decisions, and therefore another barrier to access.80 They 
concluded there was a general unwillingness by doctors in Queensland to pursue 
abortion as a practice area. This has apparently led to deficiencies in medical training 
and to abortion tourism, where women travel to other states, notably Victoria, at 
added expense and discomfort to achieve an abortion.81  
4.4 Summary  
In practice, abortion laws in both New South Wales and Queensland delegate to the 
doctor, the decision making process of considering whether the abortion was 
reasonable in all the circumstances of the case and a proportionate response to 
harm to the mother. Few cases are prosecuted and doctors use their professional 
judgment in making such decisions without formal review.  
If concerns were held by a doctor about whether or not the particular circumstances 
met the legal criteria for lawfulness, it is open to them to seek a declaration to that 
effect from the court, as was sought in State of Queensland v B.82 Presumably, in a 
true emergency situation of life and death, such a concern would not exist as the life 
of the mother would be in jeopardy and therefore by definition, would meet the legal 
threshold.  
                                                
79 Douglas et al, above n 52, 561-2. 
80 Heather Douglas, Kirsten I Black and Caroline De Costa, ‘Women’s Access to Abortion After 20 Weeks’ 
Gestation for Fetal Chromosomal Abnormalities: Views and Experiences of Doctors in New South Wales and 
Queensland’ (2015) 55(2) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 144, 148.  
81 Douglas et al, above n 52, 576.  
82 [2008] QSC 231. 
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In both New South Wales and Queensland, the characteristics of the fetus, 
particularly the gestational age of the fetus, are not considered to be relevant factors 
in considering the lawfulness of an abortion. Accordingly, late term abortion is 
technically permissible in both jurisdictions if the doctor held valid concerns for the 
mother’s physical or mental health. Specific circumstances that lead to physical or 
mental health issues are not indicated. For example, in neither case does the 
lawmaker set out ‘rape’, or ‘dire financial straits’ even though these may be the 
proximate reasons that lead to serious physical or mental harm.  
The High Court has not yet had occasion to specifically review abortion law in 
Australia. With only a few common law decisions, the legal principles in both 
jurisdictions are open to review. The potential exists, therefore, for the common law 
in both New South Wales and Queensland to be appealed to a higher court for 
assessment.  
In Bayliss, Maguire DCJ noted  
The issue of abortion is a divisive and sensitive subject matter. It engenders in the 
community every sort of response. It is a controversial subject involving moral and social 
judgment in which opinions differ. It is fair to say that in Australia, the law leaves the 
determination of the lawfulness of an abortion to the discretion of doctors. It is impossible to 
police such decisions. The law exists however to consider those unusual cases where a 
doctor’s decision to perform the abortion may go against what is considered appropriate by 
reasonable community standards. 83  
This thesis concludes here in Chapter Four that in New South Wales and 
Queensland, courts are unlikely to second guess the decision of doctors who have 
made a judgment based on their medical opinion that the abortion met the relevant 
threshold in the circumstances of the case. Rare circumstances, as arose in the 
Sood case and which is reminiscent of the Dr Kermit Gosnell cases in Philadelphia 
(referred to in Chapter Two), where the doctor concerned is unprofessional and has 
not bothered to consider the reasons the abortion is sought, seem to be the current 
day purpose of abortion laws. The function of these laws is arguably primarily to 
                                                
83 (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 45.   
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protect the pregnant woman from unscrupulous conduct by doctors who fail to make 
a proper assessment of the situation.  
The hesitancy of the law to become overly involved in what is perceived to be a 
moral and medical issue between the pregnant woman and her doctor, suggests an 
assumption that the doctor will do the right thing. Whilst there have been studies 
referred to in this Chapter to support the view that abortionists find the lack of clear 
legal guidelines for lawfulness confusing in practice and a deterrent to specialising in 
the area, this does not of itself lead to a conclusion that there ought to be law reform 
so as to allow more lawful abortions to take place. Whether there is enough support 
generally in the medical profession or indeed the community to create an impetus for 
such reform in either New South Wales or Queensland remains to be seen.  
An alternative method of considering the lawfulness of abortion is to focus on 
measureable attributes of the fetus, such as its gestational age. A 2008 survey of 
attitudes to abortion amongst Australian people found nuanced views as to whether 
they would or would not support abortion in particular circumstances.84 The findings 
suggested that abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy was far more acceptable 
than late term abortion.85 Few people supported abortion at any time and in any 
circumstances.86  
This provides an indication of community support of gestational age as a basis for 
abortion. Whilst arguably a less complicated way of determining the lawfulness of 
abortion compared with maternal health concerns, it represents a mental shift in the 
way abortion is perceived, and raises significant questions about what age limit is 
appropriate and why. Chapter Five will discuss the use of gestational age in 
conjunction with maternal health concerns as a basis for lawful abortion in the laws of 
Western Australia, South Australia and the Northern Territory.    
 
                                                
84 Lachlan de Crespigny et al, ‘Australian Attitudes to Early and Late Term Abortion’ (2010) 193 (1) Medical 
Journal of Australia 9, 10.  
85 Ibid 10. 
86 Ibid 10. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GESTATIONAL AGE AND MATERNAL HEALTH AS THE BASIS FOR LAWFUL 
ABORTION 
5.1 Introduction 
In drawing a line in the sand regarding when a human being becomes a legal person, 
the born alive rule leaves open for interpretation the basis upon which the law should 
perceive the fetus between conception and birth. Given the arbitrariness of this line, 
the legal definition of a person ought not shut down intelligent debate about the 
attributes of personhood. However it can be hard to turn back the clock once a 
practice like abortion is considered lawful and has become embedded in a culture.1  
Using the gestational age of the fetus as a basis for lawful abortion is arguably no 
different to using other fetal attributes such as viability, disability or gender as a basis 
for abortion. Using any type of fetal attribute as a basis for lawful abortion moves the 
discussion away from abortion being primarily about women’s health to abortion 
being about the fetus.2 More specifically, it creates a demarcation between fetuses 
that may be lawfully destroyed with maternal consent, and those that may not.3  
In this Chapter, this thesis examines the legislative provisions in Western Australia, 
Northern Territory and South Australia, where gestational age of the fetus, together 
with maternal health concerns, is the basis for lawful abortion. It demonstrates that 
there is a disparate approach to not just the appropriate gestational age limit for 
abortion, but other requirements too such as the nature of maternal health concerns 
that must be present, the number of doctors who must confirm that those concerns 
satisfy the legislation, the specialist qualifications of those doctors, and even where 
the abortion must take place.  
                                                
1 R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 45.  
2 See, Kate Gleeson, ‘Bracket Creep in Australian Abortion Indications: When did Rubella Arrive?’ (2007) 15 
Journal of Law and Medicine 423, 433; Kate Greasley, ‘Is Sex Selection Abortion Against the Law?’ (2015) 35(4) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 14 
3 Gleeson, above n 2, 433.   
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Ultimately, using gestational age limits to determine the lawfulness of abortion is a far 
easier way for doctors to assess the lawfulness of abortion compared to maternal 
health concerns, however it commits the State to the position that the fetus of a 
certain gestational age has no independent value in the law. The overlaying of 
maternal health concerns merely permits the age limit to be breached when the law 
does recognise the fetus, and permits late term abortion in certain circumstances.  
5.2 Use of gestational age for abortion in the USA and UK 
The use of gestational age as a threshold for lawful abortion is incompatible with the 
relational analysis of pregnancy discussed in Chapter Three. It moves the argument 
away from woman’s rights.4 Physical realities of the fetus become a reason for the 
law to give certain fetuses a measure of protection from destruction, although it never 
quite gets to the point where the law requires the mother to give up her life for the 
fetus.  
Gestational age underpins the law of abortion in jurisdictions like the United 
Kingdom5 and the United States of America,6 however it has proven to be a shifting 
standard. Where technology can improve the survival chances of a preterm baby, 
thus lowering the age of viability, and scientific advancements suggest attributes of 
the fetus such as sentience and the capacity to feel pain at lower and lower 
gestational ages, the debate around when it is ethical to destroy a fetus will no doubt 
continue.7  
Failed late term abortion that results in a live birth present a conundrum for those 
who perceive personhood as a complex issue that is much more than just biological 
traits.8 At the moment of birth, biological traits become legally relevant when 
moments before, they may have been academic.9  
 
                                                
4 Greasley, above n 2, 433.  
5 Abortion Act 1967 (UK).   
6 Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 US 833 (1992). 
7 Kristen Savell, ‘Life and Death before Birth: 4D Ultrasound and the Shifting Frontiers of the Abortion Debate’ 
(2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 103, 107.   
8 See, eg, Isabel Karpin, ‘Reimagining Maternal Selfhood: Transgressing Body Boundaries and the Law’ (1994) 2 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 36, 53-5; Savell, above n 7.  
9 See R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278. 
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Described by Savell as ‘an awkward outcome’ and ‘an unexpected and unwelcome 
result, for the woman’,10 the legal consequences of the born alive rule law are clear. 
Once born and with even minimal signs of life, the entity is a person and has all the 
usual rights and protections that other people have. As noted by the Supreme Court 
of New South Wales in R v Iby, there is no requirement for the child born alive to be 
capable of surviving as a functioning being.11 Choosing a gestational age limit to 
avoid this outcome is therefore imperative.  
In the United States, the Supreme Court addressed the lawfulness of abortion in the 
seminal decision of Roe v Wade (‘Roe’).12 The case involved the interpretation of a 
Texan statute that made it a crime to procure an abortion except on medical advice 
for the purpose of saving the life of the pregnant woman. In Roe, the State was said 
to have an interest in protecting ‘potential life’. That interest however was not judged 
to outweigh the health or life of the mother.  
The Supreme Court characterised abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy as 
a matter left to the judgment of the woman and her doctor; thereafter the State may 
intervene to regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal 
health; and after the fetus is considered viable, the State recognises the potentiality 
of human life and may regulate or proscribe abortion based on medical judgment in 
order to preserve the life or health of the mother.13 
An opportunity to re-consider Roe came in the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v 
Casey (‘Casey’).14 Almost 20 years after Roe was decided, advancements in medical 
knowledge had shifted the time when a fetus is viable outside the womb from 28 
weeks gestation to 22 to 23 weeks. The plurality of judges replaced the trimester 
model used in Roe and held that viability of the fetus was the most workable model to 
determine when the State’s interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the woman’s 
right to an abortion, except for reasons of threat to her life or health.15  
 
                                                
10 Savell, above n 7, 112. 
11  (2005) 63 NSWLR 278 [79]. 
12 410 US 113 (1973). 
13 Ibid 114. 
14 505 US 833 (1992). 
15Ibid 860.   
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The plurality of judges emphasised that the change in the viability time frame was not 
an invitation to review the original reasoning in Roe because the Court had already 
upheld the constitutional right to abortion in certain circumstances. Accordingly, to 
overrule the Court was said to both ‘profoundly and unnecessarily damage the 
Court’s legitimacy and the nation’s commitment to the rule of law.’16  
Such a position suggests to this thesis the assumption that either there will never be 
evidence that can require a review of the potentiality of human life in early gestation, 
or that even if there were such evidence, the Court would not alter its position 
regarding the lawfulness of abortion at that time. If it is indeed the latter, then the law 
has to concede that it is not particularly interested in seriously exploring the notion of 
personhood, but rather it wishes to maintain a historical right that has been created 
and proliferates in society. This is an important distinction where the law advances a 
nil value on the fetus and seeks to impose this on doctors in order to effect abortion. 
Arguments about the lawfulness of techniques used for late term abortion were 
agitated in the controversial 2007 decision of the Court in Gonzales v Carhart.17 This 
case involved the constitutionality of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act 2003, 18 USC. 
This Act bans second trimester abortions when the fetus is delivered vaginally, feet 
first to the navel, and its head crushed to allow delivery of a dead fetus. Congress 
accepted the moral, medical and ethical consensus, that partial birth abortion was a 
gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary. 
Whilst assuming the premise of Roe and Casey regarding a woman’s constitutional 
right to abortion prior to viability of the fetus, the plurality of judges in Gonzales held 
that there was no undue burden placed on a pregnant woman in being prohibited 
from abortion in this fashion, given that alternatives to that procedure exist.18 
Ultimately, the Court ruled that the federal law on partial birth abortions was 
constitutional. In the minority, Ginsburg J expressed concern that the plurality opinion 
substituted their personal morality over precedent.19   
 
                                                
16 Ibid 869.  
17 550 US 124 (2007).  
18Ibid 164.  
19 550 US 124 (2007) 169.  
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The decision in Gonzales was criticised by some for the Court and the legislature 
wrongly interfering with a medical decision,20 and by others as raising questions 
about the five plurality Justices being Catholic and to what extent judges are and 
should be influenced by their religion, their ethnic background, their race, their life 
experiences and their personal values.21  
This thesis takes the view that if the underlying medical evidence in Gonzales was 
true, then removing the maternal health provision sits within the framework of laws 
that respect prenatal life after a certain gestational age. The furore around Gonzales 
confirms the continuing political nature of the abortion issue in the United States. It 
also highlights the difficulty in contracting the circumstances where abortion once 
lawful is now unlawful, and the challenge of accepting the consequence of changing 
perceptions about the fetus based on scientific knowledge. 
In the United Kingdom, abortion law is a creature of statute. Like the jurisdictions 
discussed in this Chapter, the law provides specific exceptions to what is otherwise 
an unlawful act.22 In 1991, the legislature lowered the upper limit for abortion from 28 
weeks to 24 weeks on the basis of updated scientific knowledge regarding viability of 
the fetus.23 Further unsuccessful attempts have been made via private members’ 
Bills to lower the age again, based on new technologies that demonstrate in a 
startling way, the morphological similarities between the mature fetus and a baby.24  
In the Australian community, the gestational age of the fetus has proven to be a 
primary indicator of Australians’ views on the rightness or wrongness of abortion. A 
2008 survey of attitudes to abortion amongst Australians found that people tended to 
have nuanced views with high levels of support for early abortion in the first trimester, 
with 61% of respondents unconditionally supportive and 26% supportive depending 
on the circumstances.  
                                                
20 See, eg, George J Annas, ‘The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, (2007) 356 New England Journal of 
Medicine 2201.  
21 Geoffrey R. Stone, 28 August 2009,’Justice Sotomayer, Justice Scalia and Our Six Catholic Justices’ Huffington 
Post, retrieved 10 November 2014. The Huffington Post (online), 28 August 2009 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/justice-sotomayor-justice_b_271229.html>. 
22 Greasley, above n 2, 14.  
23 Abortion Act 1967 (UK), s 1(1)(a).  
24 Savell, above n 7, 107-110. 
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 99 
However by the third trimester only 6% of respondents were unconditionally 
supportive, 48% were against and 42% felt it depended on the circumstances.25 
Accordingly late term abortion is a sticking point in the community. These attitudes 
towards the mature fetus sit comfortably with the laws in Western Australia, the 
Northern Territory and South Australia that provide greater protection for the more 
mature fetus.  
Against this backdrop of common issues that arise from using gestational age limits 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, this Chapter will now critically compare 
and contrast these three Australian jurisdictions, searching for areas of commonality 
and disagreement between them. It is relevant to note at this point that there is no 
case law that assists with interpretation or application of the legislation in any of 
these states.  
5.3 Western Australia 
In Western Australia, abortion laws were reformed in 1998, following the failed 
prosecution of two doctors with unlawful abortion. Whilst abortion is still a crime, a 
pregnant woman can no longer be charged with intent to procure miscarriage. An 
abortion is lawful when it is performed by a medical practitioner with reasonable care 
and skill26 and where it is justified under section 334 of the Health Act 1911 (WA).  
The Act sets out a two-stage process for assessing lawful abortion. At no more than 
20 weeks gestation, one doctor must form in good faith the view that the woman will 
suffer serious personal, family or social consequences, or serious danger to her 
physical or mental health if the abortion is not performed, or the pregnancy is causing 
serious danger to her physical or mental health.27 Interestingly, the provisions elevate 
circumstances that may provide grounds for the abortion into the actual grounds for 
abortion. The legislation’s provision for financial, social and family consequences, 
including future impact, which may affect physical or mental health, suggest a wide 
range of reasons will suffice.  
                                                
25 Lachlan De Crespigny et al, ‘Australian Attitudes To Early and Late Term Abortion’ (2010) 193 (1) Medical 
Journal of Australia 9, 10. 
26 Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 199(1). 
27 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(3)(a)-(d). 
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Indeed, it is hard to imagine a doctor not agreeing that the birth of a child will not 
seriously impact the financial, social or family consequences of the woman. In 
support of this interpretation of the provisions, the Western Australian Department of 
Health’s guidelines for doctors on the legal implications of abortion specifically states, 
‘In other words, abortion is available on request up to 20 weeks of pregnancy 
provided that informed consent has been given.’28  
As a counter balance to this, the legislation is unique in its emphasis on the need for 
informed consent.29 This is defined as including not just the usual requirements for 
advice and information about risks of abortion and carrying the baby to term, but also 
requires the doctor to offer to refer the pregnant woman for counselling about both 
options, and to inform her that such counselling will be available in either scenario.30  
The consent and counselling requirements for abortion in Western Australia attempt 
to ensure that there is no pressure or judgment on the pregnant woman and 
presumably increase likelihood of informed, voluntary consent being obtained. 
Greasley notes that many freely chosen abortions are actually made in response to 
stressful circumstances outside the pregnant woman’s control.31 Hence, she notes 
that some argue that it may be difficult to obtain true voluntary, informed consent for 
abortion from a pregnant woman in this environment. 
In furtherance of informed consent, the doctor who performs the assessment may not 
be the same doctor who performs or assists at the abortion.32 This would seem to 
protect against unscrupulous conduct by abortionists, out for financial gain, as seen 
in the Dr Gosnell case referred to in Chapter Two.33 Greasley notes that most of 
Gosnell's patients were poor, black or immigrant and in many cases, used his clinic 
as a last resort as it had acquired a reputation for performing abortions on anyone 
who asked for one.34  
                                                
28  Women and Newborn Health Service, Western Australia Department of Health, ‘Termination of Pregnancy: 
Information and Legal Obligations for Medical Practitioners’ (2007) 8 <www.health.wa.gov.au>. 
29 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(5). 
30 Ibid ss 334(a),(b),(c). 
31 Greasley, above n 2, 7-8.  
32 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(6). 
33  Kate Greasley, ‘The Pearl of the ‘Pro-Life’ Movement? Reflections on the Kermit Gosnell Controversy’ (2013) 
40(6) Journal of Medical Ethics 419, 420. 
34 Ibid. 
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After 20 weeks gestation though, lawful abortion can be effected on the grounds that 
two doctors who are members of a panel of at least six doctors appointed by the 
Minister have agreed that the pregnant woman or the unborn child has a severe 
medical condition that in the clinical judgment of those two doctors, justifies the 
abortion.35 At this point, serious social consequences cease to be a ground for 
abortion, unless of course they are the cause of a serious medical condition in the 
pregnant woman.  
Overall, Western Australia has liberal abortion laws that commit to a biological 
perception of the fetus. This is also reflected in its maintenance of the child 
destruction offence.36 The upper limit of 20 weeks falls below the grey zone for 
viability.37 Oversight by the medical profession ensures the doctor gives appropriate 
information and advice to the pregnant woman, and the pregnant woman gives 
informed consent. Late term abortion is permissible and confirms that serious 
maternal health concerns will prevail over any legal recognition of the mature fetus. 
De Costa et al report that only about 0.5% of abortions in Western Australia occur 
after 20 weeks gestation and further, they note evidence of abortion tourism.38 This 
would suggest that these laws are working well within their framework to prevent late 
term abortion except for exceptional cases 
5.4 Northern Territory 
Abortion lawfully performed by a medical doctor has been decriminalised in the 
Northern Territory and its practice is regulated under the Medical Services Act (NT). 
A complex regime exists in the Northern Territory regarding the lawfulness of 
abortion with three different time frames being relevant in different attendant 
circumstances. Fetal disability as a basis for lawful abortion will be discussed in 
Chapter Six.  
                                                
35 Health Act 1911 (WA) ss 334(3),(4), (7). The current approved medical facility is the Kind Edward Memorial 
Hospital. 
36 Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 290. 
37 John Keogh et al, ‘Delivery in the Grey Zone: Collaborative Approach to Extremely Preterm Birth’ (2007) 47 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 273, 275. 
38 Caroline De Costa, Heather Douglas and Julie Hamblin, ‘Abortion Law Across Australia  - A Review of Nine 
Jurisdictions’ (2015) 55 Journal of Australia and New Zealand Obstetrics and Gynaecology 105, 108.  
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Abortion is lawful at up to 14 weeks gestation when two doctors believe in good faith 
that continuation of the pregnancy would involve greater risk to the mother’s life or 
greater risk of harm to the mother’s physical or mental health than if the pregnancy 
was terminated.39 One of those doctors must have medically examined the woman 
and where practicable, must be a gynaecologist or obstetrician.40 Unlike Western 
Australia, there is no prohibition on doctors who give the advice to perform or assist 
with the abortion.  
The requirement becomes stricter in the second trimester. Abortion is lawful a further 
nine weeks along, at not more than 23 weeks. Here, one doctor must believe the 
abortion is necessary to prevent immediate serious mental or physical harm to the 
mother.41 There is no case law interpretation to give guidance as to the types of 
situations that qualify as being of immediate serious threat to a woman’s mental or 
physical health. It seems that this judgment call is made at the discretion of a doctor. 
The fact that a second doctor is not required seems to speak to the immediacy of the 
medical event. Finally, abortion is permissible at any stage of the fetus’ development 
where the sole purpose is to preserve the mother’s life.42 
Like New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western Australia, it is the belief of 
the doctor who performs the abortion that is relevant. Arguably, this makes it easier 
for a court to determine the issue given it is more difficult to determine that the doctor 
did not hold the requisite view, and less difficult to assess whether an assessment 
was made by him/her that lead to the forming of the belief.43  
The abortion laws in the Northern Territory reflect a growing recognition of the value 
of the fetus as it becomes capable of being born alive, with a corresponding need to 
demonstrate proportionate justification in the decision-making. This is also reflected 
in the requirement that, where there is not an immediate health threat, two doctors 
are required to form a view regarding the appropriateness of the abortion, and one of 
them must be a specialist gynaecologist.  
                                                
39 Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(1)(a)(b)(i). 
40 Ibid ss 11(1)(a), 11(2).   
41 Ibid s 11(3).  
42 Medical Services Act (NT), s 11(4).  
43 Cf R v Sood [2006] NSWSC 1141 (31 October 2006) [25].  
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De Costa et al note that a practical result of this requirement for specialist 
involvement is that abortions can only be performed in three hospitals in the Northern 
Territory.44 Early abortion using the drug Mifepristone (as was used in the Sood and 
Leech cases discussed in Chapters Two and Four) is not available.45 Accordingly, 
they conclude that there is a limitation to the availability of abortion services in the 
Northern Territory.  
This thesis agrees that the Northern Territory requirements suggest fairly tight control 
over abortion. The framework is complex and heavily reliant on gestational age. 
There have been no attempts to date to amend the gestational time limits since the 
inception of the provisions. Like Western Australia, the co-existence in the Northern 
Territory of a child destruction offence with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment is 
consistent with the jurisdiction’s recognition of the growing value of the developing 
fetus in the law.46 This position of giving legal value to the fetus based on biological 
traits is not consistent with the position of fetal personhood from conception. 
5.5 South Australia 
In South Australia, unlawful abortion is still a crime against the pregnant woman. A 
fetus of 28 weeks gestation is prima facie considered to be capable of being born 
alive and abortion undertaken at that time is lawful only to preserve the life of the 
woman.47 In effect, this provision operates as a child destruction offence.  
There are two things to note here. Firstly, despite being modelled on the Abortion Act 
1967 (UK), the reduction in the United Kingdom of the upper limit for lawful abortion 
from 28 to 24 weeks in 1991 was not replicated in South Australia, and 28 weeks sits 
significantly above the grey zone of viability generally acknowledged by the medical 
profession.48 Accordingly, of all jurisdictions that value biological traits of the fetus, 
South Australia permits abortion at the latest gestational age.  
 
                                                
44 Ibid s 11(1)(c). 
45 De Costa et al, above n 38, 109.  
46 Criminal Code (NT) s 170. 
47 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 82A(7)-(8). 
48 Keogh et al, above n 37. 
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Secondly, a restraining hand is evident in the maternal health concerns that must 
accompany the gestational age of the fetus. The interpretation of the phrase ‘to 
preserve the life of the woman’ suggests either literal concern for loss of life or 
alternatively, serious physical or mental health conditions that does not cause death. 
As the legislation does not indicate that the harm must be immediate, it is possible a 
court will provide a broad interpretation of that phrase, similar to that which has been 
used in Queensland.49 Accordingly, the advancing age of the fetus is recognised, 
however concern for the mother’s life (and possibly her physical or mental health) will 
still override any concern to protect it.  
Up until that time, abortion is lawful so long as there are greater risks to her life or to 
her physical or mental health. These are similar grounds to those set out in the 
Queensland and New South Wales case law (discussed in the previous Chapter). A 
point of difference though is that in South Australia, two doctors must personally 
examine the woman and form the same view regarding risks to the woman.50 Unlike 
the Northern Territory, neither doctor assessing and advising the woman is required 
to hold any particular sub specialisation in medicine such as obstetrics.  
South Australian law requires the pregnant woman to be resident in South Australia, 
for a period of two months prior to the abortion.51 This could theoretically increase the 
possibility of abortion tourism, which has been noted earlier to occur in Queensland 
and Western Australia. This would make it difficult for pregnant women to obtain 
abortion services in this particular jurisdiction.  
Overall, although South Australia permits abortion at the latest gestational age, the 
ease in obtaining abortion must be considered in light of the maternal health 
concerns that overlay the upper gestational age threshold, and the practical 
requirements on the woman of being physically assessed by two doctors and being 
resident in the State.  
 
                                                
49  R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8, 45. 
50 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(1)(a)(i). 
51 Ibid s 82A(4). 
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5.6 Summary 
Gestational age is a key criterion to lawful abortion in Western Australia, the Northern 
Territory and South Australia, however none of these jurisdictions share the same 
upper gestational age threshold. There is, however, commonality in the framework 
used between them that as the gestational age increases, so too does the 
requirement for proportionate justification via maternal health concerns. This 
suggests that the lawmaker correlates biological traits of the fetus with ethical issues 
that arise from its destruction.  
Greasley notes that outrage over failed late term abortion delivering a live baby relies 
on similarities between the fetus and the newborn and therefore argues against fetal 
rights across the board.52 This thesis agrees with this conclusion that logically, belief 
in fetal personhood precludes the use of gestational age to decry abortion. This is 
important to understand when considering law reform. 
With regard to maternal health concerns, whilst all jurisdictions use similar wording 
such as the ‘physical and mental health’ of the mother, there are slight differences 
between them such as whether the harm needs to be serious, immediate or life 
threatening. The definition of preserving the life of the mother has been interpreted in 
Queensland to include serious harm to the physical or mental health of the mother.53 
Additionally, Western Australia specifically provides for what might properly be 
considered to be circumstances that underpin the serious physical and mental health 
concerns as well as those grounds itself. The practical effect is that it facilitates a 
doctor’s capacity to validate the presence of maternal health concerns for abortion 
under 20 weeks gestation. 
However it is not clear whether this approach could be applied in jurisdictions with 
tiered approaches to abortion, where the preceding time frame specifically provides 
for serious harm to the mother’s physical or mental health and the latter refers to 
concerns for her life. It is reasonable to assume that there is a difference between the 
two, however either way the laws in these jurisdictions do not equate the life of the 
pregnant woman with the fetus in that she is not required to give up her life for it.  
                                                
52 Greasley, above n 33, 420.   
53 R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8.  
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As with maternal health concern requirements in New South Wales and Queensland, 
concerns regarding the physical and mental health of the mother are judged from the 
perspective of the doctors. The number of doctors involved with making the clinical 
decision regarding maternal health justification also differs. In Western Australia and 
the Northern Territory, one doctor is relevant for earlier abortion and two for a later 
abortion. In South Australia, two doctors must not only form an opinion but must have 
personally examined the pregnant woman.  
Overall, the legislation in these three jurisdictions provides a framework and leaves it 
up to the pregnant woman and her doctor(s) to decide on the reasonableness of 
abortion in all the circumstances of her case. Davis and Douglas provide a useful 
example that demonstrates the difficulty in meeting the legal requirements in these 
three jurisdictions.54 They note the increase in selective termination for multiple 
pregnancies, often occurring in twins in the second trimester of pregnancy.55 Time 
wise, they conclude that such abortions would fall under the more stringent 
requirements of each jurisdiction.56  
Such abortions are performed for a variety of reasons including legitimate concerns 
for the mother’s physical or mental health but also for less serious reasons such as 
financial and social concerns of raising twins, improving the prognosis for the 
remaining twin (given twin pregnancy carries increased risks) and for social sex 
selection reasons.57 They conclude that the prospect of obtaining an abortion in 
these circumstances in these jurisdictions is quite uncertain.58 Unless the doctors 
involved are willing to say that any financial and social concerns can cause serious 
physical or mental health illness, it would appear that abortion in these circumstances 
would be technically unlawful.  
 
 
                                                
54 Colleen Davis and Heather Douglas, ‘Selective Reduction of Fetuses in Multiple Pregnancies and the Law in 
Australia’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 155, 157.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid 164, 168, 171.  
57 Ibid 173.  
58 Ibid. 
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As was discussed in Chapter Four, Douglas et al found from a study of doctors 
performing abortion in New South Wales and Queensland, that doctors often 
manufactured mental health illness in the woman so as to ensure their decision to 
perform an abortion was lawful.59 Whether this occurs in these jurisdictions is 
unknown but the requirement for two doctors to agree on the seriousness of harm to 
befall the pregnant woman should the pregnancy continue, could make such a 
subterfuge more difficult to achieve.  
Savell notes that fetal imagery is standard management of pregnancy throughout 
Australia, however 4D images may reinforce scruples people have about the 
wrongness of late term abortion.60 She concludes that the visibility of the fetus as a 
result of ultrasound, rather than its viability, poses a special challenge for the law.61 
As noted above in the commentary on abortion law cases in the United States, if one 
were committed to pursuing the permissive abortion agenda or the primacy of 
maternal bodily autonomy, knowledge about the fetus is problematic where the law 
uses gestational age as a primary factor upon which lawful abortion is assessed.   
Writing in 2007, Savell predicted that 4D ultrasounds and the like might lead to 
further restrictions on abortion that yield to the recognition of fetal personhood.62 
Ultimately, this has not occurred in Australia. In fact, quite the opposite has occurred, 
with Victoria and Tasmania decriminalising abortion and creating abortion on demand 
up to 24 and 16 weeks respectively.63 This situation will be examined further in 
Chapter Seven.  
Accordingly, whilst advances in medical technology make the viability of the fetus a 
shifting standard,64 it is not clear that this will necessarily result in changes to the law. 
This is particularly so where there is no real discussion by lawmakers as to why a 
particular gestational age has been chosen or where it is simply described as 
reflective of contemporary medical consensus.  
                                                
59 Heather Douglas, Kirsten Black and Caroline de Costa, ‘Manufacturing Mental Illness (and Lawful Abortion): 
Doctors’ Attitudes to Abortion Laws and Practice in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law 
and Medicine 560.  
60 Savell, above n 7, 103-4. 
61 Ibid 104.  
62 Ibid 116.  
63 Abortion Law Reform Act 1998 (Vic) s 5; Reproductive Health (Access to Termination) Act 2013 (Tas) s 5.  
64 Talat Uppal, et al, ‘The Legal Status of the Fetus in New South Wales’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 
178,183.  
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Whilst further challenges to gestational age limits cannot be ruled out, this thesis 
suspects that they will never completely displace abortion as a lawful procedure, 
given its medical and social acceptance in our society. This thesis now discusses 
another attribute of the fetus used to justify abortion in these same jurisdictions. The 
presence of disability in the fetus, together with gestational age, is a lawful basis for 
abortion in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and South Australia. The 
articulation of disability as a reason for abortion is a big statement by the lawmaker of 
the inherently less valued status of disabled life and by extension, disabled people.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
FETAL DISABILITY AS THE BASIS FOR LAWFUL ABORTION 
6.1 Introduction 
Articulating disability in the fetus as a basis for lawful abortion creates another sub 
category of the fetus that may be destroyed on the basis of a specific attribute. Whilst 
disability is a biological trait like gestational age, it differs from gestational age in that 
it is a static attribute that is not remedied by time. Therefore, disability abortion says 
something broader about the inherent value of disabled people in our society. Pringle 
notes that provisions that single out disability fall little short of discrimination.1 
Reproductive discrimination occurs where a person or couple experience pressure 
not to reproduce a child who has their familial genetic traits or where a particular type 
of person is not reproduced because it is judged that his or her genetic traits ought 
not to be reproduced.2 In Australia there is no legal obligation on doctors to advise a 
pregnant woman to undergo an abortion for fetal disability, nor does the State place 
pressure on a pregnant woman to abort a disabled fetus. In practice however 
prenatal fetal testing is commonplace and provides the means to detect 
abnormalities in the fetus that may in turn lead to a woman seeking advice about an 
abortion.3  
The current statement of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (‘RANZCOG’) recommends testing for pregnant 
women in the first and second trimester for certain medical conditions in the fetus.4 
The understanding in the medical community appears to be that disability detected in 
the fetus is a guaranteed basis for lawful abortion in Australia.  
 
                                                
1  Helen Pringle, ‘Abortion and Disability: Reforming the Law in South Australia’ (2006) 29(2) University of New 
South Wales Law Journal Forum: Abortion and Disability 207, 213. 
2  Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, Bioethics - Motherhood, Embodied Love and Culture (Cooper Consulting, 2013) 47. 
3 This is not to suggest that all fetal disabilities are currently capable of diagnosis. See, eg Pre-Natal Testing for 
Trisomy 21 (Down Syndrome), Trisomy 18 (Edwards Syndrome) and Neural Tube Defects (College Statement C-
Obs 4, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, July 2007).  
4 Ibid. 
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The statement notes 
In the event of a diagnosis of anomaly, the woman and her partner may choose to terminate 
or continue with the pregnancy…. There is an understanding that a termination of pregnancy 
would be available in the event an abnormality was diagnosed, and that the mode of 
termination available will be influenced by gestational age.5 
Karpin and Savell note that the understanding of disability in medicine tends to be 
inherently negative and can differ from how the law views disability.6 Savell notes that 
when it comes to fetal abnormality, tension exists between those who frame the legal 
argument as that of individual reproductive autonomy and those who seek to 
contextualise prenatal testing and abortion as social practices with broader impact. 7 
She argues that the fetal disability debate has raised important questions for the law 
including: 
Should the law permit abortion without restriction as to time or reason, provided that the 
woman consents and a doctor performs the procedure? If more restrictive regulation is 
deemed appropriate, should the law recognise fetal disability as a distinct ground for 
abortion? If so, should legislation stipulate a later time limit for this reason than other 
reasons? Moreover, should the law provide some guidance on the scope and meaning of 
‘serious handicap’?8 
It is arguable that doctors have a legal duty of care to inform their pregnant patient of 
any abnormalities in the fetus so that the woman may seek advice, that may lead to 
an abortion.9 Of course such a duty is predicated on whether the particular 
jurisdiction permits abortion on the grounds of fetal disability or else, whether the 
pregnant woman’s reaction to news of the disability creates in her a physical or 
mental health concern sufficient to discharge the maternal health requirement of the 
jurisdiction (discussed in Chapters Four and Five). 
 
                                                
5 Ibid, 1.  
6 Isabel Karpin and Kristen Savell, Perfecting Pregnancy: Law, Disability and the Future of Reproduction 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012) 21. 
7 Kristen Savell, ‘Reproducing Choice or Eliminating Disability? Prenatal Diagnosis and Abortion’, (2008) 88 
Precedent 24, 30.   
8 Ibid.  
9 See, eg Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15. This case is discussed further on in this Chapter at 6.5 (a).  
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In Australia, only three jurisdictions specifically provide for abortion on the basis of 
fetal disability. Even where there are no such provisions in a jurisdiction’s abortion 
law, Gleeson notes clear instances of judicial acceptance of fetal disability as a 
circumstance that automatically qualifies a pregnant woman grounds for abortion, 
based on the serious affect giving birth to a disabled child would have upon her.10 
Whilst such news may indeed provide the circumstances that lead to a woman 
developing a serious mental health condition, laws that permit a pregnant woman to 
seek abortion on maternal health grounds can be differentiated from laws that make 
an explicit judgment on the inherent value of disabled life.11  
This Chapter reviews those jurisdictions in Australia where fetal disability is a basis 
for lawful abortion. It considers any differences between the provisions and whether it 
integrates with the gestational age of the disabled fetus and child destruction 
offences. Given the absence of case law interpretation, this Chapter considers how 
disability is characterised in other legal scenarios, specifically, wrongful birth claims, 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and end of life decisions for disabled neonates.  
6.2 Western Australia 
In Western Australia, abortion after 20 weeks gestation is lawful where two doctors 
who are members of a panel of at least six doctors appointed by the Minister agree 
that the unborn child has a severe medical condition that justifies abortion in the 
clinical judgment of those doctors.12 The doctors’ view of disability in the fetus 
determines the lawfulness of an abortion. Interestingly, there is no legal requirement 
that either of the doctors must have any sub specialisation in medicine to assist them 
in this decision and there is no case law to assist with the interpretation of what types 
of conditions would meet the requirement of a ‘severe’ medical condition.  
 
                                                
10  Kate Gleeson, ‘Bracket Creep in Australian Abortion indications: When Did Rubella Arrive?’ (2007) 15 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 423, 425. Examples include Harriton v Stephens [2006] HCA 15 arising from New South 
Wales and Veivers v Connolly [1995] 2 Qd R 326 arising from Queensland. Both involved wrongful birth suits 
against doctors who had caused a lost opportunity for abortion based on the unborn child’s exposure to rubella.  
11 Pringle, above n 1, 217.  
12 Health Act 1911 (WA) ss 334(3),(4),(7). The current approved medical facility is the Kind Edward Memorial 
Hospital. 
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Clearly, serious fetal disability as a ground for lawful abortion is complicated because 
of value judgments regarding quality of life of disabled people. Karpin and Savell note 
that empirical evidence suggests that people with disabilities rate their quality of life 
higher than those without disabilities, who tend to overrate the impact of 
impairment.13 This is an important observation where doctors are the ones advising 
on whether a disability is serious enough to justify destruction of the fetus. 
 
It is significant to note that any previous concern for the mature fetus in Western 
Australia is overridden by concern for the existence of fetal disability. Very late term 
abortion on the basis of severe disability in the fetus would appear to be lawful. This 
is in contrast to the Northern Territory and South Australia where maternal health 
concerns are the only reason for lawful late term abortion.  
Given Western Australia also has provisions for lawful late term abortion on the basis 
of a serious medical condition on the part of the pregnant woman,14 the disability 
provision covers any gap whereby the pregnant woman’s reaction to news of the 
disability does not meet the maternal health requirement. This thesis refers back to 
discussion in Chapter Four regarding doctors manufacturing maternal mental health 
illness to meet the requirement for lawful abortion.15 In a study by Douglas et al on 
doctors from New South Wales and Queensland, where maternal health concerns 
are the only basis to consider abortion lawful, the authors sought participants’ views 
on the lawfulness of a second trimester abortion due to a non-life threatening fetal 
disability (Down Syndrome) detected at 14 weeks where the mother denied any 
impact on her mental health.16  
Interestingly, the majority of participants felt the fact of fetal disability alone was not 
sufficient grounds for abortion on maternal health grounds. However, many reported 
that they would still provide abortion despite the woman falling short of serious 
dangers to her mental health should the pregnancy proceed. The Western Australian 
legislation, therefore, provides a remedy for this dilemma. 
                                                
13 Karpin and Savell, above n 6, 24-5.  
14 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334. 
15 Heather Douglas, Kirsten I Black and Caroline De Costa, ‘Manufacturing Mental Illness (and Lawful Abortion): 
Doctors’ Attitudes to Abortion Law and Practice in New South Wales and Queensland’ (2013) 20 Journal of Law 
and Medicine 560. 
16 Ibid 569-71.  
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The detailed consent requirements in the Act involving counselling, discussed in 
Chapter Five, make clear that it is not a eugenic clause and that it is instigated by the 
pregnant woman after she has received counselling for the decision to undergo 
abortion or proceed to birth of the child.17 Accordingly, abortion on the basis of 
disability is a strong statement by the Western Australian legislature about the 
negative quality of life of disabled people.  
 
6.3 Northern Territory 
In addition to maternal health concerns and gestational age, the Northern Territory 
articulates disability in the fetus as a valid basis for lawful abortion. When referring to 
the degree of disability in prenatal life that will cause an abortion to be lawful, section 
11 of the Medical Services Act (NT) provides that lawful abortion requires ‘ …a 
substantial risk that, if the pregnancy were not terminated and the child were born, 
the child would be seriously handicapped because of physical or mental 
abnormalities …. ’  
Accordingly, there need not be proof that the fetus has a serious medical condition at 
the time of the decision for abortion. The terms ‘substantial’ risk and ‘serious physical 
or mental handicap’ are not defined in the Act, nor is there any case law to assist with 
the interpretation of these sections. It is clear from the wording of the provisions that 
both factors must exist. A quantifiably small risk of a serious handicap would 
arguably not meet the requirements nor would a substantial risk of a moderate 
handicap. How would infractions to the law be policed? Overall, the correctness of 
any advice might be impossible to prove if the abortion occurs.  
Two medical practitioners must opine that there is a substantial risk of serious 
physical or mental handicap. One of them must be a gynaecologist or obstetrician.18 
There is no requirement that one of the doctors be a specialist in genetics. This gives 
rise to a concern as to whether the two doctors have sufficient knowledge to discuss 
the risk of a serious physical or mental handicap in the fetus and what it is likely to 
mean should the child be born.  
                                                
17 Health Act 1911 (WA) ss 334 (5)-(6). 
18 Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(2). The provision makes an exception where it is not reasonably practicable in 
the circumstances to get a gynaecologist or obstetrician to examine the woman.  
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A lawful abortion for a substantial risk of serious physical or mental handicap may 
only occur where the woman has been pregnant for not more than 14 weeks.19 
Clearly, this provision will not assist the pregnant woman who is ignorant of the risk 
of serious disability in the fetus after this time frame. Also, it does not acknowledge 
any limitation on testing that may require maturation of the fetus in order to determine 
either the existence of the medical condition or the likely severity of such a condition 
on the child, should they be born.  
As discussed in Chapter Five, between 14 and 23 weeks gestation, the justification 
for a lawful abortion in the Northern Territory centres solely on the pregnant woman 
and an immediate need to prevent serious harm to her physical and mental health.20 
After 23 weeks gestation, the sole concern is for preservation of the pregnant 
woman’s life.21  
For a pregnant woman discovering a substantial risk of a serious physical or mental 
handicap in the fetus between 14 and 23 weeks gestation, it is arguable that she 
could rely on the effect such news had upon her immediate mental health. Such 
news could cause fears of additional work, burden and expense in caring for a 
special needs child and how this will curtail her freedom to enjoy life into the future, 
or indeed the woman’s concern for the suffering and difficulties the child will have to 
face. If two medical practitioners considered such concerns seriously affected the 
mother’s mental health at that time, then the abortion could well be lawful.   
It is not clear whether there is the political will to increase the upper gestational age 
threshold for abortion on the basis of fetal disability. Such an amendment would 
determine whether the legislature preferences gestational age over fetal disability. 
This thesis suspects that if the core of the provisions is a de-valuing of life based on 
disability, then there may be little opposition to increasing the gestational age 
threshold for disability abortion. Indeed, this is more probable when one considers 
end of life decisions for disabled neonates, discussed further in 6.5, below.  
 
                                                
19 Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(1)(d).  
20 Ibid s 11(3).  
21 Ibid s 11(4).   
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As it stands, the Northern Territory’s abortion laws give precedence firstly to the 
mother’s life, then her health, and lastly to fetal disability. It is in synch with the 
gradualist approach to the lawfulness of abortion, as discussed in Chapter Five. More 
serious concerns are required as the gestation of the fetus increases. Unlike Western 
Australia, a serious condition in the fetus will not overshadow the gestational age of 
the fetus.  
6.4 South Australia 
South Australia uses almost exactly the same wording as the Northern Territory 
when referring to the degree of disability in prenatal life that will cause an abortion to 
be lawful. Both are modelled on the Abortion Act 1967 (UK). Gleeson notes that 
historically, the Abortion Act 1967 was passed in response to the thalidomide crisis,22 
and the provisions can be read as expressing a redundant concern for a pregnant 
woman’s well being in the extraordinary case that the fetus is impaired.23 
Section 82A(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) provides for 
lawful late term abortion up to 28 weeks gestation on the basis ‘ … that there is a 
substantial risk that, if the pregnancy were not terminated and the child were born to 
the pregnant woman, the child would suffer from such physical or mental 
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.’ Accordingly, maternal health concerns 
and fetal disability, whilst being separate bases for a lawful abortion in South 
Australia, are both limited by the same gestational age threshold.  
There is no definition of the terms ‘substantial’ risk and ‘serious physical or mental 
handicap’. Two legally qualified medical practitioners must give such advice to the 
pregnant woman.24 Their sub speciality is not indicated. Accordingly, the accuracy of 
advice pregnant women may receive regarding the degree of risk and the likely level 
of handicap could be in doubt.  
                                                
22 Gleeson, above n 2, 429. 
23 Ibid 431. 
24 Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(1)(a). 
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The medical practitioner performing the abortion may be the same practitioner 
advising the pregnant woman on the presence of a substantial risk of serious 
handicap in the fetus, and it must occur in hospital.25 
Ultimately, in South Australia, abortion laws give precedence firstly to the mother’s 
life, then fetal disability. It is in synch with the gradualist approach to the lawfulness of 
abortion, as discussed in Chapter Four. Unlike Western Australia, and in line with the 
Northern Territory, a serious condition in the fetus will not overshadow the gestational 
age of the fetus. However the upper gestational age limit for abortion for fetal 
disability in South Australia is twice that of the Northern Territory. Concerns about 
failed late term abortion, addressed in Chapter Five of this thesis, apply here but 
where the child is disabled, there may be a basis to withdraw or withhold medical 
treatment on the basis that it is not in the best interests of the child. This will be 
discussed further at 6.5(c).  
By making severe disability, or the risk of it, a basis for abortion, it begs the question 
of what constitutes a severe disability. Given the absence of case law interpretation 
for abortion disability, this thesis discusses how disability is perceived in associated 
areas of law.  
6.5 Related Legal Issues Regarding Disabled Prenatal Life 
6.5 (a) Wrongful birth claims  
Whilst the legislation in each of these jurisdictions is not coercive or mandatory, at 
the very least its practical outcome is to enshrine a value judgment that disability can 
be unacceptable in a fetus and not in their best interests to be born. If that is the 
case, then two questions arise; can a disabled person sue for negligence leading to a 
missed opportunity for the mother to seek an abortion? Can the person sue for the 
harm of being born?  
 
                                                
25 Ibid. 
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This question was addressed definitively by the High Court in Harriton v Stephens 
(‘Harriton’).26 Here the appellant argued that had the defendant doctor diagnosed 
rubella infection in her mother in a timely way, her mother would have undergone a 
lawful abortion. This would have resulted in the plaintiff not being born and, therefore, 
not suffering a life of disabilities that included being deaf, dumb and blind. The 
appellant sought damages for the extraordinary costs associated with having to live 
with disabilities.  
The plurality of the judges of the High Court found against the appellant on the basis 
that she lacked standing to bring such a claim, with an insufficient nexus between the 
doctor’s failure to provide information to her mother that would have led to the plaintiff 
being aborted and the plaintiff being born. Such a proposition was said to offend the 
Sanctity of Life principle and so accordingly, public policy concerns precluded the 
appellant from taking her action further.27 This is an interesting comment in light of 
the fact that disability abortion provisions specifically rest on a quality of life argument 
in that disabled prenatal life is less valued and therefore more expendable than non-
disabled prenatal life.28   
Parents of a disabled child may sue for the costs of raising the child born or 
conceived as a result of a doctor’s negligence. These cases require the plaintiff to 
prove that either conception would have been prevented or that earlier diagnosis of 
either the pregnancy or an unacceptable disability in the fetus would have led to a 
lawful abortion. Legislation in some jurisdictions restricts damages for the costs of 
raising the child to the extraordinary costs of raising a disabled child.29  
This seems to be tacit affirmation in those jurisdictions that the parents of a disabled 
child are more deserving and ought to be compensated for their burden. It supports 
the rationale that disability is an unwanted attribute in a person.   
 
                                                
26 [2006] HCA 15.   
27 Ibid per Hayne J [181]-182], Callinan J [206], Crennan J [243], [252], 263].  
28  Gleeson, above n 2, 423. 
29 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 71; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ss 49A, 49B; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 67. 
Contra Armellin v CLG and EM [2009] HCASL 275. 
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In the English case of Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS 
Trust30 the plaintiff brought a medical negligence claim for compensation arising from 
a failed sterilisation leading to the birth of a child with severe learning difficulties and 
special needs. Brooke LJ noted the subjectivity of the debate and stated: 
… What constitutes a significant disability for this purpose will have to be decided by 
judges, if necessary, on a case-by-case basis. The expression would certainly stretch to 
include disabilities of the mind (including severe behavioural disabilities) as well as physical 
disabilities. It would not include minor defects or inconveniences, such as the lot of many 
children who do not suffer from significant disabilities. 31 
To date, there have been no Australian cases that have interpreted the degree of 
disability sufficient to satisfy the legislative exceptions of being awarded damages for 
the wrongful birth of a disabled child. It is assumed there would be a variation of 
positions on how significant a disability needs to be to qualify for damages.  
Assisted reproductive technologies, where human embryos created outside the 
human body can be discarded by parents based on disability may provide further 
insight into the medical and legal position on the value of disabled life and are 
discussed below. 
6.5 (b) Disability in the Embryo 
Pre implantation genetic diagnosis (‘PGD’) is a technology that allows the detection 
of certain genetic characteristics prior to implanting an embryo into the womb, such 
as gender, serious heritable diseases and disabilities that will be apparent at birth or 
very early childhood or certain late onset conditions.32 Embryos can be screened and 
either selected or de-selected by their parents based on the results of this testing, 
subject to any legislative prohibitions.33  
 
                                                
30 [2002] QB 266. 
31 Ibid [52]. 
32 Government, National Health and Medical Research Council, Australian Government, ‘Ethical Guidelines on the 
Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research’, June 2007, 55. 
33 Ibid.  
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Much like abortion for fetal abnormalities, PGD provides the platform from which the 
woman or couple may consider whether or not to avail themselves of further medical 
advice. Such advice could well lead to them de-selecting an affected embryo so that 
it is destroyed and never born. Although it deals with the same issue, that is the 
destruction of disabled prenatal life, Karpin and Bennett note that PGD has been 
hailed as a means of making reproductive decisions ‘without having to face the heart-
wrenching decision to abort an affected fetus’.34  
Karpin and Savell note the ongoing debate about whether disability avoidance 
strategies constitute or contribute to disability discrimination.35 They state that it is not 
clear that the pursuit of better lives can be separated from eugenics and 
contemporary selection practices.36 Further, they note that critical feminist scholars 
and disability rights advocates question whether the pregnant woman’s choice to 
abort based on fetal disability is really a free choice, given the reality that services for 
the disabled may be limited.37 
The principle underpinning the practice of PGD is that a parent has the right to 
choose certain characteristics of their child either because they do not want their 
child to suffer from a particular condition and/or they do not want to endure the 
effects such disability may have upon their parental responsibilities.38 However there 
are limits to its use. Whilst some states have legislation that deals with assisted 
reproductive technologies,39 where there is no specific legislative framework covering 
a particular practice or technology in a jurisdiction, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council’s (NHMRC), Ethical Guidelines on the use of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (‘the Guidelines’), are the 
nation’s reference point.40  
                                                
34 Isabel Karpin and Belinda Bennett, ‘Freedom to Choose?’ (2008) 88 Precedent 4. 
35 Karpin and Savell, above n 6, 30-1.  
36 Ibid 33. 
37 Ibid 42. 
38 Contra Isabel Karpin, ‘Choosing Disability: Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Negative Enhancement’ 
(2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 89. Karpin notes instances where people have chosen to reproduce a 
particular disability such as deafness though she notes that in Australia, the consensus is to use PGD to select 
against serious disability.  
39Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988 (SA); Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW); Human Reproductive Act 1991 (WA). 
40 National Health and Medical Research Council Guidelines, above n 32.  
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Arguments against PGD listed in the Guidelines include that it implies that admission 
to life is no longer unconditional and it establishes a principle whereby parents 
choose the qualities their children have, with the process shaping a child to a 
parent’s idea of perfection and cultivating a diminished tolerance to difference or 
prevent the birth of people who are carriers of a disease or disability that may be 
passed on to their offspring even when the carrier is expected to live a normal life.41  
Arguments for PGD include that by weeding out such embryos from existence, a 
family may be spared the tragedy of having the burden of caring for a child with a 
deadly disease, it may reduce the economic and social costs of caring for the 
incurable in our society, and assist couples to not pass on heritable disorders by 
being dissuaded from having children.42  
Clearly, these are controversial issues involving a value judgment. However where 
the law ascribes to the gradualist approach to abortion, then against the background 
of denying the fetus a legal personality, a human embryo has arguably less legal 
relevance than the fetus in utero. Logically, it would follow that requirements for a 
severe disability in PGD embryo might be less onerous than those required for the 
fetus in utero.  
Karpin and Bennett note that a distinction between what is a normal genetic variation 
and what is an illness is not always straightforward. With the potential for the 
technologies to be used for non-therapeutic purposes, and the fact that our 
understanding of health, disability and normality are contested, they argue that the 
role the law should play in regulating reproductive decision-making needs further 
discussion and consideration of competing claims by State, Federal and international 
law. 43   
 
 
                                                
41 Ibid, 55 [12.1]. 
42 Ibid, 55 [12.1].  
43 Isabel Karpin, and Belinda Bennett, ‘Genetic Technologies and the Regulation of Reproductive Decision-
Making in Australia’ (2006) 14 Journal of Law and Medicine 127,134.  
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Karpin and Savell note the complex regulatory framework for PGD can create 
confusion for people, clinicians, policy makers and parents and like abortion, it can 
promote reproductive tourism.44 Further, they note that in those jurisdictions in 
Australia that allow abortion on the grounds of a risk of serious disability in the fetus, 
a prescriptive approach to setting out just what that means, by way of lists of such 
conditions or by using different language such as ‘lethal’, ‘life threatening’ or 
‘incompatible with life’ have been considered, debated and rejected. 45  
Parliament, they say, have left the definition to the judgment of clinicians so that the 
legislative parameters around fetal disability are highly dependent on the ethics of the 
woman seeking the abortion on that basis and the doctors making that decision.46 In 
practical terms, this is an easier option no doubt then politicians committing to such 
an ethically charged and potentially polarising subject.  
It is not at all clear whether the concept of a serious medical condition for PGD 
purposes equates to a serious medical condition required for abortion on the basis of 
fetal disability. This is still a developing area of legal regulation that involves complex 
ethical and social issues. However it is clear that there is a basis in related law to 
argue that disability is not a welcome attribute in a person. It raises the issue of why 
there needs to be a gestational age threshold for fetal disability as a basis for lawful 
abortion, which in turn raises issues of end of life issues for people. 
Acceptance of quality of life arguments as the basis for ending life is another strong 
argument that disability itself creates a sub category of people and not just a sub 
category of the fetus. This thesis now considers how the law deals with ending the 
life of the disabled neonate.  
 
 
 
                                                
44 Karpin and Savell, above n 6, 155.  
45 Ibid.   
46 Ibid 156.  
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6.6 (c) End of Life Decisions for Neonates 
In practice decisions to withdraw or withhold medical treatment for disabled neonates 
are made daily.47 Tibballs argues that the phrase ‘best interests of the child’, whilst a 
rationale for both the courts and clinicians, is ill defined and that to speak of best 
interests is a meaningless, nonsense term. 48  
He queries if it is in the best interests of a patient to have their life sustained by 
treatment, how can withdrawing such treatment, which will cause death, be in their 
best interests?49 He concludes it is preferable to speak of the futility of such 
treatment or the overwhelming burden of such treatment or the lack of quality of life, 
with ethical and clinical guidelines developed from legal principles so as to affect a 
transparent basis for such an important decision.50  
In cases involving withholding or withdrawing of treatment to disabled neonates, 
court decisions although not abundant, are indeed available though it should be 
noted that they are extremely fact dependant. The courts have ruled that in certain 
circumstances, disabled life is still worth living.  
An often-quoted decision is the United Kingdom case of in Re B (a minor) (Wardship: 
Medical Treatment) that involved a baby living with Down Syndrome who required an 
operation to remove an intestinal blockage. 51 The parents of B did not consent to the 
surgery, arguing that it was not in their child’s best interests to live another 20-30 
years with severe physical and mental handicaps.52 Although confirming that the 
child’s quality of life was a relevant factor to be taken into consideration when making 
the decision, the Court of Appeal denied the parent’s application and ordered that the 
surgery be performed.53  
 
                                                
47 James Tibballs, ‘The Legal Basis for Ethical Withholding and Withdrawing of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment 
in Children’ (2006) 14 Journal of Law and Medicine 244, 245.  
48 Ibid 256. 
49 Ibid 260. 
50 Ibid 260-1.  
51 [1981] 1 WLR 1421. 
52 Ibid 1421. 
53 Ibid 1424. 
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Templeman LJ noted that the test was whether the life of the child was demonstrably 
going to be so awful that in effect the child must be condemned to die, or whether the 
life of this child is still so imponderable that it would be wrong for her to be 
condemned to die.54 Ultimately, the Court held that that although the child was likely 
to be very physically and mentally disabled, having Down Syndrome provided the 
child an expectation of a reasonable quality of life.55 Importantly, both Templeman L.J 
and Dunn L.J noted that there was no reliable prognosis for the child until she was 
around two years old, and therefore no evidence that her life was going to be 
intolerable.56 
A more recent decision was that of NHS Trust v MB, an English case involving a 
dispute between the parents of an 18-month-old child suffering from spinal muscular 
atrophy, a progressive and incurable condition causing complete paralysis but often 
intact brain function.57 The hospital sought a declaration to withdraw mechanical 
ventilation from the child on the basis that it was futile treatment, causing discomfort, 
pain and distress to the child and creating an intolerably poor quality of life in 
circumstances where there was no chance of recovery or prevention of death.58 The 
parents sought their own declaration that the hospital be ordered to perform a 
tracheostomy to enable their child to have long-term ventilation.59 They argued that 
he was cognisant and could enjoy life. He could see and hear and had a bond with 
his parents and siblings. 
An extensive list of the benefits as opposed to burdens was tendered to the court, 
with the burdens outweighing the benefits, but despite this, the court determined the 
best interests of the child were served with continued mechanical ventilation.60 It 
would not order the hospital to perform a tracheostomy in circumstances where the 
doctors of the child did not wish to do so.61 Accordingly, withdrawal of treatment was 
denied but withholding treatment permitted.62  
                                                
54 Ibid1423. 
55 Ibid 1424. 
56 Ibid 1423-1424. 
57 [2006] 2 EWHC 507 (Fam). 
58 Ibid [5]. 
59 Ibid [10]. 
60 Ibid [60]. 
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid. 
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This case also highlights the conflict such decisions have on medical staff that may 
strongly believe that treatment to continue life is wrong. This is similar to cases 
referred to in Chapter Three involving maternal refusal of medical treatment likely to 
cause death of the fetus. 
Giubilini and Minerva argue that ‘after-birth abortion’ should be permissible when the 
same set of circumstances apply that would have permitted a pre-birth abortion.63  
Ultimately, they philosophically equate the fetus with the newborn as a potential 
person whose value and admission to life is trumped by the concerns of actual 
people.64 In respect of fetal disability, they argue there are many abnormalities that 
may be present in the fetus but not detectable during a woman’s pregnancy or there 
may be brain damage caused to the child in the perinatal period, during the labour 
and delivery.65 In respect of maternal health concerns, they argue that if social, 
psychological and economic concerns are good enough reasons for a lawful 
abortion, then they ought to be good enough reasons to justify killing a potential 
person.66  
Whilst this may sound radical, it is consistent with the observation made in this thesis 
in Chapters Four and Five that where maternal health concerns or fetal disability can 
trump gestational age as a lawful reason for abortion, the only thing preventing 
infanticide is the born alive rule, which provides a restraining hand. Savulescu notes 
that actions to end the life of a newborn are not classified as infanticide where the 
decision is made by a doctor for medical reasons.67 Accordingly, end of life decisions 
are made on a different basis from those for older children because parents are given 
a broader discretion in the decision making process.68 He concludes that if that is so, 
then the social antipathy to infanticide is not as strong as it might initially seem.69  
 
                                                
63 Alberto Guibilini and Francesca Minerva, ‘After-birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ (2013) 39 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 261, 261. 
64 Ibid 261-2. 
65 Ibid 261. 
66 Ibid 263.  
67 Julian Savulescu, ‘Abortion, Infanticide and Allowing Babies to Die, 40 years on’ (2013) 39 (5) Journal of 
Medical Ethics 257, 257.   
68  Ibid.  
69  Ibid.  
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There is some merit to the reasoning in this argument. At the end of the day, 
Australian law stipulates that once born alive, the child is a legal person subject to 
the usual rights and protections. The born alive rule acts as a point of restraint 
regarding behaviour that requires both legal and medical justification. Logically, it is 
not clear why, if disability is a bar to being born, that it is not also a reason to 
terminate life after death.  
The court has a difficult decision to make and is required to look to a variety of 
sources to consider whether or not life is worth living. Community attitudes to 
disability, including those of experts called on in cases, and the personal view of 
judges makes it difficult to predict outcomes.  
6.6 Summary 
Fetal disability as a basis for abortion is articulated as a standalone reason for a 
lawful abortion in three states of Australia today. It overcomes any practical concerns 
about whether the mother’s reaction to the disability in the fetus needs to have a 
particular impact on her mental health. The limitations however are that in the 
Northern Territory and South Australia, a substantial risk of a severe physical or 
mental handicap in the fetus is still subject to gestational age thresholds.  
Accordingly, considered as a whole, both the Northern Territory and South Australian 
abortion laws subscribe to the gradualist approach to abortion. Maternal health 
concerns are also important and in fact, can prevail over gestational age or fetal 
disability, although these need to involve a threat to her life or health as the fetal 
gestation increases. Western Australia however permits abortion for a serious 
medical condition of the fetus in spite of its gestational age. By identifying fetal 
disability as a valid basis for lawful abortion, all three jurisdictions would appear to 
de-value seriously disabled life.  
In today’s society, that is not a particularly shocking statement. The acceptance and 
lawfulness of PGD practices provide further support for this observation. Fetal 
disability abortion legislation basically leaves it up to the pregnant woman and her 
doctors to decide on the reasonableness of the abortion, subject to the guidelines.  
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The laws discussed in this Chapter are created by the State rather than by 
development of the common law. This is not to suggest that we have State 
sponsored eugenics, given the requirement for maternal consent to abortion. At the 
end of the day, abortion on the basis of fetal disability is only ever considered where 
the mother requests it. It is therefore the attitude of the mother and the value she 
ascribes to the disabled fetus that it is the starting point for any discussion on 
abortion and this directly falls within the concept of maternal bodily autonomy.  
The standard use of fetal diagnostic testing and the general availability of abortion in 
the earlier stages of pregnancy, together with assisted reproductive technology and 
its capacity to offer destruction of unwanted prenatal life with no physical side effects 
for the woman, suggests that our society expects the law to fit in with its expectation 
of reproductive liberty and the desire for a healthy child.  
To make fetal disability a basis for a lawful abortion has the potential to negatively 
affect people’s attitudes to those living in the community with serious disabilities. The 
effect of such attitudes on our society cannot easily be measured. However as Hart 
notes: 
…it cannot be seriously disputed that the development of law, at all times and places, has in 
fact been profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular 
social groups, and also by forms of enlightened moral criticism urged by individuals, whose 
moral horizon has transcended the morality currently accepted.70 
In support of this conclusion, and using the dramatic change in American society’s 
morals towards race relations following changes to the law, George notes that it is 
naïve to discount the effect law can have on shaping the perceptions of the morality 
of things.71 Gleeson too notes that public policy that endorses the view that the 
disabled fetus is more expendable and offered less protection than a non-disabled 
fetus, that is only expendable if they threaten the pregnant woman’s health must 
impact on the lives of disabled people.72  
                                                
70 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed 1994) 185. 
71 Robert P George, Making Men Moral (Oxford University Press, 1993) 2-3.  
72 Gleeson, above n 2, 431. 
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This thesis contends that permitting disability as a lawful basis for abortion raises 
some concerning questions about what message it sends to the broader community 
about the value of disabled life, and what future laws may be generated that are 
underpinned by this perspective and affect disabled people. This reveals the 
personal bias of this thesis that may well be the minority view in the community.  
This thesis now reviews the laws of abortion in the balance of the jurisdictions, being 
Victoria and Tasmania, where there is abortion on demand up to a certain gestational 
age, as well as the Australian Capital Territory, which has limited legal regulation of 
abortion. This review of each jurisdiction’s laws regarding destruction of the fetus 
forms the basis of the final discussion in this thesis on whether conscientious 
objection by doctors to participating in abortion can co-exist with laws that de-value 
the fetus. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ABORTION ON DEMAND UP TO A PARTICULAR GESTATIONAL AGE 
7.1 Introduction 
Abortion on demand makes the reasons for which a pregnant woman seeks an 
abortion irrelevant to the question of whether the procedure is lawful. It suggests the 
State has no interest in protecting the fetus, based on the position that the fetus is 
not an entity of value and abortion is purely about women’s rights to bodily autonomy.  
Abortion law reform occurred in Victoria1 and Tasmania2 in 2008 and 2013 and 
provided abortion on demand to pregnant women up to 24 and 16 weeks 
respectively. Interestingly, whilst they have a similar overall purpose, that is to de-
criminalise abortion and make access to abortion easier, the lawmakers were unable 
to agree on the upper gestational age limit for abortion on demand. Of note, although 
Tasmania has the more recent legislation, it was unable to obtain parliamentary 
support for the 24-week threshold and instead accepted a more restrictive upper 
gestational age limit.  
In line with widening access to abortion, both states created statutory duties on 
doctors who conscientiously object to performing or participating in abortion to refer 
the pregnant woman on to another doctor who does not conscientiously object. They 
also compel them to perform an abortion if the woman’s life or her health is at risk.3 
Statutory duties on doctors that flow from these rights to abortion will be explored in 
Chapter Eight.  
The focus of this present Chapter is to compare and contrast abortion law reform in 
these jurisdictions and consider its limitations. It will also consider the issue of social 
sex selection, where the fetus is aborted on the basis that the woman does not want 
a child of a particular gender.  
                                                
1 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic), s 4.  
2 Reproductive Health (Access to Termination) Act 2013 (Tas) s 4.  
3 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8; Reproductive Health (Access to Termination) Act 2013 (Tas) s 6(3). 
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Whilst the Australian Capital Territory does not technically have abortion on demand, 
its legislation is not in accord with the three themes of maternal health concerns, 
gestational age or fetal disability prescribed in the legislation and case law of the 
other seven jurisdictions of Australia. Given there is arguably minimal legal 
interference in the practice of abortion in the Australian CapitalTerritory, its abortion 
laws will be also discussed in this Chapter.  
7.2 Victoria  
Prior to the passing of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008, the lawfulness of an 
abortion was based on the 1969 decision in R v Davidson.4 The case involved the 
prosecution of a doctor under section 65 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) for performing 
an unlawful abortion. During the trial, Menhennit J directed the jury to consider 
whether the defendant held an honest belief on reasonable grounds that the abortion 
was both necessary and proportionate, with necessary meaning that the abortion 
was necessary to preserve the pregnant woman from serious danger to her life or to 
her physical or mental health beyond those of normal childbirth, and proportionate 
meaning the abortion was not out of proportion to the danger to be averted.5 The jury 
ruled in favour of the defendant and the doctor was acquitted.  
The ruling was adopted in New South Wales in R v Wald6 discussed in Chapter Four. 
The ruling made no reference to the age of the fetus as being a relevant criterion for 
a lawful abortion to occur in Victoria. Late term abortions, however, still elicit concern 
in the community. For example, much media attention occurred around a late term 
abortion performed in Victoria in 2000. The woman was 32 weeks pregnant and was 
told by doctors that her unborn child suffered from skeletal dysplasia.7 She attended 
the Royal Hospital for Women and requested an abortion, threatening to kill herself if 
an abortion was not performed. The doctors attending to her decided that the threat 
was real and that the performance of a late term abortion was justified and lawful, 
and it was carried out.8 
                                                
4 [1969] VR 667. 
5 Ibid 671 [50].  
6 (1971) 3 DCR (NSW) 25. 
7 (2006) VACA 85 [1].  
8 Ibid [85].  
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There were concerns that the fetus did not actually suffer from the condition that 
induced the mental health concern in the woman9 but ultimately the doctors involved 
were not prosecuted and an opportunity to clarify abortion laws and the impact of 
gestational age as opposed to maternal health on the lawfulness of abortion was lost. 
In 2007, the Law Reform Commission of Victoria reviewed the Victorian laws 
regarding the crime of abortion as set out in section 58 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). 
The purpose of the review was so that the law could be ‘modernised, clear and [be] 
widely understood’ with the government’s aim to neither expand the extent to which 
abortion occurs nor restrict access to services.10 Following this review, Parliament 
enacted legislation to decriminalise the practice of abortion and remove the offence 
of child destruction through the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic).  
As a result of the reforms, Victoria has very liberal abortion laws. Under the Act, 
abortion is legal in Victoria for pregnant women up to 24 weeks gestation for 
whatever reason and without the need for the woman to satisfy any criteria or for the 
doctor to act as the gatekeeper regarding the lawfulness of the act.11 There is no 
need for a doctor to provide any counselling to the pregnant woman regarding her 
decision to abort at that time.   
The choice of the upper gestational age for abortion is in line with the United 
Kingdom’s Abortion Act 1967. This thesis notes previous comments made in Chapter 
Five regarding fetal viability and failed late term abortions resulting in live births. A 
practical concern, the purpose of an upper limit is reflective of medical opinion on the 
viability of the fetus, however there is no mention of the fetus in the provisions for a 
post 24 weeks gestation abortion. After 24 weeks gestation, a doctor may perform an 
abortion only when they consider the abortion is appropriate in all the circumstances 
and they have consulted with at least one other doctor who also reasonably believes 
that the abortion is appropriate in all the circumstances.12  
When considering whether the abortion is appropriate after 24 weeks gestation, the 
doctor must have regard to all the relevant medical circumstances and the woman’s 
                                                
9  Ibid [85].  
10 Victorian Law Reform Commission, The Law of Abortion Information Paper (2007) 4.  
11 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 4. 
12 Ibid s 5.  
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current and future physical, psychological and social circumstances.13 There is no 
case law currently available to assist with the interpretation of the precise maternal 
circumstances that will satisfy this requirement. However the phrase ‘appropriate in 
all the circumstances of the case’ seems to be an expanded version of the previous 
Menhennit ruling.14  
Accordingly, under the Abortion Law Reform Act, there is no requirement that the 
abortion be considered by the doctors to be a proportionate act. Her life need not be 
at stake. Immediate grave concerns for physical or mental health do not apply. As 
was argued in Chapter Four, the basis for any prosecution of a doctor must be that 
the doctor performing the abortion did not hold a reasonable belief about the matters 
in question. With no agreement in the community, let alone amongst doctors, as to 
the ethical value of prenatal life, it would seem impossible to judge a doctor’s view 
that the abortion was or was not appropriate in all the circumstances. To do so would 
be to attack the doctor’s personal views on the subject.  
In commenting on the framework for the Abortion Act 1967 (UK) which is largely used 
in Victoria post 24 weeks gestation, Greasley notes that it cannot be the meaning of 
the statute that every conceivable reason for not having an abortion, including those 
that are trivial or irrational is deemed legally acceptable so long as the desire for 
abortion by the pregnant woman is sufficiently intense.15 She notes that the purpose 
of the Act is to provide exceptions to an otherwise unlawful act where but for the 
particular impediment, the baby was wanted by the pregnant woman.16 
However where the intention is to provide abortion on demand, any trivial reason for 
abortion would appear to be lawful.  The capacity to access a lawful medical abortion 
in Victoria after 24 weeks would seem to be relatively easy if one can locate a doctor 
who shares the same views on the appropriateness of abortion and is sympathetic to 
the general situation.  
On this point, it is worth noting the controversial case of Dr Mark Hobart, a Victorian 
general practitioner who refused to refer on for abortion a woman who was 19 weeks 
                                                
13 Ibid s 5(3). 
14 R v Davidson [1969] VR 667, 671 [50].  
15 Kate Greasley, ‘Is Sex Selection Abortion Against the Law?’ (2015) 35(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 14.  
16 Ibid.  
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pregnant with a female fetus. The woman sought the abortion because she wanted a 
boy. This is an interesting scenario that integrates the issue of social sex selection as 
a legitimate basis for abortion and conscientious objection.17 Suffice it to say that 
Victoria has committed to a permissive agenda regarding access to abortion, 
essentially leaving much of the policing in regards to the appropriateness of this 
practice to the medical community.  
It is not clear whether a doctor’s opinion that a sex selection abortion after 24 weeks 
is not appropriate will fall within the scope of a reasonable belief held by them that 
meets the statutory requirements, or a conscientious objection. Imposing on the 
community the notion that a woman has a right to access abortion for any reason is 
also a moral belief. It seems clear that the purpose of the Victorian law is to ensure 
women may access abortion. Accordingly, a pregnant woman in Victoria arguably 
has a right to abortion, with very minimal medical input into the decision.18 The end 
result appears to be that a pregnant woman seeking an abortion in Victoria, even a 
late term abortion, will probably achieve that end.  
Repeal of the child destruction offence removes any concerns that a late term 
abortion in Victoria might become a de facto crime. Where a late term abortion 
results in a live birth, reliance on end of life decisions for disabled neonates would 
arguably cover denial of resuscitation to the baby to ensure its death.19 
Conscientious objection by doctors to late term abortion may occur and this will be 
discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
 
 
 
                                                
17 Miranda Devine, ‘Doctor risks his career after refusing abortion referral’ The Herald Sun (online), 5 October 
2013. http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/opinion/doctor-risks-his-career-after-refusing-abortion-referral/story-
fni0ffsx-1226733458187?nk=ecfb38feadba99ac69e1dc8a421a5a4. 
18 See, eg, Naomi Oreb, ‘Worth the Wait? A Critique of the Abortion Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2009) 17 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 261, 268; Danuta Mendelson, ‘Decriminalisation of Abortion Performed by Qualified Health Practitioners 
Under the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 651, 665. 
19 Kristen Savell, ‘Life and Death Before Birth: 4D Ultrasound and the Shifting Frontiers of the Abortion Debate’ 
(2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 103, 112.  
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7.3 Tasmania  
Abortion on demand is lawful in Tasmania up to 16 weeks gestation under the 
Reproductive Health (Access to Termination) Act 2013 (Tas).20 After 16 weeks 
gestation, abortion is lawful if two doctors certify in writing that they reasonably 
believe that the continuation of the pregnancy would involve greater risk of injury to 
the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman than if the pregnancy were 
terminated.21 In assessing the risk, the woman’s current and future physical, 
psychological, economic and social circumstances are relevant factors for 
consideration.22  
Tasmanian abortion laws are arguably very similar to Queensland, New South Wales 
and Western Australia when adjusted for abortion after 16 weeks gestation. 
Arguably, they are not as permissive as Victoria, given the upper gestational age limit 
for abortion on demand is some eight weeks lower and given that an assessment 
that there is a serious risk of injury to physical or mental health is required as 
opposed to the more elastic ‘in all the circumstances’ provision in Victoria.  
Like Victoria, in Tasmania, doctors with a conscientious objection to abortion are 
required under the legislation to perform an abortion where it is deemed necessary to 
save the life of the woman or to prevent her from suffering serious physical injury.23 
This will be explored further in Chapter Eight.  
However despite having a lower limit for abortion on demand compared to Victoria, 
the Tasmanian legislation makes it illegal for people to protest abortion where such 
protest can be seen or heard by a person accessing the abortion clinic.24 The penalty 
for such behaviour is harsh, being 75 penalty units or 12 months imprisonment or 
both. 
  
                                                
20 Reproductive Health (Access to Termination) Act 2013 (Tas) s 4. 
21 Ibid s 5(1)(a). 
22 Ibid s 5(3). 
23 Ibid s 6(3). 
24 Ibid s 9.  
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 134 
Accordingly, the clear purpose of this legislation is to remove as many obstacles as 
possible to permit pregnant women access to abortion.25 Although it retains arguably 
more medical oversight than permitted in Victoria, it has a broader impact on the 
community to support the notion of abortion as a non-controversial, standard medical 
service as opposed to the destruction of human life.  
7.4 The Australian Capital Territory 
The Australian Capital Territory does not share the three themes that have been 
discussed in Chapters Four to Six that specify serious maternal health concerns, 
gestational age limits and fetal disability. The act of abortion was decriminalised via 
the Crimes (Abolition of Offence of Abortion) Act 2002 (ACT) and is regulated under 
the Health Act 1993 (ACT). There is no gestational time limit as to when abortion 
may not be performed.  
The presence of any fetal abnormality is not a stated relevant consideration nor is 
there a need to demonstrate that abortion is a proportionate response to health 
concerns for the pregnant woman. There is no requirement for counselling to be 
provided to the pregnant woman. Rather, regulation is restricted to two criteria; firstly, 
the abortion most be performed by a medical doctor, and secondly, the abortion 
must be performed in a facility approved by the Minister.26  
As was discussed in Chapter Two, the Australian Capital Territory retains the offence 
of child destruction. Concerns about properly performed late term abortion 
overlapping with child destruction are probably unfounded. In practice, the sole 
tertiary hospital in Canberra, The Canberra Hospital, relies upon an ethics committee 
to ratify a doctor’s decision about the reasonableness of a late term abortion. 27  
 
                                                
25 Population Health Equity, Information Paper Relating to the Draft Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) 
Bill, Department of Health and Human Services, March 2013, 10.   
26 Health Act 1993 (ACT), ss 81-2.  
27  See, eg David Ellwood, ‘Late Terminations of Pregnancy – An Obstetrician’s Perspective’, (2005) 29 Australian 
Health Review 2.  
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Balanced against this liberal access to abortion, no one is under any duty in the 
Australian Capital Territory to perform or participate in an abortion, even where it is to 
save the woman’s life.28 This is contrasted with the laws in Victoria and Tasmania, 
discussed above and further in Chapter Eight.  
Accordingly, in a practical sense, the Australian Capital Territory leaves the 
regulation of abortion to an Ethics Committee of a tertiary hospital and relies on 
doctors who, of their own free will, wish to perform the abortion in the particular case. 
There is something to be said for this system in terms of it being less complicated 
than the other jurisdictions. Under this arrangement, because of the strict 
requirements on who may perform abortion and where it may be performed, 
concerns regarding unscrupulous practices by abortionists after economic 
advantage, such as those previously discussed in Chapter Five, are minimised.  
7.5 Social sex selection abortion 
Just because gender is a part of a woman’s explanation for seeking abortion, it does 
not necessarily mean that she has distaste for giving birth to a child of a particular 
gender.29 For example, the gender of the child may be at the crux of a disability 
condition. However abortion for purely social as opposed to non-medical reasons is a 
recognised emerging cultural issue, reported to be a particular problem in India, the 
People’s Republic of China, and Pakistan, where the cultural norm values male 
children over female children.30  
In the United Kingdom, section 84 of the Serious Crimes Act 2015 (UK) was 
introduced this year to ensure that the government assessed the evidence for social 
sex selection abortion in England, Scotland and Wales, and to take action to change 
prejudices, customs and traditions that underpinned such beliefs.  
                                                
28 Health Act 1993 (ACT), s 82(1)-(2).  
29 Greasley, above n 15, 7.  
30 See, eg Explanatory Memorandum, Health Insurance Amendment (Medicare Funding for Certain Types of 
Abortion) Bill 2013; Rebecca Lobo, ‘Socially Repugnant or the Standard of Care’ (2014) 60 (3) Canadian Family 
Practice 212, 212.  
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As required by the legislation, in August 2015, the Secretary of State published their 
assessment on social sex selection abortion.31 Ultimately they were unable to draw 
definite conclusions in the short time available, but noted that discrimination in favour 
of sons and against daughters was a deep-seated problem in some cultures. A 
commitment to further research was made, with the promotion of gender equality 
thought to be the most effective long-term solution.32 
In comparing the rationale for abortion based on disability as against gender, Lobo 
suggests little difference between the two in cultures where burden and suffering are 
not just limited to the disabled.33 She suggests society can either redress the reasons 
why the person’s gender or disability is a burden or allow for unrestricted access to 
abortion with no consideration of motivation.34  
Given federal laws ban discrimination for both gender and disability, denying entry 
into society based on disability but not for gender, demonstrates a lack of 
consistency in principles.35 As argued earlier in this thesis, the segregation of the 
fetus that may be destroyed into sub categories dependant on attributes such as 
gestational age or the presence of disability is already evidenced in a number of 
jurisdictions. Accordingly, this thesis agrees that gender becomes just another 
attribute upon which the worth of the fetus can be measured. 
Doctors in Victoria and Tasmania who are offended at a request for social sex 
selection abortion would appear to have no alternative but to assist the pregnant 
woman to achieve this end by referring her on to someone who does not object to 
performing such an abortion. Accordingly, the State’s interest in permitting pregnant 
women liberal access to abortion suggests maternal autonomy prevails over other 
ethical concerns of the community such as social sex selection abortion. 
                                                
31 Department of Health, Assessment of Termination of Pregnancy on Grounds of the Sex of the Foetus, 27 
August 2015 <www.gov.uk>. 
32 Ibid 13.  
33 Lobo, above n 30, 213-5. She notes the probability of violence and sexual assault, unequal status in 
employment, the need for a family to raise a dowry for marriage and an inability to inherit land or wealth as 
examples of the burdens that females can contend with in certain cultures.  
34 Lobo, above n 30, 216. 
35 See, eg, Andrea Whitaker, ‘Media Debates and ‘Ethical Publicity’ on Social Sex Selection Through 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Technology in Australia 2008-2014’ (2015) 17(8) Culture, Health and Sexuality 
962. 
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It would be impossible to know if social sex selection abortion was occurring in 
Victoria and Tasmania given a pregnant woman is not required to stipulate the 
reasons the abortion is sought when it is performed prior to the upper gestational 
time limit. Currently before the Senate is the Health Insurance Amendment (Medicare 
Funding for Certain Types of Abortions) Bill 2013 which seeks to disallow 
government funding of social sex selection abortion.36 The Bill makes an exception 
for abortion on the basis of a gender specific disorder.  
The second reading speech for the Bill noted: 
Sex-selection abortions do happen in this country. That they happen is of deep moral 
abhorrence. It is something we should not tolerate under any circumstances. That a child will 
be destroyed if it is not of the desired gender is obscene. In an era when we claim equality 
for women and men, it is even more scandalous. Human beings are valued for their dignity 
as human persons. If having a boy to carry on the family name is out-moded then so too 
should we shun the pressure for our children to be complimentary bookends. Sex-selection 
abortion is a further means of entrenching sexual prejudice and devaluing the human 
person.37 
Predictably, there was vigorous opposition to the Bill based not on disagreement that 
social sex selection abortion was a concern for the community, but rather a suspicion 
that it was a tactic to suppress abortion. Senator Lee Rhiannon stated: 
It is actually the latest ugly tactic of those who want to limit women’s sexual reproductive 
rights. For many, their aim is to ban women’s right to choose abortion. Quite seriously, the 
Bill is unnecessary and it is vexatious. It is about whipping up unfounded fear in the 
community by stigmatising women who seek abortion.38 
Of course, as has been demonstrated in this thesis, Australian women do not have 
an unfettered right to choose abortion except in Victoria and Tasmania up to a certain 
gestational age of the fetus. The Bill has not progressed beyond the Second Reading 
debate. Although this thesis agrees with the concern regarding social sex selection, 
the Bill is an impractical solution given the disparate state of abortion laws in 
Australia.  
                                                
36 Explanatory Memorandum, Health Insurance Amendment (Medicare Funding for Certain Types of Abortion) Bill 
2013.  
37 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 19 March 2013, 2037 (John Madigan).  
38 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 27 June 2013, 4349 (Lee Rhiannon). 
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 138 
In 2013 in Britain, the Director of Public Prosecutions chose not to prosecute two 
doctors who had offered and agreed to perform abortions based solely on gender, 
specifically the female gender. The position of the British Medical Association was 
that although normally it is unethical to perform abortion based on the grounds of 
fetal gender alone, the pregnant woman’s views about the effect of the gender on her 
situation and on her existing children could be a legal and ethical justification for 
abortion (in other words, it could meet the United Kingdom requirement for maternal 
health concerns).39  
Davis and Douglas agree that there may be severe social and psychological 
pressures on a pregnant woman in a sex-unbalanced family that lead her to seek 
social sex selection abortion.40 They argue that in certain cases, social sex selection 
abortion can be as necessary as other medical therapies.41 It is clearly available in 
Victoria and Tasmania so long as it is sought prior to the upper gestational age 
thresholds.  
For late term abortions in Victoria and Tasmania, and for the remaining states, where 
maternal health concerns prevail, the availability of a social sex selection abortion 
would seem to depend upon the ethics of the doctors involved and whether they see 
social sex selection abortion as a legitimate mental health concern or a social 
concern that makes abortion appropriate in all the circumstances.  
7.6 Summary  
In the preceding Chapters, this thesis has demonstrated the diversity of abortion law 
in Australia, with five different gestational age limits, and varying integrating 
requirements regarding maternal health concerns as well as fetal disability 
provisions. At first glance, abortion law is a confusing mess. It seems an impossible 
task to reconcile the disparity amongst the jurisdictions in order to achieve national 
consistency.  
 
                                                
39 Holly Watt and Claire Newell, ‘Legal to Abort a Baby Because of its Sex’, Daily Telegraph (London), 8 October 
2013, 1.  
40 Colleen Davis and Heather Douglas, ‘Selective Reduction of Fetuses in Multiple Pregnancies and the Law in 
Australia’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 155, 172. See also Greasley, above n 15, 6. 
41 Ibid.  
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This thesis notes the comments made in 1996 by the Model Criminal Committee, a 
Committee set up to unify criminal law in Australia.42 Almost 20 years ago, in its 
discussion paper on ‘Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person’ they noted that the 
political process in Australia had been unable to deal with the issue of abortion for a 
century and in their opinion, that was unlikely to change. To date, that prediction 
remains solid. Faunce has observed that given the inconsistent state of abortion laws 
in Australia and the lack of individual human rights under the Australian Constitution, 
there is no guarantee that the abortion issue will not come before the High Court of 
Australia in the near future.43  
 
Given that abortion laws are based in legal positivism, the disparate approach 
between the jurisdictions should not technically matter. However this thesis agrees 
with comments made by De Costa et al that concern by some parts of the medical 
profession regarding lack of guidelines in legislation and lack of case law examples 
suggest a need for clearer guidelines.44 The problem remains though as to how to 
prescribe the circumstances that justify a doctor forming the belief that an abortion is 
appropriate given the lack of consensus in the community as to the moral value of 
the fetus and when it is right or wrong to destroy it.  
 
Legalising abortion on demand replaces the individual views of doctors and judges 
with that of the State.45 Arguably, it elevates abortion to a right that then requires the 
State to provide doctors willing to perform the act. As a consequence, it would 
appear to eliminate the basis for a doctor to object to the act by holding a different 
moral view,46 or at least require such a view to be subjugated to the woman’s right to 
an abortion.  Such an outcome highlights the significant consequences of the positive 
law legislating on moral issues.47  
 
                                                
42 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Discussion Paper: Chapter 5 – Non Fatal Offences Against the 
Persons, 1996, Standing Committee of Attorneys General, APGS. 
43  Thomas Faunce, ‘The Carhart Case and Late Term Abortions – What’s Next in Australia’ (2007) 15 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 23, 29.   
44 Caroline De Costa et al, ‘Abortion Law Across Australia – A Review of Nine Jurisdictions (2015) 55 Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology 105. 
45 Oreb, above n 18, 268. 
46 Malcolm Parker, Bioethical Issues – Teaching Medical Ethics and Law’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 
444, 449.  
47 Oreb, above 18.  
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Abortion on demand and other liberal abortion laws that place emphasis on maternal 
health concerns characterise abortion as a women’s health issue and de-emphasise 
the ethical aspect that it destroys human life. Whilst a pregnant woman’s decision to 
undergo abortion may not interfere with the general community’s ability to express a 
contrary view about the act, there is no getting away from the fact that abortion either 
by surgical procedure or by medical treatment (self administered abortifacient drugs) 
requires the assistance of health care professionals.  
 
Their capacity to express objection to abortion and refrain from participating in it may 
be threatened in an environment where debate about the morality of abortion has 
been shut down in favour of debate about the lawfulness of abortion. The lawfulness 
of abortion is based on an artificial rule that is incapable of authoritatively and 
persuasively addressing the issue of human personhood.48  
 
Against this background of having discussed the basis of abortion laws in Australia, 
this thesis now discusses the legal status of conscientious objection by medical 
practitioners to performing or participating in lawful abortion.  
 
                                                
48 R v Iby (2005) 63 NSWLR 278 [63].  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION BY DOCTORS TO ABORTION 
8.1 Introduction 
Whilst medical law follows the positivist model, it continues to be punctuated by the 
natural law tradition.1 The legal recognition of a doctor to conscientiously object to 
performing or participating in lawful abortion is one such area that finds its roots in 
the natural law,2 and is the final area of discussion in this thesis.  
In Australia, the right of doctors to conscientiously object to abortion is recognised by 
five jurisdictions, subject to limitations.3 Of those, two states impose statutory duties 
on doctors who conscientiously object to abortion to refer a woman on to another 
doctor whom they know does not have a conscientious objection.4 Four states 
compel a doctor to perform and/or participate in an abortion in an emergency 
situation, notwithstanding their conscientious objection.5 
Conscientious objection to abortion forces the lawmaker to accommodate different 
perceptions of abortion and the fetus. The challenge for the lawmaker is to consider 
whether the divergent views on the value of the fetus and the morality of its 
destruction can be accommodated in the law to the satisfaction of both parties or 
whether it will simply rank one right above the other.6 This thesis argues that in 
jurisdictions that permit abortion on demand, doctors who object to participating in 
abortion on conscience grounds may be in danger of the State imposing on them its 
position on the moral value of the fetus, and requiring them to participate in 
destruction of the fetus. 
                                                
1 Malcolm Parker, ‘Teaching Medical Ethics and Law’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 444, 447-8.  
2 This is based on the connection between conscientious objection and the moral value of the fetus.  
3 See Table 2, page 148. 
4 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8(2); Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 7(2). 
5  Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8(3); Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 
6(3); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(6).  
6 See, eg, Ronli Sifris, ‘Tasmania’s Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013: An Analysis of 
Conscientious Objection to Abortion and the “Obligation to Refer”’ (2015) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 900, 
910; Mark Davis, ‘Conscientious Objection to Abortion – An Ethical and Professional Balancing Act’ [2014] Health 
Law Bulletin 36, 38.  
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In this Chapter this thesis considers international covenants as a source of authority 
for a right to conscientious objection and overseas cases where the court has been 
asked to rule on what it means to participate in an abortion and whether it conflicts 
with conscientious objection. It then analyses the laws recognising conscientious 
objection by doctors to abortion in Australia and concludes that it is an area where 
there is likely to be ongoing debate and concern that arises from the conflict between 
the abortion laws and conscientious objection.  
8.2 International Covenants 
Hart notes that in the positive tradition of law, the natural law and its focus on 
objective or moral truths springs from ‘deep and old confusions from which modern 
thought has triumphantly freed itself.’7 Accordingly, it is not necessary for positive law 
to adhere to demands of morality, even though it often does.8 However where the law 
touches upon a moral issue, the question arises as to who has the authority to decide 
moral rights, set the hierarchy of rights, and restrain what the lawmaker can do.  
This has been recognized in circumstances such as the Nuremburg laws arising from 
World War II, which held that the laws in Nazi Germany though validly made, violated 
human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 recognises in its 
preamble, a need for normative morals for all people of the world in order to avoid 
acts that have gone against the conscience of people.9 It speaks of objective, 
fundamental human rights for all members of the human family that are to be 
universally protected. Accordingly, it sets a standard for behaviour by which people 
should abide by in order to enjoy freedoms such as freedom of speech and belief.10 
Covenants that flow from this original source instrument include the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 196611 and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child of 1990.12 In these documents there is acknowledgement of the unborn 
child. Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prescribes 
                                                
7 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 186.  
8 Ibid 185-6.  
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GAS Res 217A(III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd Plen mtg, UN Doc 
A/RES/217A(III) 10 December 1948. 
10 Ibid Articles 18-19.  
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 2200 (XXII) 
(entered into force 23 July 1976).  
12 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNTS 1577 (entered into force 3 September 1990). 
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that every human being has the inherent right to life that shall be protected by the 
law. It goes on in subsection 5 to note that sentence of death shall not be carried out 
on a pregnant woman. 
Additionally, the Convention on the Rights of the Child notes that the child, by reason 
of his or her physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.13 Although dated, 
none of the instruments sanctioned by the United Nations refer to a right of a 
pregnant woman to abortion.  
Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights specifically 
acknowledges that everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion with no one being subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. Interestingly, it goes on to provide 
that freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others. Accordingly, freedom of 
conscience is not an absolute right and it may be overridden.14 
As has been argued in this thesis, women in Australia have what can best be 
described as a conditional right to access abortion. In these circumstances, how 
does such a conditional right co-exist with other conditional rights? If there is no 
common morality in a society and all its laws are relative, when will one right override 
other associated rights and who has authorised this?  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not directly enforceable in 
Australia; however its provisions support a number of domestic laws which confer 
enforceable rights on individuals. In Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, 
where Human Rights Charters exist, the Convention can be used by a plaintiff or 
defendant who invokes those jurisdictions’ Human Rights Charters.15 While the 
Convention cannot be used to overturn a law, a Court can issue a declaration of 
                                                
13 Ibid.  
14 Sifris, above n 6, 905. 
15 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 28; Human Rights Act 2006 (ACT) s 32. 
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incompatibility which requires the relevant Attorney-General to respond in Parliament 
within a set time period.16  
Oreb notes that with regard to abortion and conscientious objection, the introduction 
of such Charters is a positive move that attempts to contain judicial discretion and 
individual views on morality by setting a context in which rights and notions of 
morality are perceived.17 However as noted above, the right to conscientious 
objection is subjugated to the laws of the State for broad reasons including the 
protection of public health.18 It sits awkwardly in the law where abortion law is framed 
solely as a women’s health issue, with no value given to the fetus. Accordingly it is 
the view of this thesis that International Charters are ill equipped to confirm either 
concientious objection by doctors to abortion as an inviolate right or any right of a 
woman to abortion in any circumstances. In this area of law, the ordering of these 
rights is beholden to the morality of the lawmakers and their position on what the 
fetus is and whether it has any right to life or protection from destruction.  
This thesis will now consider the conflict of rights between the right of a pregnant 
woman to have a lawful abortion and the right of health care professionals to refuse 
to participate in it. Several overseas decisions provide useful examples of practical 
circumstances where health care professionals considered their right to 
conscientious objection was breached, however in none of the cases was the health 
care professional successful. 
8.3 International Decisions  
Disputes about the infringement of a health professional’s right to conscientious 
objection to abortion have tended to focus on participation in abortion as opposed to 
performance of it. Specifically, indirect participation, as opposed to direct participation 
(such as assisting in the operating theatre) has been called into question. There are 
a number of international judgments that provide specific examples where courts 
have been required to determine whether indirect participation has intruded on 
conscientious objection. This thesis considers four that are on point.  
                                                
16 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 30; Human Rights Act 2006 (ACT) s 33. 
17 Naomi Oreb, ‘Worth the Wait? A Critique of the Abortion Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2009) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 
261, 268-9. 
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, above n 11, Article 18(3).  
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In Greater Glasgow Health Board v Doogan and Anor19 two midwives were co-
ordinators of a labour ward and had formally lodged their conscientious objection to 
participating in abortion with their employer. The labour ward subsequently started to 
accept patients for abortion and the midwives claimed they were required to 
delegate, supervise and/or support other staff in participating in abortion or caring for 
patients having abortion. The midwives lodged a grievance with the hospital that was 
rejected. An appeal to the hospital’s board was also rejected and so the case came 
before the courts.  
The Court of Appeal held that conscientious objection extends not only to the actual 
medical or surgical termination but to the whole process and that the right to 
conscientiously object is recognised, because the process of abortion is felt by many 
people to be morally repugnant.20 This was overturned on appeal where the Supreme 
Court held that the right to conscientiously object in section 4 of the Abortion Act 
1967 (UK) was not unfettered, but was subject to exceptions such as to save the 
mother’s life or prevent grave injury to her health. The particular wording of the 
provision permitted conscientious objection to participate in any treatment leading to 
abortion. A narrow meaning was taken to the phrase ‘to participate in’ and was held 
to be restricted to performing the tasks involved in the course of treatment, in a 
‘hands on’ capacity.21  
This case is in line with the earlier decision of Janaway v Salford Health Authority22 
where the House of Lords held that a receptionist typing a referral letter to a doctor to 
consult a patient regarding abortion was not participating in abortion. The term 
‘participate’ was held to have its ordinary meaning, which referred to actually taking 
part in treatment administered in a hospital or other approved place.23  
Obviously, it is a matter for the lawmaker to decide whether they wish a narrow or 
broad construction of the term ‘participation’. As will be discussed in 8.4 below, two 
jurisdictions in Australia compel doctors who conscientiously object to abortion to 
refer the pregnant woman to another doctor whom they know does not have a 
                                                
19 [2014] UKSC 68.  
20 [2013] CSIH 36. 
21 [2014] UKSC 68 [37]-[38]. 
22 [1989] AC 537. 
23 Ibid 1082. 
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conscientious objection to abortion.24 This raises questions of whether this will result 
in an abortion being performed; whether the referring doctor can be said to have 
participated in abortion indirectly; and whether indirect participation is covered by 
conscientious objection.  
In Pichon and Sajous v France25 two French pharmacists claimed that their freedom 
of religion had been breached as a result of their conviction by French authorities for 
refusing to dispense oral contraception to three female customers. They appealed to 
the European Court of Human Rights. The Court held that the pharmacists could not 
give priority to their personal beliefs over their professional obligations where 
contraceptives are legal and could only be gained through prescription at a 
pharmacy.  
In Noesen v State, Dept of Regulation and Licensing26 a Wisconsin woman, married 
with four children sought the morning-after pill at a local pharmacy. The pharmacist 
refused to fill the prescription and refused to transfer it to another pharmacist or to 
return the original prescription to the patient. The local Board reprimanded him for 
abusing his professional power by refusing to transfer the prescription to another 
pharmacy. He appealed this decision, but it was dismissed.  
These two judgments highlight other ways in which health care professionals may 
feel they have participated in abortion. In these cases, the State’s sanctioning of a 
particular medical practice or treatment was the basis to refuse the health care 
professionals claim of conscience. This thesis contends that in so far as the law of a 
State tends towards the view that abortion is primarily about women’s health, and de-
emphasises the destruction of human life, the application of a doctor’s right to 
conscientiously object to participating in abortion seems extremely limited.27 
 
                                                
24 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 8; Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 7.  
25 Pichon v Sajous v France (European Court of Human Rights No 49853/99, 2 October 2001). 
26 Nosen v State, Dept of Regulation and Licensing, 754 N W 2d 849 (WI 2008).  
27 See, eg, Sifris above n 6, 913; Anna O’Rourke, Lachlan De Crespigny and Amanda Pyman, ‘Abortion and 
Conscientious Objection: A New Battleground’ (2012) 38(3) Monash University Law Review 87, 104-7.  
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This small selection of international cases demonstrates the complexity of the issue. 
The courts will not immediately recognise a health care professional’s conscientious 
objection to abortion as absolving them from performing certain tasks. Rather, it 
requires a careful review of the health care professional’s work duties, measured 
against the infringement on the pregnant woman’s capacity to seek and obtain a 
lawful abortion in the particular country. This thesis now reviews the laws on 
conscientious objection in Australia.  
8.4 Legislative Overview on Conscientious Objection  
Table 2 below summarises the current relevant legislative provisions in Australia. 
Essentially, there is no statutory duty on a doctor by contract or statue to carry out an 
abortion in the Australian Capital Territory,28 the Northern Territory,29 South 
Australia,30 Western Australia,31 and Tasmania,32 although exceptions expressly exist 
with regard to an emergency situation in the Northern Territory, South Australia and 
Tasmania. New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland do not have specific 
legislation recognising conscientious objection by doctors to abortion.  
In addition to legislation, or in lieu of it, professional standards can be found in the 
policies of various organisations such as the Australian Medical Association’s (‘AMA’) 
‘Conscientious Objection’,33 and ‘Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine’,34 and the 
Royal Australian and New Zealand’s College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologist’s 
(‘RANZCOG’) ‘Code of Ethical Practice’.35  
 
 
                                                
28 Health Act 1993 (ACT) ss 84-5.  
29 Medical Services Act (NT) ss 11(6)-(7). 
30 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(5),   
31 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(2).  
32 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 6(1).  
33 Australian Medical Association, Conscientious Objection 2013 <https://ama.com.au/position-
statement/conscientious-objection-2013>. Abortion is not the only area where doctors may have a conscientious 
objection. Other areas include end of life decisions, blood transfusions, organ donation, circumcision and 
euthanasia. 
34 Australian Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine (2013) <https://ama.com.au/position-
statement/ethical-issues-reproductive-medicine-2013>. 
35 Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Code of Ethical Practice 
(November 2001, revised 2006) <https://www.ranzcog.edu.au/the-ranzcog/policies-and-guidelines/code-of-
ethical-practice.html>. 
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Table 2 – Recognition and Limitations to Conscientious Objection to Abortion 
 Jurisdiction  Act Recognition of a doctor’s 
conscientious objection to 
participating in abortion 
 
Duty to participate in an 
emergency situation 
ACT Section 84(1) 
and (2), Health 
Act 1993 
No duty to carry out or assist in 
abortion. A person is entitled to 
refuse to assist in or carry out 
an abortion 
No 
NSW None  No 
NT Section 11(6), 
Medical 
Services Act  
No duty to terminate or assist in 
terminating a woman’s 
pregnancy 
No 
QLD None   No 
VIC Section 8(3), 
Abortion Law 
Reform Act 2008 
 
 Duty to perform an abortion in an 
emergency where necessary to 
preserve the life of the woman 
SA Sections 82A(5) 
and (6), Criminal 
Law 
Consolidation 
Act 1935 
No duty to participate in 
abortion where person has a 
conscientious objection 
Duty to participate in treatment 
necessary to save the life or to 
prevent grave injury to the physical or 
mental health of the woman 
TAS Sections 6(1) 
and (3), 
Reproductive 
Health (Access 
to Terminations) 
Act 2013 
No duty to participate in an 
abortion where a person holds 
a conscientious objection 
Despite any conscientious objection, 
there is a duty to perform an abortion 
in an emergency if it is necessary to 
save the life of the woman or to 
prevent serious physical injury 
WA Section 334(2), 
Health Act 1911 
No duty to participate or 
perform an abortion 
No 
 
These documents are applicable nationally, despite the discordance in Australia’s 
abortion laws. This presents a challenging situation where the profession’s ethical 
position on various medical practices have no state boundaries, yet must be 
integrated into the differing legal norms of a jurisdiction. In addition, State health 
departments and individual hospitals or facilities may also have policy directives that 
articulate such duties.36 
 
                                                
36 See, eg, Policy Directive, New South Wales Health, ‘Pregnancy – Framework for Terminations in New South 
Wales Public Health Organisations’ (PD2014_022, 2 July 2014) 7 [4.2]. 
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The AMA defines conscientious objection as a refusal to provide or participate in a 
legally recognised treatment or procedure due to a conflict with the doctor’s personal 
beliefs and values.37 Its position is that no doctor should be compelled to act 
contrary to his or her moral convictions or religious beliefs except as required by law 
or in an emergency.38 The profession accepts, therefore, that conscientious 
objection is a limited right subject to the State’s authority to override it.  
In regards to reproductive medicine, the AMA notes that a doctor may refuse to be 
clinically involved in the care of a patient seeking an abortion, but such a refusal 
should not impede the patient’s access to care.39 The AMA’s Position Statement on 
‘Conscientious Objection’ states that indirect actions such as referring the patient to 
another doctor to provide the service is participation in the act.40 The main issue, 
therefore, is whether the lawmaker agrees that such participation infringes the 
doctor’s freedom of conscience and whether its laws are in line with the profession. 
Parker notes that Codes of Conduct are owned by the profession and remain distinct 
from the law, but they are not above being inadequate.41 In some cases, where an 
aspect of self-regulation is enshrined in the law, the profession can end up 
surrendering that aspect of its conduct to external regulation.42 This appears to have 
occurred in Australia and will be discussed further below at 8.6.  
There are few studies on the attitudes of Australians to abortion, and fewer still on 
the attitudes of doctors to conscientious objection to abortion.43 This is unfortunate 
given its self-evident relevance to the current debate. This thesis notes that a key 
issue is not just how many doctors have a conscientious objection to abortion, but 
how many support the right of their colleagues to be protected by conscientious 
objection.  
 
                                                
37 Australian Medical Association Conscientious Objection, above n 33 [33].  
38 Ibid [1].  
39 Australian Medical Association, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine, above n 34 [2.4.2]. 
40 Australian Medical Association Conscientious Objection, above n 33 [1]. 
41 Parker, above n 1, 449. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Victorian Law Commission, Law of Abortion, Final Report 15 (2008), 58-68. 
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/VLRC_Abortion_Report.pdf.  The report noted that few studies 
had attempted to rigorously ascertain attitudes to abortion in Australia and those done had major flaws.  
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Internationally, a number of quantitative studies have been conducted on doctors or 
medical students and their attitudes to abortion. Strickland’s 2012 study of the 
attitudes of 1,437 medical students from universities in Cardiff, London and Leeds 
found that a third of participants would not perform an abortion for fetal disability after 
24 weeks gestation, a third would not perform abortion for failed contraception after 
24 weeks and a fifth would not perform abortion for a minor who was pregnant 
through rape.44 She concluded that although there were an increasing number of 
abortions taking place in the United Kingdom, fewer doctors were willing to perform 
them and if all the participants in the study acted on their conscience, it might be 
practically impossible to accommodate such doctors in the medical profession.45  
 
Nieminen et al’s 2013 study of 548 first and last year medical and nursing students 
and professionals in Finland concluded that whilst only a minority would seek 
conscientious objection for themselves, one third to one half of respondents 
supported a doctor’s right to conscientious objection. A majority felt that 
conscientious objection would cause conflict in the workplace, with others needing to 
take over an unpleasant task.46 The authors concluded that rational discussion on 
conscientious objection by health care workers requires professionals, politicians and 
the public to be made aware of the complexity of the issues involved. This included 
how to accommodate conscientious objection with lawful abortion and how to 
address the impact of conscientious objectors in the workplace, where discrimination 
and social conflicts might occur.47  
 
This thesis echoes this need for more research and more detailed discussion from 
people who will be affected by such legislation such as doctors. This Chapter will 
now focus on the legislation in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia and its 
position on direct participation in an emergency and indirect participation by referral 
to another practitioner who has no conscientious objection. 
 
                                                
44 Sophie Strickland, ‘Conscientious Objection in Medical Students: A Questionnaire Survey’ (2011) 38(1) Journal 
of Medical Ethics   22.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Petteri Nieminen et al, ‘Opinions on Conscientious Objection to Induced Abortion Among Finnish Medical and 
Nursing Students and Professionals’ (2015) 16 BMC Medical Ethics DOI:10.1186/s12910-015-0012-1. 
47 Ibid.  
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8.5  Abortion in Obstetric Emergency  
Clearly, the medical profession’s representative bodies agree that conscientious 
objection is beholden to the law.48 With regard to emergency situations, it is not clear 
what constitutes this and whether it extends beyond a threat to the pregnant 
woman’s life. There are no reported instances in Australia where a doctor’s refusal to 
perform an abortion based on conscientious objection lead to the death or serious 
injury to a pregnant woman.  
Much like maternal health concerns underpinning lawful abortion in New South 
Wales and Queensland, discussed in Chapter Four, such a term is capable of wide 
construction and application due to its subjectivity. Additionally, an emergency 
situation is characterised by immediacy and so by definition does not permit for time 
to explore the basis of the clinical judgment, much like maternal refusal of caesarean 
section discussed in Chapter Three (although in that scenario, there is a reversal of 
concern for the fetus over the pregnant woman).  
In Victoria, there is a positive duty on the health practitioner in section 8(3) of the Act 
to perform an abortion on a pregnant woman when it is deemed necessary to save 
her life. The circumstances that would satisfy this scenario are not set out in the 
legislation, however Mendelson notes that it is likely this phrase will be interpreted to 
mean the physical and mental health of the pregnant woman as defined by 
Menhennit J in R v Davidson, 49 discussed in Chapter Seven.50 This thesis agrees 
with this conclusion. 
In Tasmania there is also a duty to perform an abortion where it is necessary to save 
the life of the woman or preserve her from serious physical injury.51 Again there are 
no guidelines in the legislation to assist with interpretation of what constitutes a 
serious physical injury deemed sufficient to override a doctor’s conscientious 
objection to abortion.  
                                                
48 Australian Medical Association, above n 33 [4]; RANZCOG, above n 34, 5.  
49 [1969] VR 667, 672. 
50 Danuta Mendelson, ‘Decriminalisation of Abortion Performed by Qualified Health Practitioners Under Abortion 
Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic)’ (2012) 19 Journal of Law and Medicine 651, 666. 
51  Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 6(3).  
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In South Australia, there is a statutory duty to perform an abortion where it is 
necessary to preserve the life of the woman or to prevent grave injury to her physical 
or mental health.52 This tri-fold criterion that compels a doctor who conscientiously 
objects to abortion to perform or participate in abortion in South Australia appears to 
have the clearest and widest application amongst the three jurisdictions.  
Ascertaining whether the harm to be averted actually existed to the level required 
and was capable of being known within time in order to perform the abortion, is a 
medical question and may be subject to a difference of opinion. The case of Royal 
Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioner’s Board,53 referred to in Chapter Seven 
involving a Victorian woman threatening suicide if an abortion were not performed, is 
an example where a positive assessment was made by two doctors.  
Should a pregnant woman be denied an abortion and succumb to injury, Mendelson 
notes there would appear to be a strong case for breach of statutory duty by the 
doctor in a civil claim for damages.54 She opines that in such cases, the only 
complete defence by the doctor would be proving that the breach was occasioned 
solely by the plaintiff’s conduct, with no contribution by the defendant doctor.55 
Accordingly, a tragedy is required in order to test the extent of circumstances that 
apply. As the incidence of emergency cases mandating direct participation on the 
conscientious objector seem rare, the more contentious area of dispute is that of 
requiring a doctor to participate in treatment leading to an abortion and working out 
whether the term ‘participate’ has a different meaning in practice and in the law.  
According to the examples given in international law, referred to in section 8.3 above, 
actions judged to be ‘indirect’ participation as opposed to ‘direct’ participation, may 
not be a sufficient platform for the doctor to exercise conscientious objection. This 
thesis now considers how the law compels participation in abortion by 
conscientiously objecting doctors in these three jurisdictions.  
 
                                                
52 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(6).  
53 [2006] VSCA 85, 24[1]. 
54 Mendelson, above n 50, 665.  
55 Ibid.  
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8.6  Participation in abortion  
8.6 (a) South Australia 
In South Australia, the legislation provides that the burden to prove conscientious 
objection rests with the person who wishes to rely on it.56 This is not the case in 
Victoria and Tasmania. Between 1988 and 1990 in South Australia, nurses refused to 
provide services for second trimester abortions for ‘social reasons’ on the basis of 
conscience. Pregnant women seeking abortion on those grounds were required to 
travel to Sydney or Melbourne to obtain abortion.  
Cannold argues that the nurses’ conscientious objection was morally impermissible 
because it invaded the pregnant woman’s autonomy, put her health at risk (by having 
to travel interstate for abortion), and treated her unjustly.57 Whilst she conceded that 
participation in late term abortion might cause stress to a health care professional 
that could outweigh the harm to the pregnant woman,58 in her view, the health care 
professional would need to demonstrate that the objection against abortion, or 
abortion in the particular circumstances, was central to their self-definition.  
In her opinion, the person must be willing to lose their job or even go to jail to prove 
the depth of their belief otherwise their conscientious objection is civil disobedience 
or a political act.59 Otherwise, she concluded that morality requires such nurses to 
refrain from acts that are inconsiderate to the interests of others. In other words, a 
nurse can conscientiously object, but only where there is an assurance someone 
else will provide the care.  
However in South Australia, the fetus of 28 weeks gestation has a special status in 
that it is considered a child capable of being born alive and its destruction is only 
permitted where the woman’s life is at risk.60 Accordingly, if considering the 
jurisdiction’s abortion law and conscientious objection law together as a sensible 
                                                
56 Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(5). 
57 Leslie Cannold, ‘Consequences for Patients of Health Care Professionals’ Conscientious Actions: The Ban on 
Abortion in South Australia’ (1994) 20 Journal of Medical Ethics 80, 81-2.  
58 Ibid, 85.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(8).  
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whole, this thesis suggests that Cannold’s argument may not hold for a very late term 
abortion, though it may do so at an earlier fetal gestational age.  
This thesis now examines the situation in Victoria and Tasmania regarding the 
requirement of a doctor exercising a conscientious objection to abortion to refer the 
patient on to another doctor who does not hold the same objection, and considers 
how this position sits with the respective underlying abortion law.  
 8.6 (b) Victoria 
Prior to the introduction of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008, Victoria did not have 
any legislative provisions relating to conscience whereby a doctor could be excused 
from performing or assisting with an abortion. Now, section 8(1)(a) and (b) of the Act, 
whilst recognising that health practitioners may have a conscientious objection to 
performing or participating in an abortion, sets a positive duty on the part of such a 
doctor to declare their conscientious objection to the pregnant woman and to refer 
her on to another practitioner whom they know does not have a conscientious 
objection to abortion.  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act clarified that the doctor was obliged to 
make enquiries or take other steps to inform himself or herself of the views of the 
doctor to whom the referral is made so as not to refer the woman to another doctor 
who may share a conscientious objection to abortion.61 However it may be difficult to 
classify a doctor as having a conscientious objection to performing or participating in 
an abortion per se.62 How exactly are doctors able to carry out this task of 
ascertaining the views of colleagues unless the referral is to a doctor or facility that 
performs abortions? Would this constitute indirect participation in abortion? 
It is not clear whether the referral is to be made to a doctor who will perform abortion 
or merely to a doctor who will advise and present choices that include abortion. If it is 
the former, then as noted in 8.4 above, the AMA’s Position Statement on 
Conscientious Objection characterises referral to another doctor who will provide the 
service as an example of an indirect action that qualifies as ‘participation’ in a 
                                                
61 Explanatory Memorandum, Abortion Law Reform Bill 2008. 
62 Strickland, above n 44. 
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procedure or treatment, and therefore an activity that the doctor may object to.63 This 
is a conflict between the law and the profession. Acknowledging this conflict, AMA 
Victoria advised doctors to fulfil their legal duty and avoid a conflict of interest by 
placing signs in their waiting rooms or on their website stating they are not available 
for advice or assistance with abortion.64  
Obviously a practical solution, it obviates the need to prepare a referral note and 
avoids concerns about moral complicity. However, this recommendation that doctors 
should ‘out’ themselves as being conscientious objectors to abortion so as to avoid 
the requirement to provide a referral to an abortion provider raises concerns about 
privacy. It sits well, though, with Cannold’s comments noted in 8.6(a) above, that a 
doctor who objects ought to go to great lengths to demonstrate this otherwise their 
refusal is an act of civil disobedience.65 
If however it requires a referral to a doctor who will not actually perform the abortion, 
then Ethicist Nicholas Tonti-Filippini makes the practical point that as abortion is 
widely available from a variety of community centres without referral, there is no need 
for the doctor to refer the woman on. Accordingly, in his view, women would not be 
excluded from accessing abortion if doctors exercised conscientious objection and 
withdrew from advising them.66  
This thesis takes the position that the opinion of those who object to being obliged to 
refer patients on is relevant to this discussion. Understanding whether they would 
consider referring the patient on to another person who does not perform the abortion 
might be a distinction that is acceptable. Further research is required.  
The Professional Standards Panel of the Victorian Medical Board ruled on a 
complaint made by a doctor about the conduct of another doctor who conscientiously 
objected to abortion.67 The respondent doctor admitted that in practice, when 
approached by a woman seeking an abortion he would advise her of his 
                                                
63  Australian Medical Association Conscientious Objection, above n 33 [1].  
64  Australian Medical Association Victoria, ‘Conscientious Objection and AMA Victoria Policy’, 18 June 2011  
<httml://amavic.com.au/page/specialists_ in_ public_ hospitals/templates>. 
65 Cannold, above n 57, 81-2.  
66 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini, Bioethics, Motherhood, Embodied Love and Culture, (Cooper Consulting, 2013) 151.  
67   Medical Board of Australia, Performance and Professional Standards Panel Hearing: Reasons, Hearing date 
24 January 2013, reasons, 14 February 2013.  
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conscientious objection, refuse to provide a referral to another doctor but indicate 
that the patient should see another doctor to obtain the said referral.   
This practice was found to be unprofessional conduct and in contravention of the 
requirements under section 8 of the Act. The Panel noted that the doctor’s conduct 
was not consistent with the expectations of the community and the contemporary 
environment. It concluded that the term ‘refer’ required that at a minimum, the doctor 
should send or direct that patient to another practitioner who did not have a 
conscientious objection to abortion or he was to otherwise facilitate access to such a 
practitioner.  
Whilst this decision does not clarify the issues raised above regarding to whom 
precisely the referral needs to be made and whether that referral will directly result in 
abortion, it does suggest to this thesis that ‘indirect’ participation on the part of the 
doctor is not considered to be ‘participation’ sufficient to displace a woman’s right to a 
lawful abortion up to 24 weeks gestation.  
In Victoria, abortion is permissible after 24 weeks where two doctors believe it is 
appropriate in all the circumstances.68 It is unclear whether the doctor’s view on the 
moral status of the fetus is a permissible circumstance or whether it is restricted to 
the health consequences to the pregnant woman. This is somewhat different to the 
South Australian situation where legislation defines the fetus at 28 weeks as a child 
capable of being born alive, and where the lawfulness of destruction at this time 
reflects this definition.69 In other words, the fetus in and of itself does not appear to 
be the focus of the provisions. It holds no special status that overrides other 
concerns.  
This thesis argues that to disallow the doctor’s view on the moral value of the fetus 
as a relevant matter to consider for abortion after 24 weeks gestation, is a very 
worrying development in the law, as it is not only the State imposing its view that the 
fetus has no value, but it then directs the doctor to act in accordance with that view. It 
seems a distinct probability that in line with Victoria’s liberal abortion laws, the courts 
                                                
68 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 5(1)(a).  
69 Criminal Code Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 82A(8).  
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will interpret ‘participation’ in a narrow sense, uphold the statutory duty to refer, and 
limit the doctor’s exercise of conscientious objection.70  
It is unfortunate that opponents of section 8 of the Act did not invoke the Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and require the court to issue a 
statement of incompatibility which requires the Attorney-General to respond in 
Parliament.71 This would have provided a good vehicle within which to test these 
issues. No doubt a test case will arise in which these important issues can be 
ventilated. This thesis now considers the law in Tasmania. 
8.6 (c) Tasmania 
The Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) imposes a 
statutory duty on doctors who conscientiously object to participating in abortion by 
compelling them to, under threat of a fine, provide the pregnant woman with a list of 
providers from a prescribed list who do not have a conscientious objection.72 Sifris 
argues that there is a distinction here between Victoria’s obligation to refer because 
the Tasmanian provision does not require the referral to be to a doctor who will 
perform the abortion, rather it is simply to a doctor who does not have a 
conscientious objection.73  
 
In support of this interpretation, Sifris refers to the regulations, which note that the 
prescribed health services the doctor must refer to include: Family Planning 
Tasmania, Women’s Health Information Line, The Link Youth Health Service and 
Pulse Youth Health South.74 As argued above, this interpretation is an interesting 
one, but requires clear confirmation from the lawmaker and the views of the 
profession, especially doctors who conscientiously object.  
 
 
                                                
70  See, Oreb, above n 17. Oreb notes that the doctor’s obligation to refer is evidence of the intent that abortion on 
demand up to 24 weeks gestation is an actionable right for all women.  
71 Oreb, above n 17, 266-7.  
72  Reproductive Health (Access to Termination) Act 2013 (Tas) s 7(2).  
73 Sifris, above n 6, 913. 
74  Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Regulations 2014 (Tas) s 4.  
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The purpose of the Act can be found in documents such as the Population Health 
Equity's Information Paper on the Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Bill 
(‘the Information Paper’) which states that the changes sought to recognise that 
unplanned pregnancies occur, acknowledge women as capable decision makers, 
recognise abortion as a safe, medical procedure that will not cause negative mental 
health outcomes and recognise community standards.75  
 
The Information Paper noted that the dividing line as to when abortion on demand 
ceases was picked on the basis of clinical practice and approaches in other 
jurisdictions.76 There is a clear supposition in the Information Paper that abortion is 
nothing more than a woman’s health issue.77 There is no acknowledgement of the 
variety of views regarding the moral value of the fetus or indeed the scientific 
advances in knowledge that may challenge the notion of personhood or the viability 
of the fetus at certain gestational ages.78 
Explaining how the legislation would not deny a doctor or woman opposed to 
terminations the ability to live by their beliefs, the Information Paper curiously noted 
‘Rather, the law will extend that right to all Tasmanian women. In that way, each 
individual woman is able to make the best decision for her, according to her beliefs 
and having regard to her individual circumstances.’79 In other words, there was no 
recognition by the lawmaker that the Bill might take anything away from doctors. 
Instead, its focus was on giving something to women. However it is not clear how 
compelling a doctor to indirectly participate in abortion achieves a balance of rights 
from the doctor’s perspective. Guidance regarding what a referral involves can be 
found in the Second Reading Speech for the Bill wherein it was stated:  
…the referral obligation in the Bill is a reasonable balance of rights. The Bill does not 
legislate the manner of referral and does not demand, for example, a written letter detailing 
the patient’s medical history as one might do with a referral to a specialist. Instead, the 
doctor or counsellor will fulfil the duty if he or she provides the woman with the name and 
                                                
75 Population Health Equity, ‘Information Paper Relating to the Draft Reproductive Health (Access to 
Terminations) Bill’ Department of Health and Human Services, March 2013, 6-11. 
76 Ibid 12.  
77 Ibid 10.  
78 See, eg, Talat Uppal et al, ‘The Legal Status of the Fetus in New South Wales’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 178, 183; Kristen Savell, ‘Life and Death Before Birth: 4D Ultrasound and the Shifting Frontiers of the 
Abortion Debate’ (2006) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 103, 109.  
79 Above n 78, 12.  
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contact details of an alternative service provider who does not hold a conscientious 
objection.80 
 
Accordingly, the lawmaker has decided that a referral note does not amount to 
participation in abortion. There is nothing much a doctor with a conscientious 
objection may do other than wait to be charged and then mount a challenge that the 
law is unjust and engage in a serious discussion about how participation to the 
degree required is a serious affront to their freedom of conscience regardless of the 
lawmaker’s decided stance on the value of the fetus. Oreb notes that there may be 
other, less restrictive ways, to achieve access to abortion such as maintaining a 
public register of abortionists or doctors who do not hold a conscientious objection.81 
This is a useful suggestion as it obviates the need for a referral. 
 
After 16 weeks gestation, the woman’s access to abortion is not absolute.   
However the matters doctors must take into consideration for an abortion sought at 
this time are not open ended. Specifically, two doctors must agree that continuation 
of the pregnancy would involve greater risk of injury to the physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman than if the pregnancy was terminated and in so doing they 
must take into account the current and future physical, psychological, economic and 
social circumstances of the person.82  
 
However unlike the Victorian legislation, there is no reference to a doctor considering 
‘all the circumstances’.83 Accordingly, whether or not the legislation permits a doctor 
to decline abortion on the basis that they believe a fetus of a particular gestational 
age attains personhood or moral standing is unclear, but taking into the account the 
clear intent of the lawmaker to promote abortion as a woman’s health issue suggests 
the State is imposing a non-neutral view that the fetus has no value. 
It is worth noting that the Tasmanian law has additional provisions that enhance a 
woman’s access to abortion. The act prohibits people protesting in relation to 
abortion to come within 150 metres of an abortion facility under pain of a fine up to 75 
                                                
80 Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 16 April 2013 (Michelle O’Bryan).  
81 Oreb, above n 17, 268. 
82 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 5(2).  
83 Abortion Law Reform Act 2008 (Vic) s 5(1)(a).  
 
 
Walsh_al_Masters examination_pdf.doc 160 
penalty units or imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or both.84 Without case law 
examples, it is difficult to say how these laws will work in practice. Two years on, 
there have been no court cases regarding a breach of these provisions.  
It is also worth noting that in October 2015, the Australian Capital Territory enacted 
similar zones for persons protesting abortion in the Health (Patient Privacy) Act 2015. 
As at November 2015, Victorian Parliament commenced debate on the Public Health 
and Wellbeing (Safe Access Zones) Bill 2015 that also intends to enforce exclusion 
zones. Laws such as these raise issues about freedom of political communication 
and no doubt will result in a test case that touches upon the status of abortion laws 
and the value of the fetus in the law.85  
Calls for the reform of abortion laws nationally so there is effectively abortion on 
demand, as well as laws that limit the capacity for people to protest abortion, would 
seem to diminish the importance of conscientious objection. Where the State, 
through various laws, imposes its view on the community that the fetus has no 
inherent value that can override the consent of the pregnant woman to its 
destruction, there seems little basis for an opposing view based on morality to have a 
credible place in the debate.  
8.7 Summary  
In Australia, clarification of what the obligation to refer entails is critical to properly 
assessing whether balance has been struck. Sifris notes that compromise in this 
context means each party is not entirely content and that laws in Victoria and 
Tasmania have achieved balance.86 This thesis disagrees. The compromise required 
of doctors displays a lack of recognition for the position that abortion is immoral. 
Savulescu suggests that conscientious objection by doctors is wrong and immoral 
and should be illegal because doctors who are not prepared to offer lawful services 
that are beneficial to patients should not be doctors.87 As has been stated throughout 
this thesis, where a legal system’s laws are based on legal positivism, then morality 
                                                
84 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 9. 
85 See Sifris, above n 6, 904. 
86 Sifris, above n 6, 914.  
87 Julian Savulescu, ‘Conscientious Objection in Medicine’ (2006) 332 British Medical Journal 294.  
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is not a necessary ingredient to the validity of its laws.88 It is interesting that 
Savulescu takes a moral position on a legal issue and then attempts to bind others to 
it based on his morals. He seems to argue that a lawful practice is a moral practice 
and therefore denying access to it is immoral.  
As George notes, the claim that moral laws are unjust is inescapably a moral claim 
so beware the ethical relativist.89 Savulescu ignores the fact that there is no clear, 
unfettered legal right to abortion in every circumstance. Where it is lawful it still 
requires medical oversight that rises above that of obtaining informed consent. To 
use the fact that abortion can be lawful to jettison conscientious objection seems a 
bold statement, particularly where the law in question has a confused position on 
what the fetus is and, therefore, whether it is morally right or wrong to destroy it.   
The natural law concerns itself with identifying principles on which laws are based 
and the limits of the rule of law.90 The use of authority by lawmakers is defective, 
says Finnis, where rules are made by them not for the common good but for their 
own or their friends’ or party’s or faction’s advantage or out of malice against some 
group of people.91 Arguably, an unjust law is still a valid law. An issue however is 
whether a person’s conscience may be used as a basis to compel them not to follow 
a validly made law and if so, the consequences of that decision (such as Apartheid 
laws). 
Finnis frames the question as: Given that a legal obligation presumptively entails a 
moral obligation, and that the legal system is by and large just, does a particular 
unjust law impose upon me any moral obligation to conform to it?92 Whether this 
question should be answered by the law and jurisprudence or better left to the fields 
of bioethics or politics is debatable.  
                                                
88 Hart, above n 7, 185-6.   
89 Robert F George, Making Men Moral (Oxford University Press, 1993) 3.  
90 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011) 352.  
91 Ibid 352.  
92 Ibid 357.  
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Finnis argues that these issues are dealt with by judges every day when giving 
judgment set against the milieu of the sociology and political philosophy current at 
that time.93  Hart points to a sobering fact of life that 
… it is plain that neither the law nor the accepted morality of societies need extend their 
minimal protections and benefits to all within their scope, and often they have not done so… 
though a society to be viable must offer some of its members a system of mutual 
forbearances, it need not, unfortunately offer them to all.94 
The controversy over statutory duties on doctors who conscientiously object to 
performing or participating in an abortion highlights the complexity of the abortion 
debate in Australia. It reminds us that it is not just about a woman’s capacity to 
access health care and advice on abortion, it is also about community expectations 
of a need to strike a reasonable balance that also accommodates the rights of the 
doctor to exercise freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief. This in turn 
encompasses a doctor’s opinion regarding what the fetus is.  
Whitcomb notes that with the legalisation of abortion in many countries of the world, 
there is an ostensible social acceptance of the practice however a uniform 
willingness by doctors to perform abortion has not followed.95 Moreover, she argues 
that societal and professional pressure to provide abortion has given rise to an 
affirmative intolerance of conscientious objection in the medical profession with the 
view that those who conscientiously object to performing an abortion are somehow 
subversive and threaten abortion rights.96 She argues that the push for mandatory 
referral by doctors who conscientiously object forces a material co-operation on the 
part of the doctor and is an effective way for those who oppose conscientious 
objection to force affirmative co-operation on those doctors. 97 
Australian laws provide doctors with a limited protection of their right. Liberal access 
to lawful abortion in Victoria and Tasmania further limits conscientious objection by 
elevating abortion to a right, when sought prior to the fetus reaching a particular 
                                                
93 Ibid 352. 
94 Hart, above n 7, 200-1. 
95 Erin Whitcomb, ‘A Most Fundamental Freedom of Choice: An International Review of Conscientious Objection 
to Elective Abortion’ (2010) 24 (4) Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 771. 
96 Ibid.  
97 Ibid.  
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gestational age.  This thesis anticipates that doctors who conscientiously object to 
performing or participating in abortion in these States will likely be labelled as people 
with ‘fringe views’. This is based on the fact that their views as to the value of the 
fetus and the ethics of abortion are adverse to the trend in law reform in these States. 
The medical profession would appear to support the position that when it comes to 
conscientious objection to lawful medical procedures or treatments, abortion 
represents a special category of case where the profession’s representative bodies 
are not willing to support a robust and broad interpretation of what acts constitute 
‘participation’ in abortion. Additionally, as has been argued in previous Chapters, they 
are contending with different abortion laws throughout Australia that lack a common 
thread. Trying to accommodate a national response from the profession in these 
circumstances seems a very difficult task.  
The debate will no doubt continue and culminate in a legal test case to assess the 
boundaries and perhaps validity of these laws in Australia. In the meantime, until the 
law is clarified in Australia, doctors who conscientiously object but practice in areas 
where they may be called upon to perform or participate in an abortion would be well 
advised to follow professional Codes of Conduct and open lines of communication 
with employers to ensure that a suitable compromise can be reached to 
accommodate their objections whilst not infringing women’s access to lawful 
procedures. Further research and study into what Australian doctors believe 
constitutes participation in abortion would obviously be helpful. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the way in which the Australian law punishes or condones 
destruction of the fetus in the context of third party assaults against the pregnant 
woman; maternal duty of care to the fetus, abortion; and conscientious objection by 
doctors to abortion. It considered whether there is a common and consistent position 
in Australia on when it is lawful to destroy a fetus in order to test the hypothesis that 
the legal status of prenatal life in Australia is relative.  
This thesis has demonstrated that the fetus has a relative status under Australian law 
by revealing an absence of unchanging principles that underpin the way in which the 
law perceives what the fetus is, what its value is, and when its destruction is lawful. 
This thesis highlights the disparate legal approach between the jurisdictions as to 
when and in what circumstances it is lawful to destroy a fetus and how the relevance 
of the physical attributes of the fetus to the commission of an offence, changes 
dependant on the specific law in question.   
The capacity for the status of the fetus to be relative is made possible by 
maintenance of the born alive rule, which posits that only at birth does the 
(previously) unborn child become a legal person.1 With the maintenance of the born 
alive rule, one has a legal basis to ignore evolving scientific knowledge about the 
fetus, as well as philosophical reasoning about what a person is.2  This arbitrary 
approach to the definition of a legal person fits into the framework of legal positivism, 
where notions of morality or justice are not considered to be necessary requirements 
of valid law.3 
 
                                                
1 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 20; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 10; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 292; Criminal Code 
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 269; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) ss 1C sc1(2)(a)-(c); R v Hutty [1953] VLR 338 , 
339.  
2 See, eg, Kristen Savell, ‘Is the ‘Born Alive’ Rule Outdated and Indefensible?’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 
625, 663; Talat Uppal et al, ‘The Legal Status of the Fetus in New South Wales’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and 
Medicine 178, 183.  
3 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1994) 185-6.  
 walsh_al_Masters examination.docx 165 
In Chapter Two, this thesis demonstrated that where the fetus is destroyed as the 
result of a third party assault on a pregnant woman, the criminal law statutes in the 
Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria, 
expressly characterise the pregnant woman and the fetus as a single entity.4  
Accordingly, as the fetus is not considered to be a legal person, it cannot be the 
victim of a crime and therefore any crime is characterised as one against the 
pregnant woman alone.  
 
For this offence, the level of physical development of the fetus is irrelevant to whether 
a crime is committed. This is in contrast to the offence of child destruction, which 
operates in the Australian Capital Territory, the Northern Territory, Queensland and 
Western Australia.5 Here, it is a crime to destroy a fetus about to be born or capable 
of being born alive. Accordingly, the physical maturity of the fetus is a relevant 
consideration as to whether that particular crime has been committed.   
 
The argument has been made that as child destruction is an offence rarely 
prosecuted today, it ought to be repealed and dealt with under laws regulating late 
term abortion.6 However, in the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland, there is 
no express prohibition on late term abortion,7 and in Western Australia, a late term 
abortion is permitted under certain circumstances.8 Accordingly, in these jurisdictions 
that maintain the offence of child destruction and permit late term abortion, there is a 
clash in logic from the perspective of the fetus, where its physical traits that were 
determinative of an offence being committed in one scenario (child destruction), 
suddenly become irrelevant in a different scenario (late term abortion).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 4, 42; R v King (2003) 63 NSWLR 278; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 43, 48A; Criminal 
Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 15; Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 184A.  
5 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 42; Criminal Code 1988 (NT) s 170; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 313(1); Criminal Code 
Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 290. 
6 See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Law of Abortion, Final Report No 15 (2008) 108; Mark Rankin, ‘The 
Offence of Child Destruction: Issues for Medical Abortion’ (2013) 35(1) Sydney Law Review 1, 23-26.  
7  Health Act 1993 (ACT) ss 80-83; Medical Services Act (NT) s 11(3); R v Bayliss (1986) 9 Qld Lawyer Reps 8.   
8 Health Act 1911 (WA) s 334(7). 
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After considering third party assaults on the pregnant woman that destroy the fetus, 
this thesis then considered the general issue of materno-fetal conflict. Academic 
opinion can be sorted into three main approaches; the separate entity approach, the 
single entity approach and an in between approach. The third approach often called 
the ‘not one, but not two’9 approach appears to find the most resonance in legal 
cases dealing with maternal behaviour that compromises the fetus. Whilst the law 
upholds the concept of maternal bodily autonomy over the life of the fetus, on 
occasion it has circumvented this to protect the fetus by finding a lack of legal 
capacity on the part of the pregnant woman that then curtails her behaviour.  
 
These morally complex dilemmas are the precursor to the issue of abortion, where 
the pregnant woman specifically seeks to harm the fetus. Chapters Four, Five, Six 
and Seven of this thesis considered the regulation of abortion in Australia. It 
highlighted the disparate national approach to the circumstances that make abortion 
lawful. As summarised in Table 1 on page 75, in seven jurisdictions, the law 
expressly states in statutes or case law that the mother’s life or health has primacy 
over any right of the fetus to be born. In five jurisdictions, the gestational age of the 
fetus sits alongside maternal health concerns. In three jurisdictions, the presence of 
disability in the fetus can legitimise abortion, in conjunction with gestational age. In 
two jurisdictions, the consent of the pregnant woman to abortion is sufficient to 
legitimise abortion so long as the fetus is below a particular gestational age.  
 
From a positive law perspective, as the law considers the physical realities of the 
fetus as only one of a number of factors relevant to the question of whether its 
destruction is lawful, multiple approaches are acceptable. The capacity for physical 
traits to decide whether an offence has been committed is determined by the 
particular law in question, with no rationale required as to why it was relevant in one 
set of circumstances but not in another.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Isabel Karpin, ‘Legislating the Female Body: Reproductive Technology and the Reconstructed Woman’ (1992) 
3(1) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 325, 329.  
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Accordingly, despite the muddled approach to the regulation of abortion in Australia, 
the laws that are made are still valid, positive laws. However, if the purpose of 
positive law is to regulate rights and obligations between people, achieve a measure 
of justice and be socially accepted by the community, then the State must ensure its 
laws achieve balance. 
 
It is evident when considering abortion law reform in Australia over the last 25 years, 
that there has been increased access to lawful abortion and a de-emphasis on any 
notion of fetal legal rights. However, this thesis’ analysis of the laws in each 
jurisdiction demonstrates that we have not reached the point where it could be said 
that Australian law as a whole reflects abortion on demand. Limitations and legal 
oversight in one form or another continue to exist and a doctor's judgment as to the 
appropriateness of the abortion is still considered a necessary requirement in all 
jurisdictions. 
 
This thesis has argued that continuing medical oversight for the appropriateness of 
abortion should be non-negotiable given it requires the assistance of the medical 
profession to achieve its end. However the most recent abortion law reform in 
Victoria and Tasmania, discussed in Chapter Seven, created abortion on demand up 
to a certain gestational age.10 In so doing, it took away the power of medical 
oversight and elevated abortion in that context to a standard medical procedure.  
This thesis takes the position that where the State imposes laws that equate abortion 
to a standard medical procedure, it runs the risk of creating a duty on doctors to 
provide abortion on request. Those doctors that oppose abortion could be at risk of 
becoming marginalised, with their views considered not worthy of being considered in 
public discourse because the law has deemed a fetus to have nil value. This thesis 
views this type of development as worrying. Doctors who conscientiously object 
would have no protection from State oppression.  
 
 
 
                                                
10 Abortion Law Reform Act 2006 (Vic) s 4; Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 4.  
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The Tasmanian law has gone further in advancing the primacy of a woman's right to 
abortion by imposing more stringent obligations on doctors to co-operate materially in 
ensuring that abortion is achieved, notwithstanding their conscientious objection to 
participating in the act.11 The response of the medical profession in Victoria and 
Tasmania suggests that rather than insisting on a doctor’s right to freedom of 
conscience and integrity of moral beliefs, they will try and find a way to avoid this 
conflict occurring.  
 
The practical application of these laws, and the question of whether laws creating 
statutory duties on doctors to perform or participate in abortion are unjust and/or 
defective, await a suitable test case. This is an area worthy of further research.  
 
Whether other jurisdictions can enact similar provisions limiting conscientious 
objection by doctors to abortion or creating statutory duties on them is less clear. 
This thesis contends that without clear laws creating abortion on demand, a 
jurisdiction probably cannot limit conscientious objection. In other words, where there 
is a requirement for doctors to be satisfied of maternal health concerns, a pregnant 
woman cannot demand an abortion from them. Accordingly, where the lawmaker 
wishes to advance the primacy of a woman’s right to bodily autonomy, law reform 
would need to formally remove medical oversight and with it, the doctor’s traditional 
gate keeper status.  
 
Such conflicts of rights are the foreseeable result where relativism underpins the law. 
Where the touchstone principle of the law fails to deliver consistent legal results, it is 
difficult for the State to regulate with any moral authority, the rights and obligations of 
people affected by the laws it makes. Imposition by the State of a particular position 
such as the nil value of the fetus, would permit the lawmaker to regulate the 
behaviour of people affected by that law, such as doctors.  
Having considered the laws in these four areas, and reflected on areas where there 
appear to be common purpose, this thesis now makes suggestions for amending the 
law to achieve consistency between jurisdictions. These suggestions are made on 
the following realistic, assumptions/limitations: Firstly, that it is unlikely lawmakers in 
                                                
11 Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 7(3).  
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Australia will overturn the born alive rule and bestow legal personhood on the fetus; 
and Secondly, that the practice of abortion is likely to continue.  
The suggested amendments are; the repeal of child destruction laws in the Australian 
Capital Territory, Queensland and Western Australia; decriminalisation of abortion in 
Queensland, New South Wales and South Australia; lawful abortion where two 
doctors are satisfied that there is a proportionate justification for the abortion in 
accordance with their best judgment; deletion of reference to fetal disability; and 
recognition of a doctor’s right to conscientiously object to performance or 
participation in abortion without limitation. Penalties should remain severe for 
unlawful abortion.  
The non-existence of prosecutions for child destruction highlights its lack of practical 
usefulness. Of most concern for this thesis is the rationale that the mature fetus is 
more deserving of legal recognition and protection than the less mature. This relies 
on an attribute of the fetus as the basis for the offence as opposed to any inherent 
value. It provides justification for other attributes of the fetus (such as disability) to be 
considered legitimate factors in assessing the lawfulness of destroying it.  
The decriminalisation of abortion is not a particularly controversial suggestion for 
Australia given abortion law reform. However, the subsequent suggestion regarding 
how abortion should be regulated is the most challenging reform and ties into the 
related recommendations regarding fetal disability and conscientious objection.  
The most significant reform would be whether to adopt the gradualist approach to the 
value of the fetus and agree on an upper time limit when abortion is unlawful or 
subject to strict guidelines. As discussed in Chapter Five, to do so would bring 
Australia into line with countries like the United States of America and the United 
Kingdom. On the other hand though, it imposes an arbitrary value on the fetus that 
does not accord with the way third party assaults on the pregnant woman are 
perceived in the law, and may also not accord with evolving scientific knowledge or 
philosophical arguments about the fetus.  
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Requiring two doctors to be satisfied that there is proportionate justification for 
abortion and permitting conscientious objection without limitation would be the trade-
off for having no gestational age limitation. It permits a difference of moral and/or 
scientific opinion on the issue and does not dictate what the doctor must consider. 
This thesis takes the position that a militant, pro-abortion agenda that seeks to bind 
everyone to the view that the fetus is not a person and has no value, is not the 
answer to ‘good’ law, does not reflect a tolerant and respectful society, and does not 
acknowledge the variety of perspectives on personhood. Rather, it represents a 
tyranny that is unbecoming to the values this nation adheres to.  
In regards to conscientious objection and the obligation of doctors to refer patients on 
to others who will perform abortion, the position of this thesis is that the doctor who 
conscientiously objects should accept that the State has deemed that abortion can 
be lawful in certain circumstances and therefore s/he ought not to actively prevent a 
woman from accessing it. However likewise, the pregnant woman should accept that 
the doctor who is asked to perform an abortion can either refuse outright on the basis 
of conscience or refuse on the basis of a valid concern that in the particular 
circumstances the abortion is not justified (assuming the particular law permits this). 
The doctor should not be forced to participate nor should their non-participation 
become a disciplinary issue.  
This thesis concludes that the search for the truth about what the fetus is, what its 
value is, and why it is right, wrong or neutral to destroy it, cannot be found in the 
positive law with its commitment to the born alive rule. If our Australian legal system 
were to replace relativism with the natural law, then it would be highly doubtful that 
abortion laws and other laws legalising destruction of prenatal life would be lawful or 
at the very least would be much smaller in number with clear boundaries that would 
not change with the times or with technological advances. However as ethical 
relativism is fundamental in Australian society, where social practices expected by a 
section of the community involve the destruction of prenatal life, laws that reflect a 
strict moral position that the fetus is a human being and all human beings are 
persons, is very unlikely to be accepted by the community and hence by lawmakers.  
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